From: WM on
On 16 Jun., 14:19, "J. Clarke" <jclarke.use...(a)cox.net> wrote:
> On 6/15/2010 4:33 PM, WM wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 15 Jun., 21:38, stevendaryl3...(a)yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
> >> WM says...
>
> >>> On 15 Jun., 18:53, stevendaryl3...(a)yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
> >>>> For example, we can define a real r as follows:
>
> >>>> r = sum from n=0 to infinity of H(n) 2^{-n}
>
> >>>> where H(n) = 1 if Turing machine number n halts on input n,
> >>>> H(n) = 0 otherwise.
>
> >>>> That's definable, but it is not computable.
>
> >>> Anyhow it is not a definition.
>
> >> It certainly is. It uniquely characterizes a real number,
> >> so it's a definition.
>
> > It does not. If it would, the number could be computed.
> > Who defines what Turing machine number n would do?
>
> Can you say "circular argument"?  It's not a number because it's not
> computable and that proves that all numbers are computable.-

To be computable can be use as a *definition* of number.
What is a natural number that cannot be counted or used for counting?
What is a name that cannot be named?
(A stone remains a stone, even if nobody names or knows it, but a
thought that remains unthought forever is not a thought.)
A real number could also be called a computable entity.
Then we would earlier have recognized the charlatanism implicit in
uncomputable or undefinable real "numbers".
Cantor himself did not share that idea. He was convinced that the
number of definition is not countable. Otherwise he was too much
inclined to real mathematics to have upheld the claim of an
uncountable set of reals.

Regards, WM
From: WM on
On 16 Jun., 14:05, "J. Clarke" <jclarke.use...(a)cox.net> wrote:
> On 6/15/2010 11:59 AM, Aatu Koskensilta wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > WM<mueck...(a)rz.fh-augsburg.de>  writes:
>
> >> We should not use oracles in mathematics.
>
> > Nonsense. Using orcales we can show for example that the P = NP problem
> > can't be solved using any technique that relativizes. This is a useful
> > result.
>
> >> A real is computable or not. My list contains all computable numbers:
>
> >> 0
> >> 1
> >> 00
> >> ...
>
> > Your list doesn't appear to contain any real at all, just finite binary
> > sequences.
>
> Did someone redefine the real numbers to exclude all numbers that
> consist only of the digits 0 and 1?

All definable real numbers and all their possible representations are
contained in that list. This list is a list of everything. The
alphabets and the languages and the dictionaries are given in later
lines. It is very probable that every line has many different meaning,
but no line has uncounatbly many meanings. Therefore the list contains
only countably many finite definitions. And obviously the list cannot
be diagonalized - like every meaningful list of meaningfuls words.

Regards, WM
From: MoeBlee on
On Jun 15, 10:37 pm, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> Virgil <Vir...(a)home.esc> writes:
> > But until you can determine which of those 10 cases, how can you
> > compute the number?
>
> You can't. The number is computable nonetheless, in the sense that there
> exists an effective procedure for churning out its decimal expansion.
>
> As noted, computability is a purely extensional notion. Recall the
> classical recursion theory exercise, which we find, in some form or
> other, in pretty much any text on the subject:
>
>  Let f : N --> N be a function such that
>
>    f(x) = 0 if Goldbach's conjecture is true, and 1 otherwise.
>
>  Is f computable?

Hey, even I, a pathetic tyro, knows that one (I think)!

If GC is true, then f is the constant function whose value is always 0
If GC is false, then f is the constant function whose value is always
1.

So, in either case, f is recursive.

I'm ready for my PhD!

MoeBlee

From: Aatu Koskensilta on
WM <mueckenh(a)rz.fh-augsburg.de> writes:

> It is very probable that every line has many different meaning, but no
> line has uncounatbly many meanings.

Every line has an indefinite and indeterminate number of possible
meanings. It makes no sense to speak of the cardinality of the totality
of all possible meanings of a string of symbols.

> Therefore the list contains only countably many finite definitions.

The list contains just random, meaningless strings. Whenever we instill,
with mathematical precision, these strings with some definite meaning,
so that they become definitions of reals, we find there are definitions
not included in the list. There is an absolute notion of computability
in logic. There is no absolute notion of definability.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: MoeBlee on
On Jun 16, 12:34 am, Virgil <Vir...(a)home.esc> wrote:
> In article <874oh3ir6m....(a)dialatheia.truth.invalid>,
>  Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:

> >  Let f : N --> N be a function such that
>
> >    f(x) = 0 if Goldbach's conjecture is true, and 1 otherwise.
>
> >  Is f computable?
>
> Not yet!

There exists an algorithm to compute f. We don't know what the
algorithm is (we don't know whether it is to set f(x) = 0 for all x,
or to set f(x) = 1 for all x), but still the algorithm exists - either
the algorithm is to set f(x) = 0 for all x, or the algorithm is to set
f(x) = 1 for all x..

In ordinary study of computability, that is what it means to say that
a funciton is computable - that there exists an algorithm to compute
it.

If you wish to include also that the algorithm is KNOWN (known to
whom? and known when?) then you need to find some treatment that
supports that notion or invent your own.

But then would you say that each function becomes computable only
historically as certain people, through history, figured out
algorithms for various functions? So whether a function is computable
is relative to what certain people know at certain times (and even as
some people know at a certain time but other people don't)?

MoeBlee