From: MoeBlee on
On Jun 16, 11:46 am, WM <mueck...(a)rz.fh-augsburg.de> wrote:
> On 16 Jun., 18:07, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:

> > it's not
> > uncommon for people to mistakenly think, in a classical context, that
> > countable sets come equipped with a designated bijection witnessing
> > their countability.
>
> The proof of countability of S does not require a bijection of S with
> N but only an injection of some superset of S into N.

He didn't say "bijection with N" (I take it by N you mean the set of
natural numbers or perhaps the set of positive natural numbers).

But, every countable set does have a bijection with N or has a
bijection with some member of w (the set of natural numbers). Aatu's
point here is that in classical mathematics the definition of 'x is
countable' is 'there exists a bijection from x onto the set of natural
numbers or onto a natural number', and that definition does not
include a clause that we (me, you, whoever) KNOW of a particular
bijection that we can specifically mention or define.

MoeBlee

From: WM on
On 15 Jun., 21:11, "Mike Terry"
<news.dead.person.sto...(a)darjeeling.plus.com> wrote:


> 1) What you write is sloppy (mathematically) and so it's not
> clear what you intend to say with your individual statements.

But actually everybody can easily imagine what is meant. You prove it
for your person below.

>
> > Consider the list of increasing lengths of finite prefixes of pi
>
> > 3
> > 31
> > 314
> > 3141
> > ....
>
> > Everyone agrees that:
> > this list contains every digit of pi (1)
>
> Literally this just doesn't make sense.

Obviously he means that this list contains every digit of pi with the
correct index enumerating its position. In discussions like the
present one it is not usual to state everything explicitly that can be
understood by an experienced reader.


Perhaps you mean to say:
>
> this list contains every finite prefix of the infinite
> digit sequence for pi (1)?
>
> I would agree with that...
>
> (What you actually said is gibberish because the list is not a list of
> digits. If we try to treat it as such, then the only digit in the list is
> 3).

A list of people can contain and usually does contain letters.
Thiks list is not a set in orthodox set theory.

>
> [My suspicion at this point is that your gibberish wording is actually the
> *key* in some way to how you want to introduce some incorrect conclusion,
> but time will tell on that. If I'm right, you won't like my clarification,
> because it will make it harder for you to express your mistake...]

This suspicion is wrong.

Every initial segment of the decimal expansion of pi is in at least
one line of your list
3.
3.1
3.14
3.141
....
What we can find in the diagonal, namely 3.141 and so on, exactly that
can be found in one line. This is obvious by construction of the
list.


>
> Same again :) This is harder to guess what you're trying to say though...

So consider this:

Every part of the diagonal is in at least one line. That means, every
part is in one single line, or there are parts that are in different
lines but not in one and the same.

The latter proposition can be excluded. If there are more than one
lines that contain parts of pi, then it can be proved, be induction,
that two of them contain the same as one of them. This can be extended
to three lines and four lines and so on for every initial segment of n
lines.

Hence we prove that all of pi, that is contained in at least one of
the finite lines of this list, is contained in one single line.

Conclusion: Either the complete diagonal pi does not exist, or it
exists also in one and the same single line (because every line that
can contain a digit sequence, is a finite line). As the latter is
wrong, so is the former. There does not exist an actually infinite
sequence. Actually infinite mean finished infinite. That is nonsense.

(The proof has the same status as Cantor's diagonal proof. Also his
proof is valid only for all finite n. In a similar way we find above:
For all finite n: All of pi that is in the list up to line n, is in a
single line of the list.)

>
> There is no unique list of computable reals - however, people would agree
> that the computable reals are countable, and so can certainly be enumerated.
> Perhaps the actual list doesn't matter and we should just choose one?

Choose this one for example:

The proof of countability of S does not require a bijection of S with
N but only an injection of some superset of S into N.

