A constant speed of light in all reference frames? Surely you can't be serious.
in [Relativity]
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From: mpc755 on 23 Feb 2010 10:54 On Feb 23, 10:51 am, Paul Stowe <theaether...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Feb 23, 12:02 am, mpalenik <markpale...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > On Feb 23, 12:16 am, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > Notice how different this approach is from sitting back and trying to > > > > decide whether mathematicians (or gangsters) are groups of people who > > > > self-select themselves into delusions, and therefore their models are > > > > not to be trusted. Why do that kind of nonsense, when you can simply > > > > ask the coin to show its colors? > > > > Because in the real world it is not simply a case of flipping the coin > > > an infinite number of times. Let's face it, we both submit to evidence > > > - that cannot be the difference between us. > > > Actually, you tend to hand-wave away any evidence you don't like as > > 100 years of bad experiments, as in the case of the Michaelson Morely > > experiment and others like it with similar, albiet more refined, > > steups, which you were insisting had problems for a long time. > > Perhaps the difference is, we understand the experimental evidence and > > you don't. > > Where did he say the MMX was a bad experiment? IMO no 'experiment' is > either good or bad, it's simply data. What's bad is predetermining > HOW one will interpret data. Tom Robert hss a point (pointing out the > 'bad' in science) when claims you cannot DO an experiment without > first knowing (have predetermined) what you're looking for. That's > plain BS and exemplifies the worse of science. Many times > experimental data or observations can fit several explanations but, if > one has predetermined HOW they want to make it fit their worldview > those others aren't even considered. In fact, the MMX is a great > experiment and it points out this fact. Scientist of that period had > the mindset that solid matter could not be affected by simple motion > because it was too rigid. They 'preconcieved' what the results MUST > BE. To this very day that preconception is clung to by many. > > > > > I don't think so. Perhaps if you gave an example from the most recent > > > > century of physics. > > > > I'm not arguing that religious principles have been used directly to > > > create "practical, artificial devices". What I did suggest was that a > > > theory can work because it promotes correct behaviors, independent of > > > the truth of its explicit premises. > > > So, for example, praying to Vishnu is a correct behavior, whether or > > not he exists? > > Example in science, virual particles... > 'Virtual' anything in physics is a label which states 'we' don't know what is going on in nature so we will just make something up. In the Casimir effect: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casimir_effect The aether displaced by each plate extends past the other plate, pushing the plates together. > > > > Whether a theory's premises are factually correct IS DETERMINED by > > > > whether it produces accurate predictions of measurements. That's how > > > > science makes that determination in the first place. > > > > Not really. Once you factor in technological constraints, margins of > > > error, empirical constants, domains of applicability, sheer > > > complexity, implict knowledge, and probably innumerable other issues, > > > it becomes very difficult to discern whether the explicit body of > > > knowledge is true or whether it simply produces sufficiently correct > > > behaviours without there being any truth to its explicit form. > > > And, if you can disprove a current theory, which means > > 1) coming up with a theory that does something the old theory can't > > 2) demonstrate that the new predictions you make are correct > > This is BS. That is not the only criteria, and you should know this. > > > If you can supplant an old theory with a new, better one, you can 1) > > publish it, 2) gain great scientific acclaim, and 3) possibly win a > > lot of money. > > None of which is the actual persuit of scientific knowledge. In fact, > it reflects on all that is 'bad' in the practice of modern science. > 1) gate keeping, 2) Pursuit of celebrity status, 3) seeking/expecting > capitalist gains from the process. In the ideal (alturistic) the > pursuit knowledge and its disimination was a goal unto itself. But, > knowledge is power, and some types of knowledge leads to dangerous > venues, as such, such knowledge and it desimination must be regulated > and controlled. Thus the need for gatekeepers and controlling what is > freely published. If you think otherwise, you're living in > fantasyland... > > > If I could disprove Special Relativity, that would be great. I'd get > > a nobel prize. But there are over 100 years of experiments that need > > to be explained with any new theory and it needs to have something new > > that relativity doesn't have. > > Like how the system would behave at superluminal velocities, right. > BTW, GR surplanted SR just like SR surplant Newton. > > > > > The scientific community and scientific publications aren't afraid of > > publishing new ideas. Nature even published an article on homeopathy > > once (with a disclaimer at the beginning) because the experimental > > setup seemed to be perfect, and yet, it gave these incredible, > > surprising results, that even after you dilute out all of a solute, > > water still somehow retains the properties of that solute. This > > prompted other scientists to try to reproduce those results, and when > > none could, the original team was investigated, and it turned out > > there were researchers who were (perhaps by accident) causing errors > > in the experiment. > > > The reason the scientists here haven't accepted you with open arms > > isn't because you're preaching something we don't like to hear, it's > > because: > > 1) You claimed that over 100 years of experiments are in error without > > any actual, logical explanation of what that error was > > 2) You > > 3) You refuse to do any quantitative predictions, which would > > immediately tell you whether or not a given modification to a theory > > is wrong (to use the gravity example, if I said that gravity falls off > > as 1/r instead of 1/r^2, that would have direct, obvious implications > > to the real world that would be easily testable/measurable). > > 4) You immediately assume that because certain physics doesn't work > > the way *you personally* want it to, that it is because science is run > > like a religion. That *your personal* philosophies are necessarily > > the correct ones, and anything that doesn't fit in with *your personal > > viewpoint* must NECESSARILY mean that science is wrong. > > 5) It is very clear that you don't have a good understanding of > > relativity or the concepts behind it. Even simply from the fact that > > you're incapable of correctly doing the thought experiments that you > > post here by yourself. It is necessary that you correctly understand > > a theory before you go around pointing out its flaws. > > And there are elements of models than cannot be readily discriminated, > like, for example, whether the gravitational constant is, in fact > constant throughout space, or, if above a certain mass, the > gravitational force remains strictly proportional to the masses, ... > etc., etc., etc. > > > The funny thing is, you accuse so many people of "wrong thinking," > > because obviously, education must cause wrong thinking, and yet, this > > is all based on the fact that our thinking does not conform to *your > > specific thinking*. You never consider that it might be your lack of > > experience, your lack of education, your lack of knowledge, and your > > personal inability to recocile certain concepts that's the problem? > > Instead, it must be that everybody else has the problem. . . > > To me, personally, wrong thinking is exemplified by extreme cynicism > and closed mindedness. An in today's world of scientist this appears > to be the norm. Like Feynman once said, what do you care what other > people think? > > Paul Stowe
