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From: Mok-Kong Shen on 8 Jun 2010 03:01
jmorton123 wrote:
> Do you want to enter one tuple at a time or an entire string of
> tuples?

One would ideally have all tuples in a file to be read by the stego
software. The file could be generated arbitrarily by the user by some
scheme, e.g. with a PRNG of his choice which depends on a message key.

M. K. Shen

From: Dave -Turner on 8 Jun 2010 12:25
The only word that springs to mind: amusing.


From: jmorton123 on 9 Jun 2010 01:38
I guess this is an inside joke: inside your own head because you have
given absolutely no reference as to what specifically you find amusing
and therefore given nothing to respond to.

There is one conclusion certain: you have nothing constructive to
offer.

JM

On Jun 8, 9:25 am, "Dave -Turner" <ad...(a)127.0.0.1> wrote:
> The only word that springs to mind: amusing.

From: jmorton123 on 9 Jun 2010 17:31
I think I underestimated you. No hard feelings, please.

You have a subtle sense of humor, yes?

Besides the back and forth with Mr. Shen, is there anything else you'd
like to comment on?

Thanks.

JM

On Jun 8, 9:25 am, "Dave -Turner" <ad...(a)127.0.0.1> wrote:
> The only word that springs to mind: amusing.

From: Twixer Xev on 9 Jun 2010 20:38
On 06/09/2010 02:31 PM, jmorton123 wrote:
> I think I underestimated you. No hard feelings, please.
>
> You have a subtle sense of humor, yes?
>
> Besides the back and forth with Mr. Shen, is there anything else you'd
> like to comment on?
>
> Thanks.
>
> JM
>
> On Jun 8, 9:25 am, "Dave -Turner"<ad...(a)127.0.0.1> wrote:
>> The only word that springs to mind: amusing.
>

You claim that your PRNG is "bulletproof" and is immune to all attacks
short of key exhaustion. Why should anyone accept such a claim at face
value?

Cryptographic algorithms (and the protocols that employ them) are not
worthy of being labeled secure until they are dissected, analyzed, and
discussed outside of the laboratory. If an algorithm undergoes such a
regimen and comes out with a measure of confidence that its security
rests solely in the key, then we have got something that is more than
just "amusing."

Otherwise, it makes no difference how large of a key-space we specify
for an algorithm. Most successful attacks on algorithms with large keys
have little to do with brute force; subtle flaws in the design lead to
attacks that take much less effort to mount. I suggest that you read up
on "security through obscurity." There are several articles on the web
that explain this concept.

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