From: Bhupinder Singh Anand on
On Apr 10, 12:18 pm, George wrote:

G>> ... The class of sentences provable in FOL from a recursive
axiom-set IS NECESSARILY, PROVABLY, ALWAYS, recursively enumerable. It
may even be recursive as well (although in the cause of PA and ZF, it
is not; that, again, is the whole content of Godel's 1st incompleteness
theorem). <<G

George
=====
Sorry, I don't quite follow this.

My understanding of a recursively enumerable set is that it is the
range (assumed to be a consistently well-defined set of a set theory
such as, say, ZF) of a recursive function.

Now, Goedel's relation Bew(x), defined as:

(Ey)(y is the Goedel-number of a PA-proof of the PA-formula whose
Goedel-number is x)

is not recursive.

It follows that the set of Goedel-numbers of the provable formulas of
PA is not recursively enumerable.

So, in what sense are we to treat the set of provable arithmetical
sentences of PA, or of ZF, as recursively enumerable?

Regards,

Bhup

From: Barb Knox on
In article <1113168563.406607.197610(a)o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com>,
"Bhupinder Singh Anand" <re(a)alixcomsi.com> wrote:

>On Apr 10, 12:18 pm, George wrote:
>
>G>> ... The class of sentences provable in FOL from a recursive
>axiom-set IS NECESSARILY, PROVABLY, ALWAYS, recursively enumerable. It
>may even be recursive as well (although in the cause of PA and ZF, it
>is not; that, again, is the whole content of Godel's 1st incompleteness
>theorem). <<G
>
>George
>=====
>Sorry, I don't quite follow this.
>
>My understanding of a recursively enumerable set is that it is the
>range (assumed to be a consistently well-defined set of a set theory
>such as, say, ZF) of a recursive function.
>
>Now, Goedel's relation Bew(x), defined as:
>
>(Ey)(y is the Goedel-number of a PA-proof of the PA-formula whose
>Goedel-number is x)
>
>is not recursive.
>
>It follows that the set of Goedel-numbers of the provable formulas of
>PA is not recursively enumerable.

No, it doesn't follow. Just because a particular set happens to be the
range of SOME non-recursive function does not imply that ALL functions with
that set as their range are non-recursive. For a simpler example, the
non-recursive boolean function IndexedTuringMachineHaltsOnBlankTape(i) has
the recursive range {true,false}.

>So, in what sense are we to treat the set of provable arithmetical
>sentences of PA, or of ZF, as recursively enumerable?
>
>Regards,
>
>Bhup

--
---------------------------
| BBB b \ Barbara at LivingHistory stop co stop uk
| B B aa rrr b |
| BBB a a r bbb | Quidquid latine dictum sit,
| B B a a r b b | altum viditur.
| BBB aa a r bbb |
-----------------------------
From: Bhupinder Singh Anand on
On Apr 10, 8:04 pm, Barb Knox wrote:

BSA>> It follows that the set of Goedel-numbers of the provable
formulas of PA is not recursively enumerable. <<BSA

BK>> No, it doesn't follow. <<BK

Barb/George
===========
You're right. That was silly of me - sorry. The set of provable
formulas of PA is, indeed, recursively enumerable if we assume Church's
Thesis.

The point I intended to raise was that the standard interpretation of
this - namely, that there is always a uniform mechanical procedure
(algorithm) for generating a r.e. set - may not be definitive.

Thanks, and regards,

Bhup

From: Daryl McCullough on
Bhupinder Singh Anand says...

>My understanding of a recursively enumerable set is that it is the
>range (assumed to be a consistently well-defined set of a set theory
>such as, say, ZF) of a recursive function.
>
>Now, Goedel's relation Bew(x), defined as:
>
>(Ey)(y is the Goedel-number of a PA-proof of the PA-formula whose
>Goedel-number is x)
>
>is not recursive.
>
>It follows that the set of Goedel-numbers of the provable formulas of
>PA is not recursively enumerable.

Introduce a new recursive function F(x,y) as follows:

If y is the Goedel-number of a PA-proof of the PA-formula whose
Goedel-number is x, then return x.
Otherwise, return the Goedel-number of the formula "0=0".

Then the range of F will be the set of all Goedel numbers of
provable formulas of PA.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

From: Bhupinder Singh Anand on
On Apr 9, 8:06 pm, Bhupinder Singh Anand wrote:

BSA>> ... the set of arithmetical sentences provable in ZF need not be
r.e. ... <<BSA

This, of course, is wrong. Sorry. What I meant was that, even assuming
Church's Thesis, the arithmetical sentences provable in ZF need not be
algorithmically enumerable, although they are, of course, recursively
enumerable.

The issue that I sought to highlight was that, though the standard
interpretation of the term 'computable' in Church's thesis implicitly
implies algorithmic computability, i.e., a uniform, mechanical process
of computation, this need not be so.

Thus a computable number-theoretic function may be provable as
individually 'computable' for any set of natural number values given to
its free variables (as Goedel has shown); however, there may be no
algorithm, or uniform mechanical procedure, for the computation.

Further, although the set of true arithmetical sentences is not
arithmetical, the assertion that the set is also not r.e. seems based
on implicitly treating recursive enumerability as equivalent to
algorithmic enumerability. Such, implicitly assumed, equivalence may
not be definitive.

Regards,

Bhup

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