From: PD on 23 Feb 2010 10:57 On Feb 22, 11:16 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > On 22 Feb, 04:07, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Feb 21, 6:38 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Hmmm. So there appears to be two models for what has happened in such > > > > > > cases: > > > > > > 1) the student who went through those classes had reason and good > > > > > > sense *stripped* of them to the point where they would believe > > > > > > nonsense, and this result is inherent to the process undergone. > > > > > > 2) the student who went through those classes learned something new, > > > > > > including how to test unambiguously for extra dimensions (regardless > > > > > > whether it has been yet determined by test) and what the motivations > > > > > > for even considering them might be, so that what seems like nonsense > > > > > > to the novice no longer seems like nonsense. > > > > > > I dare say there is a third. The student went into the class without > > > > > having any "good sense" in the first place, and therefore they were > > > > > willing to accept anything that they were told there. > > > > > Thereby implying that those who have expertise in the field are those > > > > who lacked good sense to begin with and whose common feature of > > > > gullibility is the parameter for success in the field. Nice. > > > > I have suggested that this is a third possibility. I also note you > > > read this outside of the qualifying statement I made immediately after > > > the above (now shown further below), the essence of which is to say > > > that the hobble of a purely mathematical approach may be that the > > > maths ends up totally at large, unconstrained by the requirements of > > > (and lacking the further inspiration of) a qualitatively physical > > > explanation. > > > The "may be" could well be a concern of yours, but it does not appear > > to be borne out by fact. As I've repeated to you several times, the > > prevailing theories DO all have underlying physical conceptual > > frameworks. > > They are not all cogs-and-levers of the form that you would like to > > see, but that does not mean that they are purely mathematical > > exercises. > > It's remarkable that you have this apparent false dichotomy of cogs- > > and-levers and, failing that, purely mathematics. > > I haven't really argued such a dichotomy. What I have said is that > things like "backwards causation" are just totally irreconcilable with > any physical reality as I know it, and it was you who then > characterised this as "cogs and levers" and small-minded. Well then, the "physical reality as [you] know it" is what poses the constraint, isn't it? The fact is, there are physical models which involve clear, physical, and self-consistent concepts (even though you find them irreconcilable with your *chosen* axioms), making them different than "purely mathematics". And those models produce predictions that accurately reflect measurements that are designed to distinguish between models. > And as I've > said, repeatedly, what you call my "cogs and levers" approach is far > more flexible than your caricature would imply. Yes, to the point where your cogs-and-levers picture permits almost immediately obvious internal contradictions, as I've pointed out. > > > > > Conversely, you also imply that those who have good sense to begin > > > > with, and who do not suffer from gullibility, are naturally OUT OF the > > > > field. > > > > I am suggesting that those in the field may be selected by factors > > > that are not obvious, but which undermine their collective claims to > > > credibility, reliability, and objectivity on the broader questions of > > > their field of study. > > > As you wish. Basically, you're saying that you don't believe anything > > that group of people put forward, because you can convince yourself > > that any such group of people self-select to be nonsense-generators > > (especially since they disagree with you). This puts yourself in > > admirable position of being impervious to becoming convinced that > > you're wrong, at least at the hands of any representative of this > > group of people. > > You're characterising my position as being far more hardline than it > is. What I'm saying, at it's most simple, is that I'm not willing to > simply take the word of "authority". Separate from that, I've also > made it clear that I have certain axioms that are not in principle > unquestionable or irrefutable, but which would require such an > overwhelming amount of evidence to overturn that they are, in > practice, probably irrefutable. Then by all means study physics the way it is intended to be studied. That is, accept nothing without test. There is a reason, as I said, why physics courses contain a laboratory element, so that you can see how experiments can be designed to distinguish between different models, and you can see with your very own eyes the results that make that distinction. There is no better authority than your own eyes. The point is, the evidence is available to you. You can embark on a long series of experimental investigations (as I have) to accumulate the evidence overwhelming enough to overturn chosen axioms. And/or you can do what all physicists also do, which is to gain enough experimental experience to be able to critically and analytically read the published documentation of an experiment performed by another, enough so that you can convince yourself there are no significant stones left unturned. > > > > Incidentally, I once heard a fictional story that a mathematician and > > > a gangster are both witnessing a coin toss. The coin shows heads ten > > > times in a row. They are asked to estimate the probability of the next > > > result. The gangster says "almost certainly heads". The mathematician > > > guesses the gangster's logic, laughs, and says "an equal probability > > > of heads or tails - the past results do not influence the future > > > probabilities". The gangster suggests "it does if the coin is > > > weighted". And regardless of the true nature of the coin, both gave > > > answers that were heavily contingent on unstated assumptions (most of > > > which will have been wholly implicit and unexamined as far as the > > > conscious mind is concerned), and both raised issues that the other > > > will almost certainly not have considered before giving an answer. > > > Precisely! And you will note that there is an experimental test to > > check which of these two models, including the presumptions of each of > > their models, is at work. Note that it is not possible to determine ON > > THE FACE of it > > I'll forgive this atrocious pun. ;) > > > which of these two models is correct or even more > > likely, even if you have a hunch or a personal preference for one. But > > both the gangster and the mathematician have put forward models with a > > testable prediction. In particular, if you tossed it another 100 > > times, the two theories would have remarkably different predictions, > > and the *coin itself* will tell you which of the two models is a > > better description of it. > > That's not true. A further 100 tosses would not discern definitively > between the two theories, for the outcome would still be technically > consistent with either theory. Technically, yes, but the likelihood that one still applies becomes smaller and smaller. No theory is ever PROVEN to be right, but it becomes pretty clear from enough preponderance of data which theory, among the set being considered, is the clear favorite. But the key is, it's the data from the coin itself that gives you this information, NOT an analysis of whether the mathematician or the gangster is