This is established by my list


0
1
00
01
....


where every line may be enumerated by an element of the countable set
omega^omega^omega (and, if required, finitely many more exponents for
alphabets, languages, dictionaries, thesauruses, and further
properties)

An obvious enumeration of the lines is 1, 2, 3, ... where every line n
can have many sub-enumerations

n
n.1.a
n.11.a
n.111.a
....

where every section of 1's and a's contains enuogh symbols to
enumerate every single line as often as required to cover all its
meanings in all possible languages. If necessary we can add 2's and
b's and so on and remain in the countable domain.
>
>
> Also, now your talking about reals rather than digit sequences. These are
> distinct objects, but there are obvious correspondences.

In particular users of Cantor-lists do intermingle them. Digit
sequences do not converge at all. Therefore infinite digit sequences
cannot be used to express something meaningful.

Regards, WM
From: WM on
On 16 Jun., 19:45, MoeBlee <jazzm...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:

> But, every countable set does have a bijection with N or has a
> bijection with some member of w (the set of natural numbers).

That would be true if countability and aleph_0 were not self-
contradicting concepts.

But there is a set that is less than uncountable but has no bijection
with N or a definasble subset of N. This set is the set of all finite
definitions (in binary representation).


0
1
00
01
....


where every line may be enumerated by an element of the countable set
omega^omega^omega (and, if required, finitely many more exponents for
alphabets, languages, dictionaries, thesauruses, and further
properties)


An obvious enumeration of the lines is 1, 2, 3, ... where every line
n
can have many sub-enumerations

n
n.1.a
n.11.a
n.111.a
....

Every section of 1's and a's contains enough symbols to enumerate
every single line as often as required to cover all its meanings in
all possible languages. If necessary we can add 2's and b's and so on
and remain in the countable domain.

This set contains all possible finite words in all possible languages
over all possible alphabets over all possible whatever may be required
in addition.
This set is countable. Hence the set of all definable, computable, and
"whatever may be invented by clever set theorists" real numbers is
countable as a subset.

Cantor shows that a countable set is uncountable or that a constructed
real is unconstructable.

Regards, WM
From: MoeBlee on
On Jun 16, 1:04 pm, WM <mueck...(a)rz.fh-augsburg.de> wrote:
> On 16 Jun., 19:45, MoeBlee <jazzm...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > But, every countable set does have a bijection with N or has a
> > bijection with some member of w (the set of natural numbers).
>
> That would be true if countability and aleph_0 were not self-
> contradicting concepts.

What I mentioned is pretty much just a definition of 'countable'.

x is countable <-> Ef(f is a bijection from x onto w or Enew x is a
bijection from x onto n)

Meanwhile, I don't have a thousand lifetimes to wait for you to show a
formula P such that both P and ~P are derivable in ZFC from the above
definition.

MoeBlee

From: Virgil on
In article
<91a57f95-54ee-4f0a-8341-b2a7dc2f11de(a)h13g2000yqm.googlegroups.com>,
WM <mueckenh(a)rz.fh-augsburg.de> wrote:

> On 16 Jun., 05:37, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> > Virgil <Vir...(a)home.esc> writes:
> > > But until you can determine which of those 10 cases, how can you
> > > compute the number?
> >
> > You can't. The number is computable nonetheless, in the sense that there
> > exists an effective procedure for churning out its decimal expansion.
> >
> > As noted, computability is a purely extensional notion. Recall the
> > classical recursion theory exercise, which we find, in some form or
> > other, in pretty much any text on the subject:
> >
> > �Let f : N --> N be a function such that
> >
> > � �f(x) = 0 if Goldbach's conjecture is true, and 1 otherwise.
> >
> > �Is f computable?
>
> All computable, Turing-computable, nonetheless computable, definable
> (in any useful, i.e., finite language), and by other means
> determinable numbers form a countable set.

I am not sure that in standard mathematics that that description can
"form a set" at all, much less a countable one.
>
> If Cantor's diagonal proof results in any such a number, then it
> proves in effect the uncountability of a countable set.

If WM claims that every set of 'real' numbers is countable, meaning that
one can construct a surjection from N to it, then the very
constructability of such a surjection proves that set of numbers to be
incomplete by the Cantor "anti-diagonal" construction.