Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
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From: M Purcell on 2 Jan 2010 08:46 On Jan 2, 5:30 am, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol> wrote: > M Purcell wrote: > > On Dec 31 2009, 8:37 pm, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote: > >> M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > >>> Sometimes approximations are good enough and necessary to arrive at > >>> timely decisions. Even if our idealized mathematical models were > >>> accurate, the measurements used to verify them are imprecise. Science > >>> is practiced by imperfect human beings with limited prior knowledge > >>> and imagination. And the standard to which both are compared is a > >>> nature knowable by virtue of our limited senses, thus the Uncertainty > >>> Principle and an Universe expanding beyond our powers of observation. > >>> I believe our knowledge is based on comparisons with ourselves and > >>> fundamentally anthropomorphic. > >> The human being navigates life largely by the process we call Inductive, > >> and most often at an automatic behavior level. > > >> Induction at the highly focused and critical level (not automatic), is > >> how one builds towards a thesis. > > >> Induction does lead to knowledge in that it is shown to be reasonable > >> (to use Patricia's term) or it does not weather scientific methodology.. > > >> Regardless, each outcome does lead to knowledge. > > >> It is truly that simple. > > > I was simply trying to move on to a definition of knowledge although > > I'm sure that has also been endlessly debated. Although a critical > > compairson of inductive conclusions with observations does determine > > thier validity, I doubt the invalidity of an inductive conclusion > > would be considered knowledge. > > But that's the most valuable piece of knowledge...what doesn't work. I doubt you could sell it. Do you consider all inductive conclusions as knowledge?
From: Zinnic on 2 Jan 2010 08:53 On Jan 1, 8:20 am, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol> wrote: > Zinnic wrote: > > On Dec 31, 8:30 am, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol> wrote: > >> John Stafford wrote: > >>> In article > >>> <e6657e15-0ffc-4904-a0c8-6c95f8f8b...(a)j19g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, > >>> Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > >>>> On Dec 29, 6:00 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> [...] > >>>> You have agreed in earlier posts that the longer a sequence of > >>>> identical outcomes, then the stronger becomes your suspicion that > >>>> there is an underlying causative factor for the repetition ( I am > >>>> aware that the repetition is not itself causative). > >>>> That is, as the repetition continues it is "reasonable" (your word in > >>>> the above quote) for a mere suspicion to become an assumption and, > >>>> eventually, a confident 'assertion' that the repetition will continue > >>>> (despite the fact that certainty is not attained.) > >>> In an inductive argument, the observation of a consistent behavior can > >>> be a premise. The premise need only be strong enough that _if they are > >>> true_, then the conclusion is _likely_ to be true. This is quite unlike > >>> deductive reasoning where a _valid argument and sound conclusion_ are > >>> guaranteed to be true. > >> <snip> > > >> So the answer to the title's question is no; however, inductive > >> reasoning can lead to a correct premise. > > >> Am I getting this stuff or am I still not understanding what > >> you're saying. > > > I am interested in how you reason to exclude "correct premise" from > > your definition of knowledge. > > It's a hypothesis which hasn't been demonstrated to be "correct" > enough times nor does it have a reasonable explanation other > than a declaration of correctness. If I wasn't hip deep in > philosophers' wordage, I'd provide an example. However, this > tactic doesn't seem to work with those types. > > /BAH- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - No matter what the route, arrival at a "correct " premise is to arrive at possession of knowledge . IMO, any view that is correct is, by definition, knowledge. In a weaker sense widely held, but incorrect, views also may be included as knowledge. Obviously, we need to define knowledge one way or another.! :-) Z
From: M Purcell on 2 Jan 2010 09:20 On Jan 2, 5:53 am, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > On Jan 1, 8:20 am, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol> wrote: > > > > > > > Zinnic wrote: > > > On Dec 31, 8:30 am, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol> wrote: > > >> John Stafford wrote: > > >>> In article > > >>> <e6657e15-0ffc-4904-a0c8-6c95f8f8b...(a)j19g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, > > >>> Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > >>>> On Dec 29, 6:00 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> [...] > > >>>> You have agreed in earlier posts that the longer a sequence of > > >>>> identical outcomes, then the stronger becomes your suspicion that > > >>>> there is an underlying causative factor for the repetition ( I am > > >>>> aware that the repetition is not itself causative). > > >>>> That is, as the repetition continues it is "reasonable" (your word in > > >>>> the above quote) for a mere suspicion to become an assumption and, > > >>>> eventually, a confident 'assertion' that the repetition will continue > > >>>> (despite the fact that certainty is not attained.) > > >>> In an inductive argument, the observation of a consistent behavior can > > >>> be a premise. The premise need only be strong enough that _if they are > > >>> true_, then the conclusion is _likely_ to be true. This is quite unlike > > >>> deductive reasoning where a _valid argument and sound conclusion_ are > > >>> guaranteed to be true. > > >> <snip> > > > >> So the answer to the title's question is no; however, inductive > > >> reasoning can lead to a correct premise. > > > >> Am I getting this stuff or am I still not understanding what > > >> you're saying. > > > > I am interested in how you reason to exclude "correct premise" from > > > your definition of knowledge. > > > It's a hypothesis which hasn't been demonstrated to be "correct" > > enough times nor does it have a reasonable explanation other > > than a declaration of correctness. If I wasn't hip deep in > > philosophers' wordage, I'd provide an example. However, this > > tactic doesn't seem to work with those types. > > > /BAH- Hide quoted text - > > > - Show quoted text - > > No matter what the route, arrival at a "correct " premise is to > arrive at possession of knowledge . > IMO, any view that is correct is, by definition, knowledge. In a > weaker sense widely held, but incorrect, views also may be included > as knowledge. Obviously, we need to define knowledge one way or > another.! :-) How do you determine "correctness"? Science seems to have the most stringent requirements yet any scientific theory can be disproven.
