From: Ste on
On 9 Mar, 17:20, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mar 9, 11:07 am, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > What I haven't found compelling is the argument that falsificationism
> > is the hallmark of science as against non-science or religion. What is
> > quite clear from the judgment is that it was that court's view that it
> > is naturalism that is the hallmark of science. Indeed to quote the
> > judge: "This rigorous attachment to “natural” explanations is an
> > essential attribute to
> > science by definition and by convention."
>
> Where "natural" is distinguished from "supernatural", this being said
> at least ... oh, never mind, I lost count.
>
> You've had numerous people from the scientific field flatly averring
> that falsification and experimental test IS the hallmark of science,
> and yet you find it less than compelling. This perhaps goes back to
> the issue that you believe what you want to believe, and you choose
> your experts according to whether they hold the same belief. And this
> IS a hallmark of religious thinking.

But this case was *your* quoted authority Paul. I didn't choose it,
you did!

I agree that some sort of testability plays a part in science, but as
I say I remain unconvinced that testability (as a practical rather
than a notional proposition) defines science. In that judgment, the
judge seems satisfied with the basic proposition that science is
naturalistic, and ID is not naturalistic, and hence not science. There
is no extensive discussion of testability. Insofar as testability is
mentioned as a requirement of science at all, it is only in
juxtaposing it against the obvious untestability of supernatural
explanations.

Again, I quote (from the Claimant's closing submissions): "You heard
plaintiffs' experts Pennock, Padian, and Miller testify that that
scientific propositions have to be testable. [...] Of course, there is
an obvious reason that Intelligent Design hasn't been tested - it
can't be. The proposition that a supernatural intelligent designer
created a biological system is not testable, and can never be ruled
out."

"[Intelligent Design] has been unanimously rejected by the National
Academy of Science, the American Association for Advancement of
Science, and every other major scientific and science education
organization that has considered the issue, including, we learned this
morning, the American Society of Soil Scientists. The fact that it
invokes the supernatural is, by itself, disqualifying."
From: Ste on
On 9 Mar, 17:39, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mar 9, 11:14 am, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Yes. I'll take the symmetric case here, where they both travel outward
> and back the same distance.

Yes, we are back to talking about the symmetric case, although on
reflection I might not have made that clear.



> The details here are interesting, and again, it depends a little on
> what's actually being measured. This is also covered and explained
> nicely in the link that I gave you, so I do recommend you read that.
> You have to first keep in mind that the B and C clocks are not in the
> same place, so it takes some care to explain what you mean when you
> say that B sees that clock C is running slow. How exactly is the
> information exchanged and the propagation time corrected for? See the
> links. In a nutshell, and under one such scenario, what B sees is the
> following:
> 1. On the outward trip, C's clock is running slow, so that it is
> behind B's clock by the time the outward journey ends.
> 2. On the turnaround, C's clock leaps forward so that it is *ahead* of
> B's clock by the time the turnaround is complete.
> 3. On the inbound trip, C's clock is running slow, so that it ends up
> showing the same time as B's clock by the time the inward journey
> ends.

When we talk of the "turnaround", can we be a bit more specific about
what is happening? Also, bear in mind that *both* turnaround at the
same time.

I also find it implausible that C could leap ahead of B. The more
plausible explanation, surely, is that B slows down dramatically
relative to C. So for example, if both clocks stopped moving (relative
to A) while at their farthest distance from each other, then for a
short time the other clock would appear to leap ahead (actually a
slowing of the reference clock), until the effects of each clock
stopping had actually propagated to the other clock, at which point
they would snap back into synchronisation again (propagation delays
disregarded). Yes?
From: PD on
On Mar 9, 1:25 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
> On 9 Mar, 17:20, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Mar 9, 11:07 am, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > What I haven't found compelling is the argument that falsificationism
> > > is the hallmark of science as against non-science or religion. What is
> > > quite clear from the judgment is that it was that court's view that it
> > > is naturalism that is the hallmark of science. Indeed to quote the
> > > judge: "This rigorous attachment to “natural” explanations is an
> > > essential attribute to
> > > science by definition and by convention."
>
> > Where "natural" is distinguished from "supernatural", this being said
> > at least ... oh, never mind, I lost count.
>
> > You've had numerous people from the scientific field flatly averring
> > that falsification and experimental test IS the hallmark of science,
> > and yet you find it less than compelling. This perhaps goes back to
> > the issue that you believe what you want to believe, and you choose
> > your experts according to whether they hold the same belief. And this
> > IS a hallmark of religious thinking.
>
> But this case was *your* quoted authority Paul. I didn't choose it,
> you did!

