From: Lester Zick on
On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 09:27:05 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com>
wrote:

>> And here the matter has rested for mathematics and science in general
>> ever since. Empiricism benefitted from perceptual appearances of truth
>> in their experimental results but the moment empirics went beyond them
>> to explain results in terms of one another they were hoist with the
>> Aristotelian petard of being unable to demonstrate what was actually
>> true and what not. The most mathematicians and scientists were able to
>> say at the post perceptual conceptual level was that "If A then B then
>> C . . ." etc. or "If our axiomatic assumptions of truth actually prove
>> to be true then our theorems, inferences, and so forth are true". But
>> there could never be any guarantee that in itself was true.

>Well, if the axiom systems we develop produce the results we expect
>mathematically, then we can be satisfied with them as starting
>assumptions upon which to build. My issue with transfinite set theory is
>that it produces a notion of infinite "size" which I find
>unsatisfactory. I accept that bijection alone can define equivalence
>classes of sets, but I do not accept that this is anything like an
>infinite "number". So, that's why I question the axioms of set theory.
>Of course, one cannot do "experiments" on infinite set sizes. In math,
>one can only judge the results based on intuition.

I was discussing Aristotelian syllogistic inference and truisms here,
Tony. So I don't know why you're talking transfinite sets and so on.

~v~~
From: Lester Zick on
On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 09:27:05 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com>
wrote:

>>> If I say 3x+3=3(x+1) is that true?
>>> Yes, it's true for all x.
>>
>> How about for x=3/0?
>>
>
>Division by pure 0 is proscribed because it produces an unmeasurable oo.
>If x is any specific real, or hyperreal, or infinitesimal, then that
>statement is true for all x. 3/0 is not a specific number.

In other words the statement isn't true for all x.

~v~~
From: Lester Zick on
On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 09:27:05 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com>
wrote:

>>> If I say a=not b, is that true? Not if a and b
>>> are both true.
>>
>> How do you arrive at that assumption, Tony? If a and b are both true
>> of the same thing they can still be different from each other.
>
>You are confusing logical "not" with non-identity. "a=not(b)" means that
>if b is true, a is false, and vice versa. You are talking about
>"not(a=b)", which means simply that there is some difference between a
>and b, but not that there is a contradiction between the two.
>
>If I say, "A woman cannot be an engineer", then
>woman(x)=not(engineer(x)) and engineer(x)=not(woman(x)). If there IS a
>woman who is an engineer, then woman(x) and engineer(x), and
>"engineer(x)=not(woman(x))" is false.
>
>If I say, "A woman is not an engineer", that does not have any bearing
>on whether the same being cannot at both times be a woman and an
>engineer. That's not a matter of logical contradiction, but of some set
>of distinctions between the two classes of objects.

No clue as to what you're talking about here.

~v~~
From: Lester Zick on
On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 09:27:05 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com>
wrote:

>>> If I say a or not a, that's true for all a. a and b are
>>> variables, which may each assume the value true or false.
>>
>> Except you don't assign them the value true or false; you assign them
>> the value 1 or 0 and don't bother to demonstrate the "truth" of either
>> 1 or 0.
>>
>
>1 is true, 0 is false. If a is 0 or 1, then we have "0 or 1", or "1 or
>0", respectively. Since or(a,b) is true whenever a is true or b is true,
>or both, or(1,0) and or(0,1), the only possible values for the
>statement, are both true. So, or(a,not(a)) is always true, in boolean
>logic, or probability.
>
>Intuitively, if a is a subset of the universe, and not(a) is everything
>else, then the sum of a and not(a) is very simply the universe, which is
>true.

Yeah but you still haven't proven that 1 is true and 0 false or what
either of these terms has to mean in mechanically exhaustive terms.

~v~~
From: Lester Zick on
On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 09:27:05 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com>
wrote:

>>> If you want to talk about the truth values of individual facts used in
>>> deduction, by all means, go for it.
>>
>> I don't; I never did. All I ever asked was how people who assume the
>> truth of their assumptions compute the truth value of the assumptions.
>>
>> ~v~~
>
>By measuring the logical implications of their assumptions.

Or perhaps by measuring the truth of their assumptions instead.

~v~~