From: Tony Orlow on
MoeBlee wrote:
> On Apr 14, 7:08 pm, Tony Orlow <t...(a)lightlink.com> wrote:
>
>> Maybe I don't understand Robinson as well as I should, but it seems to
>> me the basis of his analysis was semantic, regarding statements that
>> would be considered true of *N if true of N. But, do go on...
>
> "But do go on..." Hey, smartass, YOU'RE the one who waves non-standard
> analysis like banner when you don't know ANYTIHNG about it.
>
> If you want to know anything about non-standard analysis, then you'd
> start by learning basic predicate calculus, set theory, and
> mathematical logic (personally, I'd recommend that order).
>
>>> The MAJOR point - the hypothetical nature of mathematical reasoning
>>> (think about the word 'if' twice in the poster's paragraph) and the
>>> inessentiality of what words we use to name mathematical objects and
>>> their properties.
>> I guess, by "inessentiality", you mean any attribute that one could
>> assign to any object... IF that's what you mean, or not....
>
> No, smartass, months ago, several times, I explained in detail to you,
> and with respect to the technicalities, what I mean.
>
>>> I've been trying to get you to understand that for about two years
>>> now.
>> Perhaps what you mean is exactly what I am trying to get across to
>> Lester. If the truth table is the same, then it's the same logical
>> function. It doesn't matter what the parameters are, it always works the
>> same way. The pattern defines the relationship.
>
> That's getting closer. I won't quibble with it. But I'll just say that
> in mathematical logic we have even more precise ways of saying it.
>
>> On the subject of ifs, "if this then that" means logical implication, or
>> causality, and sometimes it's hard to tell which is meant, or if they're
>> being confused. Is that what you "mean"?
>
> No.
>
>>>> I don't take transfinite cardinality to mean
>>>> "size". You say I missed the point. You didn't intersect the line.
>>> You just did it AGAIN. We and the poster to whom you responded KNOW
>>> that you don't take cardinality as capturing your notion of size. The
>>> point is then just for your to recognize that IF by 'size' we mean
>>> cardinality, then certain sentences follow and certain sentences don't
>>> follow and that what is important is not whether we use 'size' or
>>> 'cardinality' or whatever word but rather the mathematical relations
>>> that are studied even if we were to use the words 'schmize' or
>>> 'shmardinal' or whatever.
>
> THAT, to which you did not respond, is, at least at this informal
> level of discussion with you, good enough for a start as to what I
> mean.
>
> MoeBlee
>

Why would I respond to that kind of abuse? If I am a smartass, well,
I've got more smarts than you have in your little finger. (Did that come
out right?) ;)

TOEKnee
From: Alan Smaill on
Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> writes:

> Alan Smaill wrote:
>> Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net> writes:
>>
>>> On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 21:34:09 +0100, Alan Smaill
>>> <smaill(a)SPAMinf.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear me ... L'Hospital's rule is invalid.
>>>>> So returning to the original point, would you care to explain your
>>>>> claim that L'Hospital's rule is invalid?
>>>> haha!
>>> Why am I not surprized? Remarkable how many mathematiker opinions on
>>> the subject of mathematics don't quite hold up to critical scrutiny.
>> knew you wouldn't get it,
>> irony is not a strong point with Ziko.
>> nor indeed do you bother defending your own view that you can use
>> Hospital to work out the value for 0/0.
>> well, there you go.
>>
>>> ~v~~
>>
>
> In all fairness to Lester, I am the one who said 0 for 0 is
> 100%. T'was a joke,

of course!

> ala L'Hospital's theft from the Bernoullis, and
> the division by 0 proscription.
>
> :)

and Zick was the one who claimed that he would use l'Hospital to work
out the right answer for 0/0.

such a japester, eh?

>
> Tony

--
Alan Smaill
From: MoeBlee on
On Apr 17, 10:58 am, Tony Orlow <t...(a)lightlink.com> wrote:

> Any false statement implies any statement, true or false,
> as long as you're not an intuitionist.

For intuitionists too.

f |- P

holds for intuitionistic logic.

MoeBlee



From: Virgil on
In article <4624fa54(a)news2.lightlink.com>,
Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> wrote:

> cbrown(a)cbrownsystems.com wrote:

> > To me, that "looks" more like a fish net or a giant diamond than a
> > tree.
> >
> > At any rate, my question was: what is recursive about that definition?
> >
>
> May I restate the definition, for the purposes of this elucidation?
>
> 1. E S e P(S)
> 2. A X e P(S) A x e X E Y e P(S) | A y e X (x<>y -> y e Y)
>
>
> Does this not recursively define a tree of subsets of P(S)?
>
> You may consider S to be the maximal element of P(S).

What definition of "tree are you using, TO?

