Free will
in [Lisp]
|
From: RG on 28 May 2010 10:48 In article <htof08$747$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-27 11:41:55 -0400, Pascal Costanza said: > > > There is also the possibility that free will is an emergent property, > > where it doesn't matter whether there is determinism in the university > > or not, or whether there are extra-physical causes or not. > > Absolutely, but: > > 1. The burden of proof for such an emergent free will would be on those > who claim its existence. > 2. That still doesn't rescue our *subjective* experience of choice from > experiments that can predict our choices before we feel that we make > them. If we do have an emergent free will, it operates *before* we > think it does, and is therefore, something distinct from what we > subjectively feel to be our choosing (unless one of its emergent > properties is time travel of course). > > My whole point here is simply this: > > a. the experimental evidence gives the lie to our subjective experience > of choice. > > b. the simplest explanation of the experimental evidence is that our > experience of free will is a perceptual illusion like many other > documented perceptual illusions. Just as Quantum Mechanics gives the lie (a nice precise scientific phrase by the way) to our subjective experience of existence as classical entities. > c. making other arguments for free will as yet unsupported by > experimental evidence (quantum indeterminism, emergent properties, > etc.) is special pleading. That is not true. The experimental evidence applies only to very short time scales and very simple tasks. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to treat free will on long time scales and on complex tasks as if it were real (even though it isn't), just as it is not unreasonable to treat the world on macroscopic scales as if it were classical (even though it isn't). I am getting really sick and tired of having to repeat this over and over. rg
From: Bob Felts on 28 May 2010 13:12 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-27 11:41:55 -0400, Pascal Costanza said: > > > There is also the possibility that free will is an emergent property, > > where it doesn't matter whether there is determinism in the university > > or not, or whether there are extra-physical causes or not. > > Absolutely, but: > > 1. The burden of proof for such an emergent free will would be on those > who claim its existence. > 2. That still doesn't rescue our *subjective* experience of choice from > experiments that can predict our choices before we feel that we make > them. If we do have an emergent free will, it operates *before* we > think it does, and is therefore, something distinct from what we > subjectively feel to be our choosing (unless one of its emergent > properties is time travel of course). > Why do you separate the "choosing" part from the "subjectively feel" part? That seems to me to be an arbitrary separation and it's the only way it appears that your argument holds up. [...] > > Science doesn't operate by special pleading, Of course it does. I'm about to get into this with Don. Problem is, this thread is like Hydra. While I'm working on chopping down one head, several more appear. ;-) > but by taking the best explanation for existing evidence. And there you go. Putting our subjective notion of good and evil (cf. "best") into what should be objective statements.
From: Bob Felts on 28 May 2010 13:12 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: [...] > Therefore, it is not unreasonable to treat free will on long time scales > and on complex tasks as if it were real (even though it isn't), just as it > is not unreasonable to treat the world on macroscopic scales as if it were > classical (even though it isn't). > > I am getting really sick and tired of having to repeat this over and > over. > Ron, you've made your point. I don't think you understand Raffael's objection to your position (as least as far as I think I understand it). Classical mechanics is a convenient fiction/approximation/illusion to the real quantum world. I think Raffael would say, "sure, but it's important to know what's *really* going on, 'below' the level of convenient fiction." Maybe we'll never get below the level of quantum mechanics; maybe it's the bottom. Maybe we'll never understand "free will" any more than a convient illusion. But Raffael isn't satisfied with "a convient fiction is enough." For you, I'm going to go out on a limb and say that "everything is an illusion" is a true, satisfactory, statement. I don't think Raffael would agree with that. But I'm guessing. I detest writing "this is what you're thinking"; but "I think this is what each of you are thinking" is the only way I know to try to get both sides to see each other's position.
From: RG on 28 May 2010 13:34 In article <1jj7dmh.k2csyj1ldua4gN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > I think Raffael would say This is exactly the problem. We have to guess what Ralph would say because he refuses to say, and I consider his silence to be hypocritical. If you're going to stand on the psychophysical evidence and insist that free will doesn't exist and that this has policy implications, then you should also stand on the quantum mechanical evidence and insist that reality doesn't exist and accept those policy implications as well. But of course he can't do that because the policy implications of classical reality being an illusion don't suit his political agenda. In this Ralph is no better than a creationist. He emphasizes the evidence that supports his pre-selected conclusion and pointedly ignores all the evidence that undermines it. It's hypocrisy of the first order, and I'm calling him out on it. So you see, no speculation from a third party about what he might be thinking can possibly resolve this. There are only three possible resolutions. Either Ralph explains why emphasizing psychophysics over QM does not constitute "special pleading", or he recants, or he cops to hypocrisy. Failing that, good Scientists everywhere will have no choice but to burn him at the stake. ;-) rg
From: Bob Felts on 28 May 2010 13:36
Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Thu, 27 May 2010: > > What provides that creative spark and (apparently limitless) state > > space? What determines what you imagine? > > We don't fully understand the algorithm, for sure. But making up > answers doesn't get you closer to the truth either. > So if you don't fully understand it, how can you exclude randomness? It seems you're as interested in determinism as I am to indeterminism. I'm trying to articulate why I think indeterminism is necessary in order to explain observable phenomena. > Most of imagination is simple extrapolation from things that are already > known. You make a submarine, you learn about space, you wonder what > would happen if you put the two together ... aha, a spaceship! You > watch trains chug and ships sail, you see birds flying, and you wonder > if there could be a version of a train or ship that flys like a bird > ... aha, airplanes! > > This isn't randomness. This is much more like looking at some sparse > process in the world: > INPUT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 > ...goes to... > OUTPUT 2 4 6 - 10 12 14 - 18 20 > and saying, hey! I notice that 4 and 8 are missing from the table. > I wonder what to expect in a possible, not-real world where 4 and 8 were > inputs to the process. Maybe ... 8 and 16, respectively? > > It's deduction and induction -- deterministic processes -- not > randomness. > > Now, in the full complexity of marvelous human thought, of course there > is lots going on that we don't yet understand. (Otherwise, AI would be > done already!) But there's no reason to suppose that the remainder is > qualitatively different from the stuff we do understand. > There is a story that when Gene Roddenberry was filming one of the early Star Trek episodes (it may have been the pilot, "The Cage") he grew increasingly frustrated with the set designers because he wanted alien plants, but he kept getting deduction and induction from existing earth forms. In frustration, he took a potted plant someone had given him, yanked the plant out and stuck it in upside down saying, "this is more like what I want!" So, yes, induction and deduction are two of the methods we use when we imagine. But we're also capable of off-the-wall new things. In fact, one way to expand the imagination is go break existing patterns and go off in new directions. Something powers those new directions, and it's different for every one of us. > >> > _Why_ don't you consider randomness free will? Because there's no > >> sense of choice or responsibility with randomness, which intuitively > >> seems like a criticial component of what people mean when they use the > >> term "free will". > > But there's likewise no sense of choice or responsibility with > > determinism. > > Says you, over and over again. For the record, _I_ don't say this. But a lot of other people do. Many, many, many people have the intuitive moral sense that if they are determined then they aren't responsible. [...] > > In any case, EVEN IF you don't believe me about deterministic decisions, > you still never answered the original question. Why do you think that > randomness has anything at all to do with choice or responsibility? > I think it has to do with choice because I think it's the engine that drives our imagination. I think that were I to write an AI that I'd have to use randomness to actually get an accurate model. It's there for me to use and I'd certainly give it a try before I tried to find a deterministic method. For the record, I don't think either randomn or deterministic decisions has anything to do with responsibility. |