I made no statement about it being an authoritative declaration. What
I said is that the definition is acknowledged (and it is) in a
statement intended for layfolk outside the scientific field, which I
took this ruling to be. Your return comment was that this is in fact
not a statement intended for layfolk at all, and there are nuances in
how to read a legal judgment, wherein it is not sufficient to actually
read the statement in the section about how intelligent design and
creationism are distinguished from science, but instead one must count
instances of words. Moreover, one should -- in the context of a legal
opinion -- ignore the explicit identification of "methodological
naturalism" with the scientific method and the explicit contrast of
naturalism against creationism's supernaturalism, and feel free to
interpret naturalism however the hell one wants, including one's
favorite philosophical connotation, though that connotation is
unmentioned entirely in the judgment. In these instructions on how to
properly read legal judgments, I of course defer to you, and I thank
you for the patient instruction.

>
> I agree that some sort of testability plays a part in science, but as
> I say I remain unconvinced that testability (as a practical rather
> than a notional proposition) defines science.

I may be of the opinion that architecture is art, and that structural
integrity is not an essential distinction between the two. I might
even find some source that agrees with this. However, if I find that a
number of architects strenuously disagree with me, then I suppose I
would reconsider the fitness of my position.

> In that judgment, the
> judge seems satisfied with the basic proposition that science is
> naturalistic, and ID is not naturalistic, and hence not science. There
> is no extensive discussion of testability. Insofar as testability is
> mentioned as a requirement of science at all, it is only in
> juxtaposing it against the obvious untestability of supernatural
> explanations.
>
> Again, I quote (from the Claimant's closing submissions): "You heard
> plaintiffs' experts Pennock, Padian, and Miller testify that that
> scientific propositions have to be testable. [...] Of course, there is
> an obvious reason that Intelligent Design hasn't been tested - it
> can't be. The proposition that a supernatural intelligent designer
> created a biological system is not testable, and can never be ruled
> out."
>
> "[Intelligent Design] has been unanimously rejected by the National
> Academy of Science, the American Association for Advancement of
> Science, and every other major scientific and science education
> organization that has considered the issue, including, we learned this
> morning, the American Society of Soil Scientists. The fact that it
> invokes the supernatural is, by itself, disqualifying."

From: PD on
On Mar 9, 1:25 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
> On 9 Mar, 17:20, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Mar 9, 11:07 am, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > What I haven't found compelling is the argument that falsificationism
> > > is the hallmark of science as against non-science or religion. What is
> > > quite clear from the judgment is that it was that court's view that it
> > > is naturalism that is the hallmark of science. Indeed to quote the
> > > judge: "This rigorous attachment to “natural” explanations is an
> > > essential attribute to
> > > science by definition and by convention."
>
> > Where "natural" is distinguished from "supernatural", this being said
> > at least ... oh, never mind, I lost count.
>
> > You've had numerous people from the scientific field flatly averring
> > that falsification and experimental test IS the hallmark of science,
> > and yet you find it less than compelling. This perhaps goes back to
> > the issue that you believe what you want to believe, and you choose
> > your experts according to whether they hold the same belief. And this
> > IS a hallmark of religious thinking.
>
> But this case was *your* quoted authority Paul. I didn't choose it,
> you did!
>
> I agree that some sort of testability plays a part in science, but as
> I say I remain unconvinced that testability (as a practical rather
> than a notional proposition) defines science. In that judgment, the
> judge seems satisfied with the basic proposition that science is
> naturalistic, and ID is not naturalistic, and hence not science. There
> is no extensive discussion of testability. Insofar as testability is
> mentioned as a requirement of science at all, it is only in
> juxtaposing it against the obvious untestability of supernatural
> explanations.
>
> Again, I quote (from the Claimant's closing submissions): "You heard
> plaintiffs' experts Pennock, Padian, and Miller testify that that
> scientific propositions have to be testable. [...] Of course, there is
> an obvious reason that Intelligent Design hasn't been tested - it
> can't be. The proposition that a supernatural intelligent designer
> created a biological system is not testable, and can never be ruled
> out."
>
> "[Intelligent Design] has been unanimously rejected by the National
> Academy of Science, the American Association for Advancement of
> Science, and every other major scientific and science education
> organization that has considered the issue, including, we learned this
> morning, the American Society of Soil Scientists. The fact that it
> invokes the supernatural is, by itself, disqualifying."

