From: Lester Zick on
On Sat, 01 Dec 2007 20:28:04 +0100, G. Frege <nomail(a)invalid> wrote:

>On Sat, 01 Dec 2007 12:19:32 -0700, Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net>
>wrote:
>
>>>
>>> "Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never
>>> know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying
>>> is true."
>>>
>>> (Bertrand Russell)
>>
>> Is that true?
>>
>I don't know. But imho it's at least _reasonable_.

"Reasonable"? That we never know what we're talking about? Nor whether
what we're saying is true? Sounds reasonable to philosophers I expect.
What is it you're paid to do anyway? Expostulate on stuff you don't
know what you're talking about that you don't know is true? Probably
why Nature abhors philosophers.

~v~~
From: Lester Zick on
On Sat, 01 Dec 2007 20:30:56 +0100, G. Frege <nomail(a)invalid> wrote:

>On Sat, 01 Dec 2007 12:20:22 -0700, Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net>
>wrote:
>
>>>>
>>>> The collection of postulates do not have to be (jointly) true. They only
>>>> have to be consistent.
>>>>
>>> On the other hand, _if_ they are consistent, then a model for that
>>> theory [assuming we are talking about first-order theories] exists; i.e.
>>> an interpretation that makes all axioms (and hence all theorems) true.
>>> With other words, there might exist a "world" (in the "modal" sense of
>>> the word) where all those axioms (and theorems) actually are true.
>>>
>> So square circles are true after all?
>>
>Huh? Show me a _consistent_ theory of Euclidean Geometry where you can
>prove the existence of square circles. :-)

Oh, so you're only talking about Euclidean geometry? Funny, from your
words "all axioms (and theorems) are actually true" I might just have
concluded something besides Euclidean geometry. Silly me. But then I
obviously don't know what I'm talking about whereas you do.

~v~~
From: Lester Zick on
On Sat, 01 Dec 2007 20:33:04 GMT, "Nam D. Nguyen"
<namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca> wrote:

>G. Frege wrote:
>> On Sat, 01 Dec 2007 13:15:11 -0500, "Robert J. Kolker"
>> <bobkolker(a)comcast.net> wrote:
>>
>>> The collection of postulates do not have to be (jointly) true. They only
>>> have to be consistent.
>>>
>> On the other hand, _if_ they are consistent, then a model for that
>> theory [assuming we are talking about first-order theories] exists; i.e.
>> an interpretation that makes all axioms (and hence all theorems) true.
>
>> With other words, there might exist a "world" (in the "modal" sense of
>> the word) where all those axioms (and theorems) actually are true.
>
>How would "there _might_ exist" and "_actually_ are true" rhyme together?

Don't ask, don't tell.

~v~~
From: G. Frege on
On Sat, 01 Dec 2007 15:03:54 -0700, Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net>
wrote:

>>>>>
>>>>> The collection of postulates do not have to be (jointly) true. They only
>>>>> have to be consistent.
>>>>>
>>> On the other hand, _if_ they are consistent, then a model for that
>>> theory [assuming we are talking about first-order theories] exists;
>>> i.e. an interpretation that makes all axioms (and hence all theorems)
>>>
of this theory [of course, *sigh*]
>>>
>>> true. With other words, there might exist a "world" (in the "modal"
>>> sense of the word) where all those axioms (and theorems) actually
>>> are true. ^^^^^
>>
>> So square circles are true after all?
>>
Note that geometrical OBJECTS can't be true or false. Only proposition
and/or statements (sentences) can be true or false. So I take your
question to mean

So the claim that there are square circles is true after all?

>>
>> Huh? Show me a _consistent_ theory of Euclidean Geometry where you can
>> prove the existence of square circles. :-)
>>
Which actually means: ...where a statement stating the existence of a
square circle can be proved.

>
> Oh, so you're only talking about Euclidean geometry?
>
Right. Since concerning Euclidean Geometry I know for sure that we can
disprove the existence of square circles. (So if Euclidean Geometry is
consistent, we _can't_ prove the existence of square circles in it.
Moreover then there is a interpretation of this theory which makes the
statement/theorem that there isn't a square circle true.)

>
> Funny, from your words "all axioms (and theorems)
>
of the theory in question
>
> are actually true"
>
Are you on drugs, or what?


F.

--

E-mail: info<at>simple-line<dot>de
From: G. Frege on
On Sat, 01 Dec 2007 23:31:42 +0100, G. Frege <nomail(a)invalid> wrote:

>>>>>
>>>>> On the other hand, _if_ they are consistent, then a model for that
>>>>> theory [assuming we are talking about first-order theories] exists;
>>>>> i.e. an interpretation that makes all axioms (and hence all theorems)
>>>>>
of this theory
>>>>>
>>>>> true. With other words, there might exist a "world" (in the "modal"
>>>>> sense of the word) where all those axioms (and theorems) actually
>>>>> are true.
>>>>>
>>>> So square circles are true after all?
>>>>
>>> Huh? Show me a _consistent_ theory of Euclidean Geometry where you can
>>> prove the existence of square circles. :-)
>>>
>> Oh, so you're only talking about Euclidean geometry?
>>
Actually, _any_ theory would do where we can prove that the assumption
that an object is a square and also a circle leads to a contradiction.


*sigh*


F.

--

E-mail: info<at>simple-line<dot>de