more likely to have arrived at a sensible model due to his "upbringing". > > > Notice how different this approach is from sitting back and trying to > > decide whether mathematicians (or gangsters) are groups of people who > > self-select themselves into delusions, and therefore their models are > > not to be trusted. Why do that kind of nonsense, when you can simply > > ask the coin to show its colors? > > Because in the real world it is not simply a case of flipping the coin > an infinite number of times. Let's face it, we both submit to evidence > - that cannot be the difference between us. > > > > > > Of course I'd rather avoid saying that these students have "no sense". > > > > > I'm much more willing to believe that they are simply not concerned > > > > > with a practical-mechanical explanation, possibly because beforehand > > > > > they don't have any well-developed intuitions for it, and secondly > > > > > it's vogue in science at the moment to emphasise purely mathematical > > > > > explanations over practical-mechanical explanations. > > > > > > > Now, how might one test which of these two claims is what has really > > > > > > happened? > > > > > > > Let me suggest one. If (1) were the case, then because of the inherent > > > > > > flaw in the process, then it would have likely been observed up to > > > > > > this point that there is a whole class of former students who have > > > > > > come to believe some principle that is objectively falsifiable. It > > > > > > would be falsifiable perhaps by the construction of a whole class of > > > > > > devices whose design is based on that principle and which (because the > > > > > > principle is false) obviously don't work in practice. Perhaps you can > > > > > > point to some cases like that where devices with designs based on > > > > > > relativity or quantum mechanics simply do not work because the > > > > > > principles are wrong. Or is it your claim that all such devices happen > > > > > > to work by accident, even though the design principles are wrong? > > > > > > If you're suggesting that it's improbable that a theory could work not > > > > > because its premises were correct, but because it simply promoted > > > > > correct behaviours, then wonders why religion has fared so well. > > > > > I don't know of any practical, artificially created devices that are > > > > used in everyday life whose designs are based on religious principles. > > > > Do you? > > > > But the form of the question is designed to confirm your > > > preconception. > > > I don't think so. Perhaps if you gave an example from the most recent > > century of physics. > > I'm not arguing that religious principles have been used directly to > create "practical, artificial devices". What I did suggest was that a > theory can work because it promotes correct behaviours, independent of > the truth of its explicit premises. But that's a meaning of "work" that is different than what I'm talking about. Sure, religion works in the sense that it can get people to behave in a certain way, if that's the goal. People *can* influence the behavior of people and change the way they operate. But in physics, nature does not change the way it operates. Our models do not influence nature's behavior. Nature behaves the way it always has, independent of us. When we build a device, all we are doing is creating circumstances under which nature will do *its own thing* and produce a result that happens to be the one we want. We aren't coercing nature to behave according to a rule we impose. We are taking advantage of discovered rules that nature lives by, with us or without us. When we can use those rules to produce an outcome we want in a *natural* process, then that's what it means for the device to work. > > Incidentally, for a long time I never understood the role of "oath- > helpers" in the context of the common law historically, until I > realised the religious significance of the oath - that is, you were > putting your eternal soul on the line if you didn't tell the truth. > And even though the premises of religious beliefs are obviously > ludicrous, in this case they served a social function of encouraging > honesty amongst those who believed. And if a notoriously God-fearing > member of the community was willing to put his own soul on the line to > support the word of the witness, then that was compelling reason to > accept the testimony of the witness. > > > > If we are to judge theories based on their tendency to bring about > > > desirable outcomes (which I think is one of the unspoken assumptions > > > in your question) then it does not seem to me that a theory's premises > > > need to be factually correct; only that it produces the desired > > > outcome. Which is what I said in the first place. > > > Whether a theory's premises are factually correct IS DETERMINED by > > whether it produces accurate predictions of measurements. That's how > > science makes that determination in the first place. > > Not really. Once you factor in technological constraints, margins of > error, empirical constants, domains of applicability, sheer > complexity, implict knowledge, and probably innumerable other issues, > it becomes very difficult to discern whether the explicit body of > knowledge is true or whether it simply produces sufficiently correct > behaviours without there being any truth to its explicit form. No, I'm sorry, this is not at all correct. Half of the work of the experimenter is in generating the measurement, and the other half is in estimating the possible size of the uncertainty in that measurement, due to the factors that you mention. And ALL those things need to be taken into account. Earlier, I alluded to reading an experimental paper critically. This is where most of that effort goes. You too easily dismiss experimental evidence as being unreliable. You've maintained that what is measured is constrained by the model (and that's wrong). You've maintained that the obtained results are not convincingly discriminatory, because there are too many influences that may have skewed that result (and that's wrong). I cannot overemphasize that the ultimate discriminator of truth in science is the experimental result. It is the SOLE arbiter between different models of nature. Not plausibility of axioms. Not elegance of argument or simplicity or familiarity of concepts. It is a brute force appeal to nature herself to tell us which of two models (that make different predictions) is more right. > > > If two theories make the same predictions in a given experiment, then > > the two theories are mined to find the place where they make DIFFERENT > > predictions, and that becomes the place where the measurement is made, > > because that's where the discernment is to be obtained. And it is via > > this channel that you determine which set of premises are correct. > > There is no other way to reliably make that determination. > > We both agree that reality is the final arbiter, but I've already said > that I think you fail to capture how science is really practiced. > > > > If we approach both science and religion from that direction, then it > > > leads to some interesting questions and some interesting explanations.. > > > > > > In > > > > > any event, I'm willing to accept Feynman's argument, basically that QM > > > > > amounts to a workable mathematical model, and makes no claim to any > > > > > truth more fundamental than that. > > > > > This under-represents Feynman's position. A deeper examination of what > > > > he wrote, other than what has been sound-bitten for your viewing > > > > pleasure, shows that he actually is responsible for the underlying > > > > physical explanation behind the math. > > > > Well I'm not giving a comprehensive treatment of Feynman's position, > > > and on some points I would strongly disagree with him. Indeed, I'm > > > pretty sure that at one time or another he had said that anything > > > beyond a mathematical model was superfluous