From: Mok-Kong Shen on
Twixer Xev wrote:
> jmorton123 wrote:
>> [snip]
>
> You claim that your PRNG is "bulletproof" and is immune to all attacks
> short of key exhaustion. Why should anyone accept such a claim at face
> value?

I think also that of the freeware at the site involved the bitmap
stego program could be useful in practice, if it allows the user to
employ a PRNG of his "own" choice to determine the locations where
the LSB is modified to convey the stego bit. If the stego then turns
out to be poor, because the PRNG chosen by the user is poor, that
would be the user's "own" fault and not the responsibility of the
stego program. There are a few CSPRNGs, but all are rather inefficient
computationally, if I don't err.

M. K. Shen
From: jmorton123 on
I may have said essentially that but certainly by no means as
aggressively as you put it.

I base my position on the simplicity of the algorithm. I believe it
is essentially no more complicated than the tossing of dice except, to
use an analogy, three di with 3,628,800 sides each, in the simplest
proposition.

Furthermore, I do not take the outcome, to continue the analogy, of
the toss of the three dice. I then take the outcome and toss the
outcome again repeatedly, to use the same analogy, with dice having
over 87 billion sides each.

And the length of the key matters because the final outcome
essentially boils down to simple mathematical probability.

I discuss this in detail in the Grand Theory Help file.

I do agree that a thorough discussion of these matters needs to be
hashed out.

Is there something in particular in the Grand Theory Help file that
you have an issue with? It's only one page long, one legal sized page
long to be most accurate. That's all there is to read.

JM

On Jun 9, 5:38 pm, Twixer Xev <twixer_...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
> On 06/09/2010 02:31 PM, jmorton123 wrote:
>
> > I think I underestimated you.  No hard feelings, please.
>
> > You have a subtle sense of humor, yes?
>
> > Besides the back and forth with Mr. Shen, is there anything else you'd
> > like to comment on?
>
> > Thanks.
>
> > JM
>
> > On Jun 8, 9:25 am, "Dave -Turner"<ad...(a)127.0.0.1>  wrote:
> >> The only word that springs to mind: amusing.
>
> You claim that your PRNG is "bulletproof" and is immune to all attacks
> short of key exhaustion. Why should anyone accept such a claim at face
> value?
>
> Cryptographic algorithms (and the protocols that employ them) are not
> worthy of being labeled secure until they are dissected, analyzed, and
> discussed outside of the laboratory. If an algorithm undergoes such a
> regimen and comes out with a measure of confidence that its security
> rests solely in the key, then we have got something that is more than
> just "amusing."
>
> Otherwise, it makes no difference how large of a key-space we specify
> for an algorithm. Most successful attacks on algorithms with large keys
> have little to do with brute force; subtle flaws in the design lead to
> attacks that take much less effort to mount. I suggest that you read up
> on "security through obscurity." There are several articles on the web
> that explain this concept.
>
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