Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: RG on 29 May 2010 13:52 In article <1jj983e.1glapw8af7kb8N%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > I can conceive of a lot of reasons to prefer one theory over another. > "Prefer" means "to like one thing _better_ than another"; "better" means > "more good", and that's puts it straight in the realm of morality. I'll > use my wetware to make a choice from imagination space (what I think > ought to be). > > But if we're going to do _science_, individual preference has to be > removed. > > If I have to compute orbital mechanics, and I have the choice between > pages and pages of calculations and a simple formula, I'm going to take > the easy way out. But that's just me. No. You are wrong. Get yourself a copy of David Deutsch's "The Fabric of Reality" and read Chapter 7. rg
From: Bob Felts on 29 May 2010 14:53 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <1jj983e.1glapw8af7kb8N%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > I can conceive of a lot of reasons to prefer one theory over another. > > "Prefer" means "to like one thing _better_ than another"; "better" means > > "more good", and that's puts it straight in the realm of morality. I'll > > use my wetware to make a choice from imagination space (what I think > > ought to be). > > > > But if we're going to do _science_, individual preference has to be > > removed. > > > > If I have to compute orbital mechanics, and I have the choice between > > pages and pages of calculations and a simple formula, I'm going to take > > the easy way out. But that's just me. > > No. You are wrong. Get yourself a copy of David Deutsch's "The Fabric > of Reality" and read Chapter 7. My corporate library doesn't have it. So it would take a few days to get it from Amazon (assuming I decide to spend the money. The reviews on Amazon certainly are mixed). Got the reader's digest version?
From: Don Geddis on 30 May 2010 01:43 wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Sat, 29 May 2010: > Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: >> you can't seem to conceive of any reason aside from observational data, >> to prefer one theory over another. > > I can conceive of a lot of reasons to prefer one theory over another. > "Prefer" means "to like one thing _better_ than another"; "better" means > "more good", and that's puts it straight in the realm of morality. That's a chain that you keep expressing. You constantly want to bring morality into discussions which have nothing to do with morality. A scientist "prefers" theory A over theory B, when theory A is a better match to observation. You already understand this, when we're talking about matching to past observations (i.e. falsifiability). What you don't seem to grasp is that there are things you can observe about the structure of proposed theories, which are well correlated with making accurate FUTURE predictions. So, unlike your off-topic claim, "prefer" in the context of scientific theories has nothing at all to do with morality. It has to do with being more accurate at predicting future observations. > I'll use my wetware to make a choice from imagination space (what I > think ought to be). This discussion has nothing to do with how things "ought" to be. It has to do with the best description of how things actually are, at the moment. > Now, you might say, "the simpler calculations eventually turned out to > correspond to reality, so we should always choose the simpler." That's > not a bad rule of thumb, but it isn't proof that reality always > corresponds to the simpler theory. Of course it's not a proof. Nonetheless, if you refuse to incorporate any notion of "simpler", then you'll find that, in general, you are FAR worse at predicting future observations than I am. > suppose you have calculations X and Y where both give the same result. > X is computationally simpler (for some definition of simpler) than Y. > What you want is proof that the universe works according to X and not > Y. No, I don't offer any such proof. What I offer is the observation, that following this advice has been productive for the recorded history of science. It appears to be a quicker path to truth, in general, than not following the advice. >> Do you really believe there is absolutely no way to have any (objective) >> preferences over the infinite set of matching theories? From your >> perspective, any one would be just as good as any other? > > There you go, again, injecting "good", which is a property of our > imagination, back into the discussion. It is you, who keeps misinterpreting this word as only referring to morality. In a scientific context, it means a theory that makes more accurate predictions. >> I think you would make for a poor scientist. Among other problems, you >> would fine that the random theory you often chose from the infinite set, >> usually was immediately falsified by the very next observation. > > Right. If it was _falsified by observation_ I'd change horses. But you've completely missed