to physics. > > > I don't recall anything ever written by him that said that. Reference > > please. If not available, then permit me to consider your statement to > > be unreliable propaganda. > > I'm afraid I couldn't find anything definitive after spending quite a > bit of time looking, so if you don't recognise this as Feynman's > position then I'd probably rather move on to a different point. > > I did however stumble over this, which you may find interesting as I > did:http://www.friesian.com/feynman.htm There are a number of superb biographies of Feynman, all of them better than a book report about a biography, not to mention the books that Feynman himself published. > > > > But one cannot > > > criticise him in that he seemed fairly open about his axiomatic > > > position and, from what I've read, did not seem to represent the > > > mathematical models as being anything other than what they are. > > > > > > > > > The point is, your argument boils down to "the only people I see > > > > > > > > convinced of alternate dimensions are the people who believe in > > > > > > > > alternate dimensions," but that's a circular argument. > > > > > > > > It's not circular. It's a simple statement that there is, to a certain > > > > > > > degree, a self-selection process, wherein the people who have a > > > > > > > susceptibility to these sorts of arguments are precisely the ones who > > > > > > > adopt and build on them. > > > > > > > Or, to couch this in terms of the second option listed above, this > > > > > > selection process happens to find those who are susceptible to > > > > > > learning something new and which is in conflict with their incoming > > > > > > presuppositions? > > > > > > I really don't think everyone has particularly strong preconceptions > > > > > (i.e. they'll believe anything), and nor do I think everyone has a > > > > > taste for challenging authority. As I say, my argument is that the pre- > > > > > existing interests, aptitudes, and psychology of students probably > > > > > determines to a large extent what they're willing to accept as > > > > > credible and coherent. > > > > > > To identify a relatively small minority of people (that is, > > > > > physicists), who have necessarily been weeded from a very large > > > > > population, and then appeal to a further subset of those in order to > > > > > somehow prove that additional dimensions are credible is just silly. > > > > > Oh, come on. Scientific theories don't rise to the top because their > > > > proponents are just predisposed to be gullible and are willing to > > > > believe anything. > > > > You know there's far more to it than that. Surely you've had enough > > > discussions with me to know that I'm not making such a simplistic > > > argument. > > > > > Science doesn't judge truth on the basis of what > > > > you're willing to believe. > > > > Fundamentally, it does precisely that. > > > No, sir. > > I've discussed this at length with you, and your mathematician vs > > gambler parable above points to where this falls apart. > > I don't know whether you misunderstood my meaning, but accepted > scientific knowledge does fundamentally come down to people's > willingness to believe and nothing else. I disagree. In science, just about anything is provisionally acceptable as long as it makes enough predictions to submit itself to arbitration by experimental test. Disbelief is deliberately suspended during this operation. It is an act of will to choose NOT to believe this or that, until an experimental test between candidates can be performed. Now, as I've said, this is not the approach that people in general take. As I've noted, there are people who simply do not believe ANYTHING that scientists claim, and (not surprisingly) find even the scientific method to be completely unreliable as a process for discovering truth. Those people will of course not be scientists, nor will any conclusion that they draw about nature be a scientific conclusion. Science does not pretend to provide evidence that will overwhelm ANYONE into believing the claims that are made. You made a statement earlier that if science does not do this, then what value does science have? Or perhaps you said that it was the expectation that science would do precisely that. It cannot. It cannot convince a religious conservative that the earth is older than 6600 years old. The religious conservative can always hold *axiomatically* that the Bible is to be taken literally and that God has *arranged* the evidence to *fool* us that it is older than 6600 years old, but of course that evidence should not be taken as compelling or dissuading. Science only offers a methodology for convincing people of certain facts about nature in the cases where those people are willing to buy into the methodology. To others who do not, science is a pointless exercise. > As I've said, we both submit > to the external world, but you don't seem to recognise the limitations > of this. > > > > > Things aren't true in science just because > > > > scientists are willing to believe them. This is the point of > > > > experimental test -- to consult NATURE on what should be believed and > > > > not believed. > > > > But then we come back to "the theory deciding what you observe". > > > As I've said, this does not happen, Einstein's bon mot > > notwithstanding. You keep repeating this statement as though it were > > an accepted maxim. It's not. > > I'm not repeating it as though it is accepted. I'm repeating it as it > characterises my position so well, but I see no sign that you > acknowledge that there is even a modicum of sense to what I'm saying, > which is unfortunate. It's not that it's nonsensical. It's just that it doesn't characterize science. It's like saying that zebras are blue. That's not a nonsensical statement. It just isn't right. > > > > People tend to find a way of consulting the external world in a way > > > that is consistent with their preconceptions. > > > Not scientists. > > Haha. Bollocks! > > > This is certainly true for you, and you've both > > confessed it and demonstrated it. Scientists try to break out of that > > time and time and time again. > > It is undoubtedly true for me to a certain extent, although I > generally consider myself to have intellectual integrity and a fair > amount of self-awareness. That's true. But please do not presume that they way YOU think is the way that EVERYONE thinks. > > As for "scientists trying to break out of it", I think this is just a > ridiculous generalisation about the conduct of scientists, and in any > event says nothing about whether they successfully break free (they > don't, of course). > > I don't know whether you're just a bulldog of your profession Paul, in > which case it's not going to do any good to break you down on these > statements (because it's a waste of my time if I fail, and if I > succeed it leaves you alienated), but in a lot of ways you seem to > typify the very problem you say science needs to overcome: the problem > of preconceptions and closed-mindedness. Oh, I'm quite open-minded. I just ask that if you're going to make scientific statements, then they are prepared scientifically. If you do not wish to prepare your statements about nature scientifically, then I'm going to take them to be nonscientific statements (which of course they are, just as a poem that happens to mention electrons is not a scientific statement), and at that point I consider them to be amusing but off-topic in a science discussion forum, you see. > And unlike me, you appear not > to acknowledge that preconceptions permeate and probably dominate > science - indeed I dare say that the more important the question, the > more the answer is permeated by preconceptions. > > > > > I understand your contention, that surely any experimental test should > > > > be accountable by a theory which contains principles that ANYONE can > > > > believe, not just those who are predisposed to be more open-minded. > > > > I'm