As a passing metacomment about this discussion, I will only remark
that at a juncture were I had the opportunity to choose between
physics and philosophy as a career path, one of the reasons I did not
choose philosophy is that it seemed to be more about the dance than
about the truth. The implicit assumption seemed to be that the better
the dance, the more likely it would represent truth, and there was no
recourse to any more objective adjudicator (such as physics uses when
it checks how nature actually behaves) than the dancers themselves.
This, philosophy shares with the practice of law, which perhaps
accounts for their appeal to you. Many times during our conversations
here, I have gotten the impression that you are more interested in the
verbal dance than in what nature actually does and what we think we
know about that and why.

PD
From: PD on
On Mar 9, 1:56 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
> On 9 Mar, 17:39, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Mar 9, 11:14 am, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Yes. I'll take the symmetric case here, where they both travel outward
> > and back the same distance.
>
> Yes, we are back to talking about the symmetric case, although on
> reflection I might not have made that clear.
>
>
>
> > The details here are interesting, and again, it depends a little on
> > what's actually being measured. This is also covered and explained
> > nicely in the link that I gave you, so I do recommend you read that.
> > You have to first keep in mind that the B and C clocks are not in the
> > same place, so it takes some care to explain what you mean when you
> > say that B sees that clock C is running slow. How exactly is the
> > information exchanged and the propagation time corrected for? See the
> > links. In a nutshell, and under one such scenario, what B sees is the
> > following:
> > 1. On the outward trip, C's clock is running slow, so that it is
> > behind B's clock by the time the outward journey ends.
> > 2. On the turnaround, C's clock leaps forward so that it is *ahead* of
> > B's clock by the time the turnaround is complete.
> > 3. On the inbound trip, C's clock is running slow, so that it ends up
> > showing the same time as B's clock by the time the inward journey
> > ends.
>
> When we talk of the "turnaround", can we be a bit more specific about
> what is happening? Also, bear in mind that *both* turnaround at the
> same time.

As I said, the specifics are in the link that I provided and I don't
want to replicate them here.

>
> I also find it implausible that C could leap ahead of B.

I'm sorry, but do not confuse "don't understand how" with
"implausible". If I tell you that the pressure at the bottom of a tank
of water doesn't depend on whether the cross-sectional area at the
bottom of the tank is bigger than the cross-sectional area at the top
of the tank, or the cross-sectional area at the top of the tank is
bigger than the cross-sectional area at the bottom of the tank, you
may not understand how this is possible, but that does not make it
implausible.

> The more
> plausible explanation, surely, is that B slows down dramatically
> relative to C.

No. Again, you are making a generalization from a comic-book
representation of special relativity that changes in readings in
clocks is due to (and only due to) the relative speed of the clock.
This is not the case, not even in SR.

> So for example, if both clocks stopped moving (relative
> to A) while at their farthest distance from each other, then for a
> short time the other clock would appear to leap ahead (actually a
> slowing of the reference clock), until the effects of each clock
> stopping had actually propagated to the other clock, at which point
> they would snap back into synchronisation again (propagation delays
> disregarded). Yes?