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From: Timo A. Nieminen on 17 Sep 2006 16:11 On Thu, 14 Sep 2006, mmeron(a)cars3.uchicago.edu wrote: > Clausevitz, who is still one of the greatest authorities on war ever, > wrote that, for a commander, deciding what course of action to take is > not especially difficult. What is difficult is to "make it happen" in > the face of what he called "the inevitable friction", i.e. people > being lazy, having different agendas, quarreling etc. Given perfect (or at least, good enough) information, and certainty (or close to certainty) in outcome of events, decisions are easy. Clausewitzian friction is not just about the difficulty in making things happen in terms of people being lazy, having different agendas etc; it includes the other difficulties: messengers getting lost, your artillery taking the wrong turn in the dark, discovering that a river isn't fordable so you need to build a bridge. All of the things that can and will go wrong and make things take longer than expected. I read an account of a US training exercise. Not in contact with the enemy, just move from point A to point B. At night. With a strict time limit, since they had to move to the other side of a pass before the pass was scheduled to be blocked by a nuclear demolition charge (for the purposed of the exercise). I think the 50% or so of the force that was still on the wrong side of the pass when the detonation of the nuclear demolition charge was simulated must have had some serious thoughts about efficiency. This kind of friction is widespread (eg, I tell completing PhD students that the last month takes 3), but has a larger impact in war, when time matters. The Sun-Tzu/Book of 5 Rings inspired business-people might want to claim that they suffer from the same thing (do they bother to read Clausewitz - his/her book is much longer than them?), but the business world is simply not that competitive - the ideal business deal benefits both parties, something that can rarely be said about warfare. My impression (though it's some time since I opened the covers of "On War") is that Clausewitz was also very aware of the effect of "friction" on intelligence - you never know enough, and don't have time to know enough, and must decide on the basis of inadequate information. The info-lack still brings prospective commanders to stress-induced disaster in map-room exercises, even when there is nothing at stake except some careers. > So, when this > is so within the rigid and authoritarian structure of the military > (Clausevitz was writing from his experiences in the Prussian Army, it > doesn't get much more authoritarian than that), imagine how much more > complex it is within the framework of an open society. Why, yes, of course. But often enough, in the framework of an open society, not as much depends on "getting there firstest with the mostest" (although a "societal Darwinist" might argue the point, that one must crush the opposing societies swiftly and ruthlessly, by the time you mobilise to do that, then you're fighting total war already, and well within the Clausewitzian realm, and out of open society). -- Timo Nieminen - Home page: http://www.physics.uq.edu.au/people/nieminen/ E-prints: http://eprint.uq.edu.au/view/person/Nieminen,_Timo_A..html Shrine to Spirits: http://www.users.bigpond.com/timo_nieminen/spirits.html
From: mmeron on 17 Sep 2006 16:43
In article <Pine.WNT.4.64.0609180541200.864(a)serene.st>, "Timo A. Nieminen" <timo(a)physics.uq.edu.au> writes: >On Thu, 14 Sep 2006, mmeron(a)cars3.uchicago.edu wrote: > >> Clausevitz, who is still one of the greatest authorities on war ever, >> wrote that, for a commander, deciding what course of action to take is >> not especially difficult. What is difficult is to "make it happen" in >> the face of what he called "the inevitable friction", i.e. people >> being lazy, having different agendas, quarreling etc. > >Given perfect (or at least, good enough) information, and certainty (or >close to certainty) in outcome of events, decisions are easy. >Clausewitzian friction is not just about the difficulty in making things >happen in terms of people being lazy, having different agendas etc; it >includes the other difficulties: messengers getting lost, your artillery >taking the wrong turn in the dark, discovering that a river isn't fordable >so you need to build a bridge. All of the things that can and will go >wrong and make things take longer than expected. Yep, yep. >I read an account of a US >training exercise. Not in contact with the enemy, just move from point A >to point B. At night. With a strict time limit, since they had to move to >the other side of a pass before the pass was scheduled to be blocked by a >nuclear demolition charge (for the purposed of the exercise). I think the >50% or so of the force that was still on the wrong side of the pass when >the detonation of the nuclear demolition charge was simulated must have >had some serious thoughts about efficiency. > Sure. Though I would phrase it as "thoughts about the achievable effici3ency, as opposed to desireable". >This kind of friction is widespread (eg, I tell completing PhD students >that the last month takes 3), In the best case:-) but has a larger impact in war, when time >matters. The Sun-Tzu/Book of 5 Rings inspired business-people might want >to claim that they suffer from the same thing (do they bother to read >Clausewitz - his/her book is much longer than them?) I doubt they do. I encountered lots of people using a quote or two from Clausewitz, but very, very few that actually did read him. > but the business >world is simply not that competitive - the ideal business deal benefits >both parties, something that can rarely be said about warfare. > Yes, an essential difference. >My impression (though it's some time since I opened the covers of "On >War") is that Clausewitz was also very aware of the effect of "friction" >on intelligence - you never know enough, and don't have time to know >enough, and must decide on the basis of inadequate information. The >info-lack still brings prospective commanders to stress-induced disaster >in map-room exercises, even when there is nothing at stake except some >careers. Aha. People of little understanding tend to velieve that "you should just collect all pertaining information, then make a decision", not understanding that, as a rule, by the time all pertaining information is available, it is way too late for any decisions. Somewhat tangentially, a friend of mine, an MD, uses to say that "in medicine, certainty is only achievable during the autopsy". > >> So, when this >> is so within the rigid and authoritarian structure of the military >> (Clausevitz was writing from his experiences in the Prussian Army, it >> doesn't get much more authoritarian than that), imagine how much more >> complex it is within the framework of an open society. > >Why, yes, of course. But often enough, in the framework of an open >society, not as much depends on "getting there firstest with the mostest" >(although a "societal Darwinist" might argue the point, that one must >crush the opposing societies swiftly and ruthlessly, by the time you >mobilise to do that, then you're fighting total war already, and well >within the Clausewitzian realm, and out of open society). > Yes, good point. Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool, meron(a)cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same" |