the point. I can prefer the better theory BEFORE is is falsified by observation. Which is why I prefer Multiple Worlds to Copenhagen, and why I would have preferred ellipses to epicycles. You, on the other hand, apparently must wait until your favorite theory (chosen how?) is falsified, before you're willing to move on. So you're stuck with bad theories long, long after every reasonable scientist has moved on. And you'll bet on bad predictions, long after everyone else knows that your bets are going to be wrong. > In fact I've been the one insisting on it as a means to judge between > competing theories. It is one method, but not the only method. > But we haven't been talking about theories that have been falsified by > observation. Were talking about theories that have appeal to our > intuitive sense of "fitness" -- where "fitness" happens to vary > between individuals. This has nothing at all to do with individual preference. This has to do with an overall scientific prior bias on possible theories. You haven't yet directly answered the question: given that there are an infinite number of theories that are compatible with ANY stream of observational data, and given that, within this infinite set of theories, there are theories that make any prediction at all about future observations ... then, how do you choose which one to use? If I ask you to make (or bet on!) a prediction about the future, how do you decide what to predict? You CANNOT use observational data to make this choice. All of the infinite theories agree on past observation. Yet they all disagree on future prediction. What are you going to do? >> Whereas I, able to use information in addition to observational data, >> would typically choose scientific theories that just so happen to >> continue predicting new future observations correctly. > > Where do QM and MWI differ in their predictions? Careful. Quantum Mechanics are the equations that are well-verified by experiment. Your question was probably about the Multiple World _interpretation_ of QM, vs. the so-called Copenhagen interpretation. "Copenhagen" is a label that has been given to a lot of fuzzy thinking about QM. You would have to give me a precise description of what you have in mind, for me to give you a different prediction. But just as one example, some versions of Copenhagen think there is something special about human consciousness. They would predict different results, depending on whether a human is in the experiment or not. (E.g. Schrodinger's Cat.) They might predict, for example, that you cannot make an AI out of a computer, because humans have "something special" which affects quantum mechanics, whereas a computer doesn't have that power. MWI would predict no difference between a human and a computer, when it comes to any QM experiment. >> This is pretty easy to falsify. You just need an experiment that shows >> that something other than superposition (for example, "wavefunction >> collapse") definitely happens somewhere, at some scale, in some >> experiment. >> >> Then, Multiple Worlds would be falsified. > > Then do the experiment. But there is no single experiment, no precise prediction, from Copenhagen. It isn't really a "theory" in any real sense. It's just a bunch of fuzzy thinking. Copenhagen doesn't say, "collapse happens HERE, for this reason". It just says "maybe collapse happens somewhere .... whereever we haven't yet looked". Whatever experiment you run, Copenhagen fans will just scurry like rats to whatever territory you have not yet explored. They'll just say, "collapse doesn't happen where you happened to run the experiment .... but I'm sure it happens somewhere else, where you haven't yet run an experiment!" It's a foolish game for anyone to get in to. It's not a serious theory. > Until then Copenhagen and MWI return the exact same results. It > doesn't matter how "pretty" a theory is until there is experimental > evidence that the universe does, in fact, conform to our sense of > "prettiness" (or vice versa). That's where you're wrong. For one, you must be using some method to choose your favorite theory, in any case. We can compare the utility of your method, to the one that I'm proposing ("simpler"). For another, the rest of us can figure out the "right" theory, long, long before you do. We have plenty of historical examples, where we can zero in on the correct theory quickly, time and time again, and you'll putter along in ignorance far too long. We can use that gap to make money off of you by betting on future observations. >> It's far more justified than that. As I say, if we both try to form >> theories to explain a series of data points, and I use (something like) >> Occam's Razor to guide my search of theories, and you refuse to use >> anything except "falsified by the data" ... then I'm going to get to the >> right answer long, long before you will. > > Then take a look at the expermients that show when Occam's Razor fails > as a guide to theory selection. You've brought this up too much. Notice that I've