not necessarily saying this. What I am saying is that there is > > > potentially a fallacy in appealing to the opinions of scientists. > > > It's not a matter of opinion. It's a matter of what the product of the > > scientific method is, which is designed to *remove* opinion. Granted, > > this process doesn't work perfectly. > > It doesn't work at all in that respect. I disagree. > > > But it does beg the question of whether the *method* is the one to be > > pursued to determine the truth. You've said you're not sure you > > believe it is, but you don't have a better way of proceeding. > > Because like I say Paul, I'm not here to sell anything. After hours of > chiselling, conservatives always fall back on the question "is there > any better way?", and of course the very method you're espousing may > well be better if only its proponents actually acknowledged it's > systematic deficits and failings. I'm not claiming the process is perfect. Neither is Christianity, free- market capitalism, democracy, or justice by jury of peers, in any of the forms those are practiced. But what is true is that diligence and faithfulness to the principles of each of those do tend to remove or correct excursions over a period of time. > > > > > However, historically this hasn't panned out, and you have yet to > > > > provide a proof of principle. > > > > But are we implicitly back to a test of "achieving a desirable > > > outcome" again? Is it possible that people would reject the truth > > > because it would lead to an undesirable outcome? > > > Anything is possible. Is it likely? Here you have a guess. > > Not really. I think you'll find the psychological literature is awash > with data that points to cognitive biases that, I suppose at a very > broad level, all tend to have in common the theme of putting those > beliefs which are desirable above those which are factual. And I think the reverse is true, though there is always an admixture. > > > So summarizing briefly, you would like to propose that investigation > > should be structured in such a way that experimental data should be > > accountable by a model with principles that are believable by ANYBODY. > > That's not an accurate summary. > > > And yet at the same time, you say such an investigative structure > > might possibly be rejected because it leads to an undesirable outcome. > > Thus, you have no evidence that your investigative approach is even > > possible, whether there is any historical precedent for it ever having > > been pursued, or that it was rejected in the manner you fear. > > I can only assume that you've misunderstood, though I'm struggling to > identify where. I'm not advocating any particular alternative > investigative approach. I'm making a criticism of your > characterisation of the existing approach. Understood. Like the others that you have interviewed, I do not believe that the scientific method is inherently correct in any ideal sense, nor that it is infallible either in principle or in practice. The scientific method is adopted because it has a historical track record of doing a *better* job than other approaches, overall, at the types of knowledge for which it is well suited (which certainly doesn't include all kinds of knowledge). Perhaps when you ask me about what happens in nature, or how it is I would have you understand what's going on, I should first ask you, "Well, do you want to know how *scientists* think about it?" I'm certainly not prepared to try to convince you that the way that scientists think about it is inherently better than the way you think about it, except insofar that science can do things with its approach that yours cannot, though you probably do not find those things inherently valuable. > If you somehow think I've > described an alternative approach, then you've wildly misunderstood > what I've written and indeed what I intended to say. > > > > > > whereas for me I'm more likely to think of a pendulum or > > > > > basically some sort of clock. And then, when one mentions "time > > > > > slowing down", people who imagined the "t-axis" may be inclined to > > > > > develop the view that time has "fundamentally" slowed down (because > > > > > the mechanical details of how time is measured is not actually within > > > > > the realm of their primary interests), whereas I'm more likely to say > > > > > "well, what is to stop the clock slowing down without time itself > > > > > slowing down?", or even "what if it just *appears to the eye* that the > > > > > clock has slowed down?". > > > > > And yet there are tests for those questions as well. > > > > For example, let's suppose "What if there is something that is going > > > > on that is slowing the clock down without time itself slowing down?" > > > > (First of all, physicists don't say time itself slows down. This is a > > > > comic-book statement that does not represent the conceptual picture > > > > physicists have for this.) > > > > You know Paul I will hear your arguments if you contend that you > > > personally disagree with a particular statement or interpretation, but > > > you can't simply claim that everything that you don't agree with > > > amounts to a "comic book treatment of physics". I can't recall a > > > single occasion where you've said "some physicists may hold that view, > > > but I disagree and my view is...". > > > If you were talking about any subject on which there is any > > substantial controversy, then I'd be relating that. > > However, on the stuff that you are talking about, and in particular > > special relativity, there really isn't much controversy about what > > special relativity actually says or means. > > There is plenty of controversy about *other theories* which may > > compete with special relativity, but not about what special relativity > > says. > > I don't think there's much controversy about the mathematial form of > SR, but there certainly seems to be a fair amount of conceptual > vagueness. Only in the materials that you've selected to read. Which I've been telling you are unrepresentative and poorly chosen. > > > There is also plenty of superficial claptrap available on the web that > > inaccurately represents what special relativity says, and plenty of > > popularizations that render the statements in sufficiently vague > > language that misinterpretation is quite common, if not completely > > assured. > > Yes, those darn comic books. Exactly. You get what you pay for, and scientists make no warranty about the information delivered in claptrap. > > > > Indeed, according to what you'd have me believe, respectable > > > scientists seem to spend so much time writing "popularisations", > > > "comic books", and "falsehoods to entice the reader", it makes you > > > wonder how they have ever got around to doing real science, and indeed > > > no wonder that the average person does not understand when they spend > > > so much time consuming bullshit which I presume you justify on the > > > basis that the man on the street "can't handle the truth" and even > > > people otherwise interested to learn physics would find the truth > > > incomprehensible and aversive if delivered from the outset in an > > > unvarnished form. > > > Oh, but you have it completely backwards. Scientists spend relatively > > little time writing popularizations, comic-book presentations, and > > enticements to the reader that risk reader confusion. However, that > > seems to be the majority of what you've read. If instead you read some > > of the materials that scientists actually spend most of their time > > producing -- and I've recommended a small, entry-level sample of that > > -- you'd find many of these problems averted. I cannot help that you > > choose to read rotten materials, and that you have the temerity to say > > that appears to be all that is available to you. > > I was of course being sarcastic Paul. The real issue is that your > answer for virtually everything you don't agree with is that