From: John Stafford on 2 Jan 2010 10:27 In article <247354ca-0913-4639-a138-d2db6bcb885c(a)e37g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldoraz(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Your contributions have been obscure shitty little statements like > "Deduction depends on induction" I never wrote that. > and stuff like "Go read Hume" Please do. > "induction is well known to be used to gain knowledge". I never wrote that. > This sort of limp nonsense. > > Compare this with people like me who say make continuous and genuine > attempts to explain (whether they succeed or not is not quite the > point, the point is to try) with: People like you believe philosophy is to create an impressionistic fog of confusion. > "In the context of a discussion on induction, it is a reasonable thing > to ask what a piece of inductive reasoning looks like. What is it > about it that specifically makes it appropriate to call it > "inductive"? > > This argument: > > This A is B, > This A is B, > .... > ----------------- > All As are Bs > > or even > > This A is B, > This A is B, > .... > --------------------- > Probably As are Bs > > is, at least, some sort of recognizable pattern of an argument that > can be called *inductive* to contrast it with a deductive argument > like > > This A is a B > This A is a B > --------- > Some As are Bs > > "The idea here is that people think there are perfectly good arguments > like the above that are not deductive and so let's call them > inductive! > > "But they are not *good* arguments at all, they never are, no matter > how many cases are piled up in the premises. By definition, induction does not pretend to guarantee a truth. > It is not just that they > are not deductive, it is that they do not seem to have any *reasoning > power*, there seems not even a *weak* force between the premises and > the conclusion. If there were no deductive properties and also not a weakness in the premises, there would be no probability possible, so the argument would not even be induction. It would be nonsense. You see, a probability of zero is still a probability, a statement of falsehood. > "Reasoning power? I refer to the power that avoids The Gambler's > Fallacy. You see, no matter how many times a penny comes up tails, it > does not follow in any way at all that it will come up tails on the > next throw. It is not even probable! Nor is the likelihood of heads > any better. There is no reasoning connection between the premise data > and the conclusion. False. If a coin comes up tails a hundred times in a row, then it is proper induction to state that it will come up tails on the 101th toss. Why? Because we know from hard-science and statistics that 100 tails in a row indicates that the coin is probably not a fair coin and/or the toss is not a fair toss. > "Some people say that there is a more sophisticated idea of induction > that does not involve the above simplistic patterns." Attribution confusion. I did not write that. You did. See: Message-ID: <39729617-0e19-41ea-b429-84f91b3c1e56(a)a10g2000pre.googlegroups.com> > OK. I am > listening. What are these more sophisticated ideas that identify > something aptly to be called induction? We have to get this attribution fixed. It appears that you are talking to yourself. > "That scientist X thinks up one pattern and scientist Y thinks up > another contrary pattern can be described as both of them inducing > different things from the data. But there is nothing in this kind of > psychological induction to say the least thing about whether one is > good *reasoning* and the other bad. Let's sort this out. Induction does not pretend to produce a perfect truth, only a probability. > "It is just a psychological trick that trained and gifted scientists > get up to! The testing of theories is the main game but that game is > a game of deduction." Who wrote that? Not me. > You are a fool Stafford and considering your rudeness I will not miss > you if you stop following me about. You are not getting or > understanding the least thing so do what most people here do and > ignore me. What you are trying to say is quite simple. You are saying that induction does not tell us whether a posit is reasonable thinking, and my response is that inductive reasoning does not pretend to issue a truth, but only a likelihood. What would the world be like if there were no inductions?
From: PD on 2 Jan 2010 13:43
On Jan 1, 3:36 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...(a)xtra.co.nz> wrote: > On Jan 2, 3:47 am, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > No, this is NOT the context. The context was that not being able to > > breathe water is not an AXIOMATIC statement. > > You wanted an example of something that was certain, No. Please read what I specifically asked for. I asked for something that was AXIOMATICALLY certain. You ignored the adjective and provided something that was certain for a wholly different reason. The fact that you do not understand the meaning of axiomatic doesn't alter what I asked for. > I said that it is > certain that you can not survive by breathing water, survive in space > without wearing a space-suit etc, which you then claimed they were not > examples of certainties, which you preceeded with the adjective > axiomatic. > > I am still waiting for you to explain how preceeding certainty with > axiomatic changes the meaning of certainty, which you are refusing to > do. > > You wanted an example of a scientific certainty IS the context. > > MG |