What is truth?
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From: Frederick Williams on 6 May 2010 14:15 Peter Olcott wrote: > > "rods" <rodpinto(a)gmail.com> wrote in message > news:fb58bae7-2920-4b25-9887-0e4a5340b9bb(a)u31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com... > > there is no such thing as a empirical truth. > > > > Rodrigo > > You dip your hand in water, it feels wet, later on you > remember feeling that your hand was wet, thus providing a > single counter-example refuting your claim that empirical > truth does not exist. The problem is: how does one classify truths as being empirical or logical? It is a matter of arbitrary convention. -- I can't go on, I'll go on.
From: rods on 6 May 2010 14:31 On 6 maio, 15:15, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net> wrote: > Peter Olcott wrote: > > > "rods" <rodpi...(a)gmail.com> wrote in message > >news:fb58bae7-2920-4b25-9887-0e4a5340b9bb(a)u31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com.... > > > there is no such thing as a empirical truth. > > > > Rodrigo > > > You dip your hand in water, it feels wet, later on you > > remember feeling that your hand was wet, thus providing a > > single counter-example refuting your claim that empirical > > truth does not exist. > > The problem is: how does one classify truths as being empirical or > logical? It is a matter of arbitrary convention. Yes, that's the problem. What I was saying in my other posts about Tarski approach to this subject is to consider a purely semantical truth. I think is makes the subject much simpler. But it is for sure not the only possibility. Rodrigo
From: master1729 on 6 May 2010 13:33 adrian ferent wrote : > I and Darwin: > Darwin studied the Evolution on animals. > I studied the Evolution on people and here are the > results(my books): > 98% of population is at animal level; only 1 in 1300 > people have a connection with God... if that 1 in 1300 people with a connection to god are child abusing people or people like musatov , its not a good argument. :)
From: Peter Olcott on 6 May 2010 23:55 "Frederick Williams" <frederick.williams2(a)tesco.net> wrote in message news:4BE3072C.E5964BCF(a)tesco.net... > Peter Olcott wrote: >> >> "rods" <rodpinto(a)gmail.com> wrote in message >> news:fb58bae7-2920-4b25-9887-0e4a5340b9bb(a)u31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com... > >> > there is no such thing as a empirical truth. >> > >> > Rodrigo >> >> You dip your hand in water, it feels wet, later on you >> remember feeling that your hand was wet, thus providing a >> single counter-example refuting your claim that empirical >> truth does not exist. > > The problem is: how does one classify truths as being > empirical or > logical? It is a matter of arbitrary convention. > > -- > I can't go on, I'll go on. Empirical truth is the direct first-hand memory of sensory experience, close your eyes and picture a red rose. Conceptual truth (of which logic is a part) must be represented in the mind using language. You can't close your eyes and picture the concept of square root.
From: David Bernier on 7 May 2010 02:13
rods wrote: > On 6 maio, 08:27, rods<rodpi...(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> On 23 abr, 18:20, Aatu Koskensilta<aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote: >> >>> rods<rodpi...(a)gmail.com> writes: >>>> Just to make it clear what I wanted to say. >>>> I think that there is no such thing as a empirical truth. >>>> I would call such a empirical truth as a tautology, in the end we are >>>> always comparing things like 1=1. And this is a tautology. >> >>> I'm afraid this isn't very clear at all. Putting that to one side, >>> perhaps you could explain what these odd proclamations have to do with >>> the incompleteness theorem? >> >> Fromhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#S... >> >> For any formal effectively generated theory T including basic >> arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability, >> T includes a statement of its own consistency if and only if T is >> inconsistent. >> >> So let's say a theory is consistent. I would prefer to use the word >> model instead of theory. >> Let's say a model is consistent. And let's say in this model we have >> something called "empirical truth". My model cannot include a >> "statement of its own consistency" because if it does so I can use >> Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem to show that model is >> inconsistent. >> The way Tarski deals with this is to use a semantical approach. So >> instead of saying that there is an "experimental truth" that would >> lead to an inconsistent model we can just use "Truth". And it is not >> required to have a "statement of its own consistency" >> to prove that my "defined" is really "truth". > > I meant "And it is not required to have a "statement of its own > consistency" > to prove that my "truth" (or my "defined truth") is really "truth"." Either truth is pi in the sky, or else it isn't pi in the sky. |