From: rabid_fan on
On Mon, 15 Mar 2010 07:00:41 -0500, jmfbahciv wrote:

>
> If so, what are the verbs?
>

Not verbs, but predicates.

From: J. Clarke on
On 3/14/2010 11:02 PM, rabid_fan wrote:
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2010 22:13:45 -0400, J. Clarke wrote:
>
>>>
>>> The sooner we stop trying to grasp the nature of a particle with our
>>> inborn tools of comprehension, the better off we will be.
>>
>> In other words don't try because the problem is hard?
>
> No. In other words the human organism is not equipped
> to comprehend quantum phenomena.

So There Are Things Man Was Not Meant To Know?

> Inborn tools of comprehension. Get it? They are what has
> been endowed to us by the evolutionary development of life
> on this planet. That hunk of jelly within our skulls can only
> do so much.

If that is true eventually we will find something we can't deal with.
But to stop trying when your model is incomplete is giving up.

> Our concept of a particle, i.e. a localized bit of matter
> that can follow a well defined trajectory, cannot be extended
> downward into sub-atomic realms. Whatever happens in that minute
> world cannot be envisioned by the human brain. Only mathematics
> can allow us to get a handle on the reality of the quantum events.

Oh, got it, you're just blathering pointlessly.


From: Huang on

> >> The sooner we stop trying to grasp the nature of a particle with our
> >> inborn tools of comprehension, the better off we will be.
>
> > In other words don't try because the problem is hard?
>
> No.  In other words the human organism is not equipped
> to comprehend quantum phenomena.


- not true.


From: rabid_fan on
On Mon, 15 Mar 2010 02:58:57 -0700, tonyb wrote:

>
> okay, just to be clear, I'm not talking about probability in relation to
> wave equations.
> I'm talking about the probability that a descriptive mathematical
> statement about the
> behaviour of a phenomena is correct.
>
>
> Having put all theory into the same category - namely description - we
> then create models about the 'appearance of things' in terms of
> mathematics, based in observation but also, and very importantly, guided
> by the consistency of our theory with other more supported theories.
> (e.g. a theory that breaks some relativistic principle is possible, but
> less likely; as an aside, its this prior probability assigned to a
> theory in terms of pre-existing theories that made us reluctant to
> modify Newton's ideas in the first place)

>
> So then we use experiment to test the theory - but we'll always get
> systematic and random noise over our data - there is never a perfect
> fit; often we must also invoke secondary theories to remove unwanted
> artefacts from our data. So, in fact when we demonstrate the data is
> consistent with a theory, we should (I would argue) assign a probability
> to that theory and also take into account the current probability of any
> invoked secondary theories.
>

That's not how science works. If there are anomalous data, such as
outliers or other unexpected values, this data could be noise or
it could be valid. More experimentation is necessary.

When beta decay was first observed, a distribution of electron
energy was measured that was inconsistent with the well established
principle of the conservation of energy. What were the hypotheses?
1) Conservation of energy may not be valid at the sub-atomic level.
2) Another emitted particle may carry some of the energy.

Any probability assigned to either hypothesis can only be subjective.
There is no way to rigorously define a probability in the same way
we can describe a "goodness of fit."

The only true way out of the conundrum is more experimental work.

Subjective probabilities can be useful in an engineering sense, e.g.
the likelihood that a nuclear power plant will explode, but in pure
scientific work they can only be a rough guide to further directions
of investigation.


> The second part of this problem, for me is that pure mathematics lives
> in a realm of pure reasoning, uncorrupted by doubt (although often
> abstracted from reality.) In order to apply it to Physics, we have to
> assign meaning to all our variables. c becomes the velocity of light
> etc... In order to do this, we must take into account *how* we are
> measuring that variable. If we use different methods, we might actually
> be measuring different phenomena. Without any understanding of the
> probability of our hypothesis or phenomena, this could be assumption
> which is *probably* unreasonable.
>
> So my question is, how do we as Scientists, reason within an uncertain
> (essentially probabilistic) framework in a rigorous manner; but
> primarliy how do we do this issue into account on a daily basis, as we
> go about our business?
> (I hope I've nailed my question this time.)

We deal with it by not reasoning. We experiment.

The art of pure reason, and perhaps subjective probabilities, died
with Plato.
From: rabid_fan on
On Mon, 15 Mar 2010 08:15:49 -0400, J. Clarke wrote:

>
> So There Are Things Man Was Not Meant To Know?
>

Meant to know? Ha, ha! What does that imply?

You are endowing the universe, and the human beings within it,
with some teleological purpose. (Maybe you are an unscientific
idiot. Yes?)

Man is not "meant to know" anything. Things are as they are
for no inherent reason or purpose. If you think that
there is some pre-ordained master plan to the universe or to
human destiny, then you are in the wrong Usenet group. I would
suggest alt.religion or something equivalent.


>
> Oh, got it, you're just blathering pointlessly.
>

No. Your brain is stuck, spinning its wheels endlessly.