I must > have got it from a comic book (or some other publication that it in > some way not meant for serious scientific consumption) and that it > totally misrepresents the views of "physicists" (who are always > referred to as some sort of homogenous group, with the entirety of > whom you are totally familiar). I think it's fair to say I have a better exposure to a representative cross-section of their output than you do. > > > > > This question would lead to the following > > > > test. If something is happening to the clock, then surely varying the > > > > operating principle of the clock or choosing clocks of vastly > > > > different construction would produce a different time-slowing effect. > > > > After all, vibration affects some clocks and not other clocks, for > > > > example. So if a theory predicts a certain amount of rate change, and > > > > that rate change is observed in 19 different varieties of clocks of > > > > all different operational principles, then it seems unlikely that what > > > > is going on is some effect that is altering all these different > > > > mechanisms in EXACTLY THE SAME WAY. Or one can even do this more > > > > succinctly. If I predict that a clock's rate will see a certain rate > > > > effect, regardless of clock mechanism, and if I RANDOMLY select a > > > > clock out of a pool of four dozen clocks of widely different > > > > operational principles, then the chances of the prediction being > > > > exactly right for that randomly selected clock is quite low. > > > > But of course this presumes that there exist a variety of suitable > > > clocks that measure time by methods that employ qualitatively > > > different principles. > > > And there are! Would you like a small list? > > *Mechanical oscillators, such as spring-based mechanisms. > > *Potential well oscillators, using any of a variety of conservative > > forces. > > *Particle populations with well-determined half-lives > > *Atomic clocks > > *AC circuits > > *Digital oscillators > > *Optical oscillators > > When we are at the level where the fundamental principles of the > universe is in question, I think you underestimate the difficulty in > finding a diverse set of clocks which are not all subject to the same > fundamental principles. Not at all, the above are good examples of ones that operate with different cogs-and-levers principles. You are free to explain to me in some detail how the cogs-and-levers operation of all of these are in fact the same.
From: Bruce Richmond on 23 Feb 2010 20:36 On Feb 21, 11:52 pm, "J. Clarke" <jclarke.use...(a)cox.net> wrote: > On 2/21/2010 10:24 PM, Bruce Richmond wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 21, 6:10 pm, mpalenik<markpale...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Feb 21, 4:57 pm, Ste<ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > >>> If we were to extrapolate a trend from history, then physics has not > >>> yet given us a single equation which describes how the universe > >>> functions. It has given us some rules of thumb and some cumbersome > >>> approximations. > > >> This just further illustrates that you don't understand how physics > >> actually works. The history of physics isn't a series of blunders > >> that we've thrown out as we get better and better equations, hampered > >> by our belief in the old equations. Rather, physics at just about > >> every point in time since the renaissance has been a journey from very > >> specific to more general rules--criteria by which any new physics must > >> be constrained. > > >> For example, Kepler, while not really a physicist per-se, devised > >> descriptions of the elliptical orbits that planets must follow. > >> Newton, then, discovered that this is a special case of the > >> conservation of angular momentum, which is a much more general > >> principle--however, conservation of angular momentum MUST be able to > >> reproduce the elliptical orbits of planets, or else it is wrong. > >> Kepler's rules constrained Newton's theories. > > >> Special relativity then changed Newton's laws, a bit. The basic > >> principles, like F = dp/dt remained, but Special relativity says that > >> space and time must transform differently than they do in Newtonian > >> mechanics. However, Newtonian mechanics is still a special case of > >> special relativity--as the speed of an object approaches zero, the > >> laws begin to reproduce Newton's laws. Newton's laws, in this way, > >> constrain Special Relativity. Because if it did *NOT* reproduce > >> Newton's laws at low speeds, it would be wrong. > > >> General relativity came along and it turns out that special relativity > >> only works as a limiting case of general relativity, specifically, > >> when there is no mass or energy present. As the amount of mass and > >> energy present goes to zero, general relativity reproduces special > >> relativity. If it could not do this, it would be wrong. > > >> Any new physics must be able to reproduce the old physics in the > >> regimes in which it has been tested. Any new theory that cannot do so > >> is necessarily wrong because it has already been ruled out by > >> experiment. > > > Thank you for bringing this up and explaining it so well. A few days > > ago in the DeSitter thread I wrote that in SR the speed of light is > > made a universal constant by the second postulate. The coordinate > > systems are constructed based on that fact. Because of that there is > > no way you can measure the speed of light to be anything but c without > > making a mistake. > > What point are you trying to support with that statement? If one > _measures_ a velocity of light other than the one that it is commonly > held to have and others replicate your result, and it is found that > light has different velocities under different circumstances then it is > not the measurement that is a mistake but you will have just thrown > relativity right out the window and they'll be seeing you in Stockholm > pretty soon. Hold that prize. The discussion was about the basis of SR. I consider the second postulate to be a basic concept that SR was founded on. I was informed by some of the experts here that my thinking was outdated. > > I was then informed that the interpertation of SR > > has been improved upon since 1905 and that what I had written no > > longer applied. Further, relativity could survive even if it was > > found that the speed of light wasn't exactly c. > > Uh, by definition the velocity of light is exactly c. Grok the > concept--c is defined as "the velocity of light". Relativity makes no > statement concerning a specific value that c must have, only that it is > the same in all reference frames. It can be 2 millimeters per > millennium or forty quintillion kilometers per femtosecond and > relativity remains valid, as long as it demonstrably has that value and > only that value, within the limits of experimental error. I am well aware that the speed of light is c by definition in SR. That is basicly what I said in the paragraph above that starts with "Thank you". Again the experts told me I was wrong, that the speed of light was the distance traveled divided by the time. > > To that I responded > > that if the second postulate no longer applied then they weren't > > talking about Einstein's SR and should use a different name for the > > theory they were describing. From there it got into a pissing contest > > and I left. Care to comment? > > You're using phrasing that can easily lead to misunderstanding. Rather > than saying "if light has a velocity other than c", try saying "if it > can be shown that the velocity of light is different in different > reference frames", or "the velocity of light in vacuum is shown under > some circumstances to be significantly different from that which has > been measured for it in numerous experiments in the past". What's so hard to understand? They said the second postulate doesn't matter any more, so I told them they could be talking about SR.