One definition of a tree would be a set of objects, say S, such that
(1) there is a unique object, r, in S called the root
(2) there is a function P from S\{r} to S (called the parent function)
such that, under iteration, every s in S has r as an ancestor.
i.e., if we denote P^1(x) = P(x) and P^(n+1)(x) = P(P^n(x)),
inductively, then for each s in S\{r} there is a unique n in N
such that P^n(x) = r


> > In what way does the assertion:
> >
> > For all positive real numbers r, there exists a natural number n such
> > that n*r > 1?
> >
> > apply to definition above, which is about sets of naturals, and never
> > mentions real numbers at all?
> >
>
> "Given any Real number c, there exists a natural number n such that n >
> c". If all naturals are reals, then this may be restated as "A neN E meN
> | m>n". Sound a little Peanoesque to you?

Not at all. It is clearly Archimedean, preceding Peano by millennia.
>
> >>
> >>>> In that sense, there is
> >>>> no pure infinite set without some defining structure, so whatever
> >>>> conclusions one thinks they have come to regarding infinite sets without
> >>>> structure have no basis for comparison. Powerset(S) is 2^|S| sets, no
> >>>> matter the size of S. That is a specific case of N=S^L, which applies to
> >>>> symbolic strings and alphabets, as well as power sets where elements can
> >>>> have S different levels of truth, not just 2. There are 3^log2(n) as
> >>>> many ternary strings of length n as there are binary strings of length
> >>>> n, be n finite or infinite. But, that involves a discussion of
> >>>> structure.
> >>>>>>>> Anyway, my point is that the recursive nature of the definition of
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> "set"
> >>>>>>> What recursive definition of what set?
> >>>>>> Oh c'mon! N. ala Peano? (sigh) What kind of question is that?
> >>>>> Does TO seem to thing that N is the only set defineable recursively or
> >>>>> that "successor" is the only recursively defineable operations on sets?
> >>>> Does Virgil forget what he cuts from the post? What do you think we were
> >>>> discussing? I thought it was N specifically.
> >>> I thought it had something to do with the real line, and orderings.
> >> Points and lines, anyway. And points on R in N.
> >
> > On R, and yet in N? I don't understand what you mean.
> >
>
> On the real line R, in the subset of real points called N.
>
> >> Or, whatever.
> >
> > Indeed.
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>>>>>>> Order is defined by x<y ^ y<z -> x<z.
> >>>>>>> Transitivity is one of the properties of most of the orderings we're
> >>>>>>> talking about. But transitivity is not the only property that defines
> >>>>>>> such things as 'partial order', 'linear order', 'well order'.
> >>>>>> It defines order, in general.
> >>>>> Only to TO. For everyone else, other properties are required.
> >>>>> For example, in addition to transitivity,
> >>>>> ((x>y) and (y>x)) -> x = y
> >>>>> is a necessary property /every/ ordering.
> >>>> Um, that one is blatantly self-contradictory. x>y -> not y>x, always.
> >>> I don't see how this follows only from your assertion "x < y and y < z
> >>> -> x < z". You stated:
> >>>>>>>> Order is defined by x<y ^ y<z -> x<z.
> >>> Or do you mean that there is /more/ to the definition of an order "<"
> >>> than "x < y and y < z -> x < z"? If so, that was exactly Virgil's
> >>> point.
> >> Actually I corrected this response to Virgil. I misspoke a little, but
> >> he's still wrong. :)
> >>
> >>>> suppose you meant:
> >>>> ((x>=y) and (y>=x)) -> x = y
> >>>> or:
> >>>> (~(x>y) and ~(y>x)) -> x = y
> >>> These two statements are not equivalent. In some situations, the first
> >>> can hold, while the second does not.
> >> Please do elaborate.
> >>
> >
> > See the example I posted below regarding subsets of {a,b,c}.
> >
> >>>> Yes, if neither x<y or y<x is true, that is, if no order can be
> >>>> determined, then x=y for the purposes of that order.
> >>> Let's order the subsets of {a,b,c} by inclusion. Then: {a,b} <
> >>> {a,b,c}. {a,c} < {a,b,c}. {a} < {a,b}. {a} < {a,c}. But not ({a,b} <
> >>> {a,c}); and not ({a,c} < {a,b}). Does that mean that {a,b} = {a,c}
> >>> "for the purposes of that order"?
> >> Where b<c, {a,b}<{a,c}.
> >
> > Since "<" indicates subset inclusion, it is the case that not b < c.
> >
>
> If a, b and c are members of a set such that xeS ^ yeS -> x<y v y<x v
> x=y, then either b<c v b<c v b=c.

As stated, it is possible that b<c ^ b<c ^ b=c, unless TO intends,
contrary to standard notation, to have "v" to represent "xor".
> >
>
> Consider that all elements of N, x and y, are such that not(equal(x,y))
> -> x<y v y<x.

Does TO intend "v" to mean "xor" ?
From: Virgil on
In article <4624ff57(a)news2.lightlink.com>,
Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> wrote:

> Mike Kelly wrote:

> > And what does AC have to do with cardinality?
>
> What do any of the axioms of ZFC have to do with cardinality?
> Extensionality.

Which of those axioms, or combination of axioms, is extensionally
equivalent to cardinality?