said "something like" Occam's Razor. Even the reference that you keep quoting, doesn't have the implication that you think it does. It is NOT the case that they abandoned all judgement on theory simplicity. They just compared one particular metric with another, and found a metric that worked "better" than a first guess metric (which they labelled "Occam's Razor"). This is not at all what you're claiming. You're claiming that you can't make any judgements besides falsification. And you're just wrong about that. Even your reference doesn't do that. >> We can even bet on it. A black box spits out numbers. Our goal is >> to predict the next number. Every time we predict correctly, we get >> paid $10. Run this experiment with many such black boxes, and with >> you and me using our different procedures of "science", and (in this >> real universe) I'll wind up with a whole lot more money than you. > > We do have such black boxes. How many times have you played the > lottery? How many times have you won? ;-) The lottery happens to be not predictable by us, so on that one we will both fail. But that's merely one possible black box out of millions. When we try this experiment with lots of different kinds of black boxes, which one of us will wind up with more money? Me, that's who. Because you are unable to reach conclusions about theories and data as quickly as real scientists can. >> It's got nothing (directly) to do with "esthetics". Nor, therefore, >> with good and evil. > > Ok, then why the opposition to my theory that humans are driven by > (quantum) randomness Because it's completely unmotivated, and unhelpful in solving any problems. It's like saying, "when you build an AI, you should paint the outside box blue!" It has nothing at all to do with any problem that needs solving. Yet you express extreme confidence in your insight, with basically zero evidence that you have discovered anything of any value at all. > and, to test that, to construct an AI using quantun randomness, > instead of pseudo-randomness, or some deterministic algorithm? How, exactly? Nobody knows how to construct an AI. How do you operationalize your advice, to construct one "using quantum randomness"? That isn't advice that means anything. There is no plan for an AI, to which you could add "randomness" as a add-on. > It has nothing to do with ease of calculation; rather, I suspect it's > the philosophical implications. It's got nothing to do with philosophy at all. You're suggesting that we paint the computer blue, and I'm laughing at your naivete. >> And similarly, Ron and I are neither intelligent nor not, but simply >> have a certain level of intelligence. > > How can you have a "level" of something if you don't already have an > idea of what that something is? Of course I have "an idea" about what intelligence is. It's about problem solving, and learning, and all the obvious stuff. >> > So, are computers intelligent in the same way you are intelligent? If >> > not, what tests would indicate this? >> >> Yes, they are. Or at least, can be. (Only a few computers have been >> programmed to exhibit even a small degree of intelligence.) > > I didn't ask "can be". Didn't I clarify? Are you being deliberately obtuse? Computers can be configured (via software) to do all sorts of things. Some of those configurations result in a device which has (a tiny bit of) intelligence. Other configurations of the same computer result in a device without intelligence. Whether a computer is intelligent (a little bit) or not is a matter of the software that is loaded on it. Some of them are, and some of them aren't. >> Just not nearly to the same degree as I am. (Orders and orders of >> magnitude less, in fact.) > > Fine. Wonderful. How do you know this? I compare their behavior in various situations, to mine. For example, no computer can carry on a meaningful extended Usenet debate in English. I can. >> Sure. Because we have examples where it demonstrated intelligent >> behavior (with you and Ron). Since I got no data, I have no information >> to contribute to the judgement. > > So you're willing to take Ron and my word that there does, in fact, > exist an intelligent entity for which you have no direct evidence? You're obviously trying to trick me again. I'm not "willing to take your word" for it. Your word is one piece of data. If I have no reason to believe you are lying or mistaken; if I have an expectation that the kind of observation you're talking about is feasible in this universe; etc etc etc. Yes, there could be a situation where I come to believe that an intelligent entity exists for which I have no direct evidence. For example, Ron has at times mentioned something that his wife said or did. Perhaps he just made her up, but for the moment it seems highly likely that Ron is married to a human woman, who happens to be intelligent. Are you so transparent as to try to get me to say "yes" to that question, and then jump on it and say "well God is the same thing!"? Just because there are EXAMPLES where your question is true, doesn't mean I must come to the same conclusion EVERY TIME that general situation arises. -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org Consider the daffodil. And while you're doing that, I'll be over here, looking through your stuff. -- Deep Thoughts, by Jack Handey