From: Bruce Richmond on 23 Feb 2010 21:19 On Feb 23, 8:36 pm, Bruce Richmond <bsr3...(a)my-deja.com> wrote: > On Feb 21, 11:52 pm, "J. Clarke" <jclarke.use...(a)cox.net> wrote: > > > > > > > On 2/21/2010 10:24 PM, Bruce Richmond wrote: > > > > On Feb 21, 6:10 pm, mpalenik<markpale...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > >> On Feb 21, 4:57 pm, Ste<ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > >>> If we were to extrapolate a trend from history, then physics has not > > >>> yet given us a single equation which describes how the universe > > >>> functions. It has given us some rules of thumb and some cumbersome > > >>> approximations. > > > >> This just further illustrates that you don't understand how physics > > >> actually works. The history of physics isn't a series of blunders > > >> that we've thrown out as we get better and better equations, hampered > > >> by our belief in the old equations. Rather, physics at just about > > >> every point in time since the renaissance has been a journey from very > > >> specific to more general rules--criteria by which any new physics must > > >> be constrained. > > > >> For example, Kepler, while not really a physicist per-se, devised > > >> descriptions of the elliptical orbits that planets must follow. > > >> Newton, then, discovered that this is a special case of the > > >> conservation of angular momentum, which is a much more general > > >> principle--however, conservation of angular momentum MUST be able to > > >> reproduce the elliptical orbits of planets, or else it is wrong. > > >> Kepler's rules constrained Newton's theories. > > > >> Special relativity then changed Newton's laws, a bit. The basic > > >> principles, like F = dp/dt remained, but Special relativity says that > > >> space and time must transform differently than they do in Newtonian > > >> mechanics. However, Newtonian mechanics is still a special case of > > >> special relativity--as the speed of an object approaches zero, the > > >> laws begin to reproduce Newton's laws. Newton's laws, in this way, > > >> constrain Special Relativity. Because if it did *NOT* reproduce > > >> Newton's laws at low speeds, it would be wrong. > > > >> General relativity came along and it turns out that special relativity > > >> only works as a limiting case of general relativity, specifically, > > >> when there is no mass or energy present. As the amount of mass and > > >> energy present goes to zero, general relativity reproduces special > > >> relativity. If it could not do this, it would be wrong. > > > >> Any new physics must be able to reproduce the old physics in the > > >> regimes in which it has been tested. Any new theory that cannot do so > > >> is necessarily wrong because it has already been ruled out by > > >> experiment. > > > > Thank you for bringing this up and explaining it so well. A few days > > > ago in the DeSitter thread I wrote that in SR the speed of light is > > > made a universal constant by the second postulate. The coordinate > > > systems are constructed based on that fact. Because of that there is > > > no way you can measure the speed of light to be anything but c without > > > making a mistake. > > > What point are you trying to support with that statement? If one > > _measures_ a velocity of light other than the one that it is commonly > > held to have and others replicate your result, and it is found that > > light has different velocities under different circumstances then it is > > not the measurement that is a mistake but you will have just thrown > > relativity right out the window and they'll be seeing you in Stockholm > > pretty soon. > > Hold that prize. The discussion was about the basis of SR. I > consider the second postulate to be a basic concept that SR was > founded on. I was informed by some of the experts here that my > thinking was outdated. > > > > I was then informed that the interpertation of SR > > > has been improved upon since 1905 and that what I had written no > > > longer applied. Further, relativity could survive even if it was > > > found that the speed of light wasn't exactly c. > > > Uh, by definition the velocity of light is exactly c. Grok the > > concept--c is defined as "the velocity of light". Relativity makes no > > statement concerning a specific value that c must have, only that it is > > the same in all reference frames. It can be 2 millimeters per > > millennium or forty quintillion kilometers per femtosecond and > > relativity remains valid, as long as it demonstrably has that value and > > only that value, within the limits of experimental error. > > I am well aware that the speed of light is c by definition in SR. > That is basicly what I said in the paragraph above that starts with > "Thank you". Again the experts told me I was wrong, that the speed of > light was the distance traveled divided by the time. > > > > To that I responded > > > that if the second postulate no longer applied then they weren't > > > talking about Einstein's SR and should use a different name for the > > > theory they were describing. From there it got into a pissing contest > > > and I left. Care to comment? > > > You're using phrasing that can easily lead to misunderstanding. Rather > > than saying "if light has a velocity other than c", try saying "if it > > can be shown that the velocity of light is different in different > > reference frames", or "the velocity of light in vacuum is shown under > > some circumstances to be significantly different from that which has > > been measured for it in numerous experiments in the past". > > What's so hard to understand? They said the second postulate doesn't > matter any more, so I told them they could be talking about SR.- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - That should have been "couldn't".
