Cryptography
in [Science]
|
Protecting 3x16 bits with 16 bits ? (crc8 + 7 bit hamming code?) Another interesting idea could be to do the following: Spent 8 bits on a crc8 for strong error detection. Spent 6 bits on a hamming code for 1-bit error correction. Spent 1 bit on hamming code extension for 2 bit error detection. Total of 15 bits used... one spare bit (?). This would probably create a very s... 13 Feb 2010 23:48
Security Proof of PACE Hi, the new German electronic ID card ("Personalausweis") has a newly developed crxyptographic protocol called "PACE". PACE is a elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman with password authentication. The designers of PACE have now put a security proof on http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/624 Is anyone interested in analysing/... 14 Feb 2010 04:09
New breakthrough in factoring? http://www.scipub.org/fulltext/jcs/jcs59674-679.pdf ... 15 Feb 2010 08:42
Protecting 3x16 bits with 16 bits ? (I wonder about LDPC codes for gpu ;)) I investigated hamming a bit and wondered what would happen if I left out 1 bit from all data bits in a parity calculation, all data bits would receive a parity bit... from that "experiment" it was pretty clear that this hamming idea can only correct single bit errors ?!? Well maybe not because the wikipedia li... 12 Feb 2010 23:34
why doesn't the decryption primitive in PKCS#1 employ RSAblinding? On Fri, 12 Feb 2010 11:27:16 -0800, yawnmoth wrote: <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-5.1.2> discusses the decryption primitive for PKCS#1 but it doesn't seem to employ any blinding. Why not? Probably because blinding is optional. Implementations that leak information when carrying out priva... 12 Feb 2010 15:43
why doesn't the decryption primitive in PKCS#1 employ RSA blinding? <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-5.1.2> discusses the decryption primitive for PKCS#1 but it doesn't seem to employ any blinding. Why not? ... 12 Feb 2010 14:36
Algebraic attacks and data word rotations Of late I have been attempting to wrap my head around the XL and XSL algebraic attacks on block ciphers (with only limited success, I might add), and I have a few questions about how these attacks would apply to 'hidden' (i.e. unknown to the attacker) data word rotations (such as those that are used in RC5 and CAST... 15 Feb 2010 20:02
Protecting 3x16 bits with 16 bits ? (Which error correcting code for mode 3?) > For me it could be interesting to make two modes of operations for the final product: First mode which uses 3x16 bits in registers and memory. Second mode which uses 4x16 bits in registers and memory. I want to expand on these modes. There would be three modes: 1. "Casual/Normal mode" without er... 12 Feb 2010 20:14
Chip and PIN is Broken Chip and PIN is Broken: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/banking/nopin/oakland10chipbroken.pdf ... 14 Feb 2010 15:10
Another informative pronouncement from Smug Doug Gwyn When I stated the belief (which I still maintain) that the Beale cipher methodology was the work of Jefferson, Smug Doug was quick to "correct" me. No, they were Jefferson style or type (forgot which) ciphers. This remark should be viewed as nothing more than an attempt to dilute the historic significance of th... 5 Feb 2010 13:57 |