From: Bob Felts on 30 May 2010 18:56 Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Sat, 29 May 2010: > > Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > >> you can't seem to conceive of any reason aside from observational data, > >> to prefer one theory over another. > > > > I can conceive of a lot of reasons to prefer one theory over another. > > "Prefer" means "to like one thing _better_ than another"; "better" means > > "more good", and that's puts it straight in the realm of morality. > > That's a chain that you keep expressing. You constantly want to bring > morality into discussions which have nothing to do with morality. In fact, I _don't_ want morality to enter the discussion. But it keeps popping up. Every time words such as "good", "better", "utility", "simpler", ... are used it creeps in. We do it without realizing it. Hume observed the same thing: | In every system ... I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds | for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, ... when all of a | sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations | of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is | not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is | imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this | ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis | necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same | time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether | inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, | which are entirely different from it. > > A scientist "prefers" theory A over theory B, when theory A is a better > match to observation. > > You already understand this, when we're talking about matching to past > observations (i.e. falsifiability). What you don't seem to grasp is > that there are things you can observe about the structure of proposed > theories, which are well correlated with making accurate FUTURE > predictions. > I'm not arguing otherwise. I hope you do understand that. I agree with you completely on this. I know you think I don't, but that's because you're arguing based on metaphysical usefulness. Given two theories, with the _exact same equations_ and the _exact same results_ you've declared one to be "the winner" without the requisite observation. That's philosophy, not science, as I'll elaborate in just a bit. > So, unlike your off-topic claim, "prefer" in the context of scientific > theories has nothing at all to do with morality. It has to do with > being more accurate at predicting future observations. > So what future prediction does MWI make that Copenhagen does not that can be observed? > > I'll use my wetware to make a choice from imagination space (what I > > think ought to be). > > This discussion has nothing to do with how things "ought" to be. It has > to do with the best description of how things actually are, at the > moment. > "Best" lets "ought" in the back door. What distinguishes science from philosophy is that science says the distinguishing "ought" is observation that supports one theory and rules out another. > > Now, you might say, "the simpler calculations eventually turned out to > > correspond to reality, so we should always choose the simpler." That's > > not a bad rule of thumb, but it isn't proof that reality always > > corresponds to the simpler theory. > > Of course it's not a proof. > > Nonetheless, if you refuse to incorporate any notion of "simpler", then > you'll find that, in general, you are FAR worse at predicting future > observations than I am. > If I have two theories, where the formulas are _exactly the same_ (and hence give the same results) and the _only_ difference is metaphysical, and the methaphysical differences _cannot_ be observed, then there is no _scientific_ reason to use one over the other. There are reasons, but not ones based on observation. It is observation that takes philosophy out of the realm of the mind and makes it concrete; i.e. science. MWI is a wonderful interpretation but it lacks the observation that makes it science. > > suppose you have calculations X and Y where both give the same result. > > X is computationally simpler (for some definition of simpler) than Y. > > What you want is proof that the universe works according to X and not > > Y. > > No, I don't offer any such proof. What I offer is the observation, that > following this advice has been productive for the recorded history of > science. It appears to be a quicker path to truth, in general, than not > following the advice. > "Appears" is not "always". I have no problem with anyone saying "this theory is simpler than some other theory (for some metric of "simpler"), therefore I'm going to work with this one." We agree that