From: Bruce Richmond on 23 Feb 2010 21:44
On Feb 21, 8:06 pm, mpc755 <mpc...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Feb 21, 12:25 pm, Bruce Richmond <bsr3...(a)my-deja.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 21, 11:34 am, mpc755 <mpc...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Feb 21, 9:18 am, "Peter Webb" > > > > <webbfam...(a)DIESPAMDIEoptusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > > "mpc755" <mpc...(a)gmail.com> wrote in message > > > > >news:dba2b7ab-670a-473f-a7f3-5447e3f01e53(a)b7g2000yqd.googlegroups.com... > > > > On Feb 21, 12:27 am, "Peter Webb" > > > > > <webbfam...(a)DIESPAMDIEoptusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > > > "mpc755" <mpc...(a)gmail.com> wrote in message > > > > > >news:1c9cf786-36cc-4fce-8b57-7f45f5b88ddd(a)v1g2000yqk.googlegroups.com... > > > > > On Feb 20, 11:21 pm, "Peter Webb" > > > > > > <webbfam...(a)DIESPAMDIEoptusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > > > > > And if conducted in a laboratory in low earth orbit, with a relative > > > > > > > speed > > > > > > > of 25,000 kph relative to the ether - what will be the measured speed > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > light then? > > > > > > > The light will be 'measured' to be 'c'. If the Observers in the > > > > > > laboratory in low Earth orbit know how they are moving with respect to > > > > > > the aether they will be able to determine the speed of light to be 'c' > > > > > > with respect to the aether. > > > > > > > ______________________________________ > > > > > > So, according to you, in every inertial reference frame, the measured > > > > > > speed > > > > > > of light is "c", completely independent of how the observer is moving > > > > > > relative to the ether? > > > > > > Measured, yes. > > > > > > ____________________________________ > > > > > OK, is the speed of light measured as 'c' in every inertial reference > > > > > frame? > > > > > Measured, yes. > > > > > _______________________________ > > > > How about the rest of the predictions of SR? Will lengths and times measure > > > > according to SR? You have no problem with the 80 foot ladder fitting inside > > > > the 40 foot barn, or the twins "paradox" ? > > > > I have already explained to you probably twenty times now the atomic > > > clocks 'tick' based upon the aether pressure in which the exist. There > > > may be length contraction at speeds near 'c'. > > > > What you fail to be able to understand is the rate at which a clock > > > 'ticks' is based upon the aether pressure in which it exists. For > > > example, we have a clock on the embankment and a clock on a train and > > > both the train and the embankment exist in the same three dimensional > > > space. Since the state of the aether is determined by its connections > > > with the matter the state of the aether is that it can be considered > > > to be at rest with respect to the embankment. Since the train is > > > moving relative to the embankment the train is not at rest with > > > respect to the train. The clocks on the train will 'tick' slower than > > > the clocks on the embankment. > > > > This nonsense of the Observer on the train seeing the clock on the > > > embankment 'tick' slower and the Observer on the embankment seeing the > > > clock on the train 'tick' slower is exactly that, complete nonsense. > > > You have progressed a long way from where you were. It's time to take > > another step. From you previous posts I see you agree that the clocks > > on the train are out of sync with the clocks on the embankment. Now > > consider how the train observers measure the tick rate of a clock on > > the embankment. Viewed from the train the clock at A on the > > embankment passes along the length of the train. No single train > > observer can deterimine the tick rate of A because he only sees A for > > one instant. So the tick rate at A is determined by having multiple > > observers record the reading on clock A and the time of that reading > > *according to their own clock*. > > > The clocks at A and A' are compared when they pass and the difference > > in their readings noted. Next the clocks at A and B' are compared and > > their difference in reading noted. If that difference has increased > > the train observers must conclude that the clock at A is running slow > > because it has lost time compared to the clock at B' *which is in sync > > with the clock at A'*. > > > The track observers see what the train observers are doing and realize > > the train observers got a different result because *the clocks at A' > > and B' are out of sync*. > > > So now maybe you can see that the train observers can *measure* the > > tick rate of the embankment clocks to be slower, even if it is in fact > > faster. > > > Bruce > > When the clocks are moved on the train they wind up at A' and B' and > read 12:00:01 and 12:00:00, respectively. Since the embankment is at > rest with respect to the aether when the clocks are moved to A and B > they both read 12:00:00. > > If the train is moving fast enough the clocks on the train should be > ticking slow enough that the difference in the times at A' and B' > should be outweighed by the slowness of the ticking. For example, > let's say B' and A are co-located at 12:00:00. It takes 3 seconds, as > determined by the clock at B', to go from A to B. It takes 5 seconds > as determined by the clock at A to go from B' to A'. When B' and B are > co-located their clocks will read 12:00:03 and 12:00:05, respectively. > When A' and A are co-located their clocks will read 12:00:04 and > 12:00:05, respectively. All of the Observers conclude the clocks on > the train 'tick' slower than the clocks on the embankment. There is no "fast enough" here. RoS works whenever there is a relative speed between frames. As for the slowness of the ticking outweighing clock sync, you are just waving your arms. The two things you time above tell you nothing about the tick rate of the clocks. They aren't measuring the same thing. You wrote "It takes 3 seconds, as determined by the clock at B', to go from A to B." What you need to compare that to is the time for B' to go from A to B, as determined by the clocks at A and B. That is where the clock sync comes in to play. |