induction is not proof. Russell's "On Induction" (http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus6.html) is instructive. Yes, based on the laws of motion, and the observation that the sun has been "rising" every day for a long time, that the sun will rise tomorrow. The only way to move the heuristic "theories with these qualities more quickly lead to truth" from philsophy to science is to show that something in nature always generates things with these qualities. At the very least, show me the math for why nature conforms to our notions of "metaphysically simpler" theories. [...] > > >> I think you would make for a poor scientist. Among other problems, you > >> would fine that the random theory you often chose from the infinite set, > >> usually was immediately falsified by the very next observation. > > > > Right. If it was _falsified by observation_ I'd change horses. > > But you've completely missed the point. I can prefer the better theory > BEFORE is is falsified by observation. Which is why I prefer Multiple > Worlds to Copenhagen, and why I would have preferred ellipses to > epicycles. > And that's fine. What predictions does MWI make that Copenhagen does not that _can be_, or _could be_ tested. Do you think that it will one day be possible to follow a waveform into another part of the 'verse? > You, on the other hand, apparently must wait until your favorite theory > (chosen how?) is falsified, before you're willing to move on. So you're > stuck with bad theories long, long after every reasonable scientist has > moved on. > You've not understood my point. I would take both theories, work out where they give different observations, and then work to do the experiments. > And you'll bet on bad predictions, long after everyone else knows that > your bets are going to be wrong. > But they don't know it -- not in a scientific sense, because the observational confirmation hasn't been done. How many times have scientists said, "I'm going to observe this" -- only to go "oops"? > > In fact I've been the one insisting on it as a means to judge between > > competing theories. > > It is one method, but not the only method. > You contradict yourself. As you just said: | A scientist "prefers" theory A over theory B, when theory A is a | better match to _observation_. and | It has to do with being more accurate at predicting future | observations. What future observations does MWI predict that Copenhagen does not? [...] > > You haven't yet directly answered the question: given that there are an > infinite number of theories that are compatible with ANY stream of > observational data, and given that, within this infinite set of > theories, there are theories that make any prediction at all about > future observations ... then, how do you choose which one to use? If I > ask you to make (or bet on!) a prediction about the future, how do you > decide what to predict? > > You CANNOT use observational data to make this choice. All of the > infinite theories agree on past observation. Yet they all disagree on > future prediction. > > What are you going to do? > I'll use the theory that is easier to use or is more "elegant" (for some definition of elegant). What I won't do is say that it's scientifically true, until it's matched by observation. I'm not going to declare a theory a winneruntil it has won _by observation_. > >> Whereas I, able to use information in addition to observational data, > >> would typically choose scientific theories that just so happen to > >> continue predicting new future observations correctly. > > > > Where do QM and MWI differ in their predictions? > > Careful. Quantum Mechanics are the equations that are well-verified by > experiment. Your question was probably about the Multiple World > _interpretation_ of QM, vs. the so-called Copenhagen interpretation. > QM is easier to type than Copenhagen and so it appealed to me. Thank you for your _observation_. > "Copenhagen" is a label that has been given to a lot of fuzzy thinking > about QM. You would have to give me a precise description of what you > have in mind, for me to give you a different prediction. > > But just as one example, some versions of Copenhagen think there is > something special about human consciousness. They would predict > different results, depending on whether a human is in the experiment or > not. (E.g. Schrodinger's Cat.) They might predict, for example, that > you cannot make an AI out of a computer, because humans have "something > special" which affects quantum mechanics, whereas a computer doesn't > have that power. > > MWI would predict no difference between a human and a computer, when it > comes to any QM experiment. > Great. Let's build one and see what happens. Then we would just have to contend between the versions of Copenhagen that don't think there is anything special about human consciousness and MWI. > >> This is pretty easy to falsify. You just need an experiment that shows > >> that something other than superposition (for example, "wavefunction > >> collapse") definitely happens somewhere, at some scale, in some > >> experiment. > >> > >> Then, Multiple Worlds would be falsified. > > > > Then do the experiment. > > But there is no single experiment, no precise prediction, from > Copenhagen. It isn't really a "theory" in any real sense. It's just a > bunch of fuzzy thinking. Copenhagen doesn't say, "collapse happens > HERE, for this reason". It just says "maybe collapse happens somewhere > ... whereever we haven't yet looked". > And MWI says that the waveform transitions to another "reality". It's an elegant solution to a (perhaps) philosophically troubling issue. Show me the other reality. Do the experiment. Or give some other observational result. If that can't be done, it's philosophy -- not science. > > It's a foolish game for anyone to get in to. It's not a serious theory. > Except that you aren't playing by your own rules. There _are_ differences between Copenhagen and MWI, i.e. the number of "realities". Ron says there are 0 or many. Observe it and settle the issue. > > Until then Copenhagen and MWI return the exact same results. It > > doesn't matter how "pretty" a theory is until there is experimental > > evidence that the universe does, in fact, conform to our sense of > > "prettiness" (or vice versa). > > That's where you're wrong. > > For one, you must be using some method to choose your favorite theory, > in any case. We can compare the utility of your method, to the one that > I'm proposing ("simpler"). > Then at least give me the math why the universe conforms to our notions of "simpler" (and give me a metric for "simple" -- you just let an "ought" creep in that isn't _observation_. Play by your own rules.) > For another, the rest of us can figure out the "right" theory, long, > long before you do. We have plenty of historical examples, where we can > zero in on the correct theory quickly, time and time again, and you'll > putter along in ignorance far too long. We can use that gap to make > money off of you by betting on future observations. > Great. What _future observation_ will result in MWI being shown to give the correct result that Copenhagen does not? I've got $10 right here. I'll be delighted to send it to you. Show me an observation and I'll show you the money. [...] > > The lottery happens to be not predictable by us, so on that one we will > both fail. But that's merely one possible black box out of millions. > When we try this experiment with lots of different kinds of black boxes, > which one of us will wind up with more money? > > Me, that's who. > Ok. You use MWI and I'll use Copenhagen. Ready? Or do you want Copenhagen, and I'll use MWI? Payout upon successful observation of a difference. If we were arguing about Newton or Einstein, at least Einstein came up with observations that would confirm his theory. What are the observations that would confirm MWI over Copenhagen? [...] > >> It's got nothing (directly) to do with "esthetics". Nor, therefore, > >> with good and evil. > > > > Ok, then why the opposition to my theory that humans are driven by > > (quantum) randomness > > Because it's completely unmotivated, and unhelpful in solving any > problems. It's like saying, "when you build an AI, you should paint the > outside box blue!" It has nothing at all to do with any problem that > needs solving. > > Yet you express extreme confidence in your insight, with basically zero > evidence that you have discovered anything of any value at all. > It isn't unmotivated. I need something to power the imagination module of an AI. It has to have the property that this engine be able to account for the extremely wide variances in the observed differences in people. A random number generator has proven itself useful in similar applications in the past so, by induction, I'm extending it to the future. After all, Knuth himself said, "certain important computational tasks can be done much more efficiently with random numbers than they could possibly ever be done by an deterministic procedure." I want a powerful tool at my disposal, since I'm embarking on a grand voyage. Could I use other methods? Maybe. But randomness has the property that it has worked well in the past so there's no reason not to use it. Will I succeed? I'll let you know if I ever get something to show you. I have confidence in my insight because it resulted in a lot of pieces falling into place. A lot. I felt like running down the street naked shouting "Eureka!". Except that would scare the neighbors. Have I really found something important? Don't know. I might be as deluded as some American Idol contestants. Am I a crank? Very possibly. I need to start writing some simple code to see if one simple part of my idea actually holds up. I wish I didn't have to work for a living... [...] > > It's got nothing to do with philosophy at all. You're suggesting that > we paint the computer blue, and I'm laughing at your naivete. > No, no, no. Blue is for _databases_. It has the most RAM. Mauve is for imagination engines. > >> And similarly, Ron and I are neither intelligent nor not, but simply > >> have a certain level of intelligence. > > > > How can you have a "level" of something if you don't already have an > > idea of what that something is? > > Of course I have "an idea" about what intelligence is. It's about > problem solving, and learning, and all the obvious stuff. > You don't know how grateful I am to hear that. Of seven people I've asked that question, you are the first one to answer it with a minimum of prodding. Five refuse to answer. I just asked one; we'll see what he says. [...] > > >> Just not nearly to the same degree as I am. (Orders and orders of > >> magnitude less, in fact.) > > > > Fine. Wonderful. How do you know this? > > I compare their behavior in various situations, to mine. For example, > no computer can carry on a meaningful extended Usenet debate in English. > > I can. > Indeed you can. I've despaired of ever getting to this point with some people. I can understand a lot of people not knowing about the Turing test; but once they say "Yes, I'm intelligent", it isn't hard to go step by step from "Ok, how do you know" to Turing. > >> Sure. Because we have examples where it demonstrated intelligent > >> behavior (with you and Ron). Since I got no data, I have no information > >> to contribute to the judgement. > > > > So you're willing to take Ron and my word that there does, in fact, > > exist an intelligent entity for which you have no direct evidence? > > You're obviously trying to trick me again. No, I'm not. I'm not trying to trick anyone. I'm not trying to make anyone look stupid. I'm not trying to do anything except to work on an idea and see how it survives against smart people. However, I don't know how to convince you of this. > > I'm not "willing to take your word" for it. Good for you. I would expect you to take observation first, and elegance of theory second. > Your word is one piece of data. If I have no reason to believe you are > lying or mistaken; if I have an expectation that the kind of observation > you're talking about is feasible in this universe; etc etc etc. > > Yes, there could be a situation where I come to believe that an > intelligent entity exists for which I have no direct evidence. For > example, Ron has at times mentioned something that his wife said or did. > Perhaps he just made her up, but for the moment it seems highly likely > that Ron is married to a human woman, who happens to be intelligent. > > Are you so transparent as to try to get me to say "yes" to that > question, and then jump on it and say "well God is the same thing!"? > Of course not. Suppose some crank claimed, "the universe is intelligent." Well, he's a crank, so let's dismiss him. On the other hand, maybe we should have a scientific theory as to what we should expect were we to run the Turing test on the universe. Just a hypothesis. If the universe were intelligent we might expect this, that, or the other. Then at least we could point the crank to a Wikipedia page. But before we take that step, what might we expect from a Turing test on a human level AI? Well, that requires us to think about the question I posed you: when is acceptance of an intelligent entity warranted when the intelligent entity will not talk to you? When would it be justified, for example, to conclude that Ron is not married to a human woman, but to his AI level machine in his basement? After all, he has wicked mad Lisp skills. And he loves her for her mind. But I did get to visit, once. I've seen her. She has a nice rack [1]. > Just because there are EXAMPLES where your question is true, doesn't mean > I must come to the same conclusion EVERY TIME that general situation > arises. Sure. After all, I'm the one demanding observational support for theories in order to exclude some. ------ [1] I'm sorry, but that was just to easy to resist. Ron, if you want to come pound me into jello, let me know; I'll give you my address.
From: mdj on 1 Jun 2010 04:10
On May 30, 9:17 am, w...(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > Ron: That's right, I'm an atheist. My non-belief in God follows from > my belief in science, which is to say, in my belief that > experiment and rational argument are the best paths to Truth. > > wrf3: I used to be of the opinion that one had to check their brain > at the church door. Read Russell's "Why I am not a Christian" > and actually thought the arguments were cogent. I was an > ignoramous and it kept me away for years. But, like you, I > believe that experiment and rational argument are the best paths > to Truth, so that's why I converted to Christianity. Since accepting <insert theological belief system here> requires an act of faith, there's no choice but to conclude you're not being entirely Truthful about your belief in experiment and rational argument. > Straw arguments are easy, Ron. I'd continue the discussion, but I don't > want to have to put words in your mouth, and "Mu" doesn't advance > anything. Ad homs are even easier, as you're adequately demonstrating here. Matt |