Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Don Geddis on 16 May 2010 23:06 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote on Sun, 16 May 2010: > from the same wikipedia page: > "Related experiments showed that neurostimulation could affect which hands > people move, even though the experience of free will was intact. Ammon and > Gandevia found that it was possible to influence which hand people move by > stimulating frontal regions that are involved in movement planning using > transcranial magnetic stimulation in either the left or right hemisphere of > the brain. Right-handed people would normally choose to move their right hand > 60% of the time, but when the right hemisphere was stimulated they would > instead choose their left hand 80% of the time (recall that the right > hemisphere of the brain is responsible for the left side of the body, and the > left hemisphere for the right). Despite the external influence on their > decision-making, the subjects continued to report that they believed their > choice of hand had been made freely." But how does one make a "choice of hand" anyway? Presumably, they just let their mind drift, and random neurons fire, and at some point one hand or the other "feels" like it might as well be the one to choose "randomly" this time. It's thus no surprise that a cleverly set up experiment that affects the internal working of the brain, can influence how this choice mechanism concludes. Really, this universe has only determinism or randomness. There isn't any third thing. But that only outlaws the most naive form of free will. If you think that, unless there's something besides determinism or randomness, that there can't be free will ... then you don't understand free will very well. > Here a causal influence is even exterior to the subject, yet the subject > continues to perceive himself as the free will author of the action. Both those things can be true. They are not necessarily exclusive. The brain is basically a computational device. You're quote experiments that mess with the internals of the computation. The subjects are reporting that their brains were the ones that decided what to do. All of these statements can be true at the same time. They are not (necessarily) in conflict. > We know that the subject is in fact constrained in a way that is > incompatible with free will That's your mistake. Thinking that free will must be outside of physics and determinism. > yet his perception is one of undiminished free choice. He's right. He can choose whatever it is he wants. However, what he wants, is constrained by physics (and the structure of his brain). He can't choose to want something different than his brain does in fact want. > The most economical explanation of all of these data is that all of > our choices are constrained (i.e., not free) and that our subjective > perception of free will is merely an illusion. False dichotomy. It is not true that the only choices are either (1) brains are outside of physics; or (2) free will is "merely" an illusion. The correct answer is that the feeling of free will describes real behavior, which is compatible with ordinary (even deterministic!) physics. > IOW, free will means that we are choosing our own acts unconstrained > by other influences Unconstrained by quantum mechanics? By electromagnetic interaction? By the structure of neural connections within the brain? For sure, _that_ naive form of free will doesn't exist. But that doesn't at all mean that people's perception of choosing freely is all an illusion. > not that our acts have unconscious (or even extra-somatic) constraints > of which we are unaware and that we are retroactively made aware of > our supposed choices after they've already been determined, and given > the false impression that we are the unconstrained originators of > these acts. You're correct, that if some separate subconscious "really" made all the choices, and our conscious selves merely rationalized that they were "really' in charge, that would mean that all forms of free will were only an illusion. But our conscious decision making CAN (easily!) influence our behavior, so this fear of all-illusion is false. Nonetheless, our conscious decision-making is constrained by physics and the structure of our brains. -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org Thought for the day: What if there were no hypothetical situations?
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 17 May 2010 00:27 On 2010-05-16 23:06:23 -0400, Don Geddis said: > Really, this universe has only determinism or randomness. There isn't > any third thing. I'm inclined to agree. > But that only outlaws the most naive form of free > will. Well, given that the overwhelming majority of people who have ever lived were/are fairly naive, I'd say that most people believe unthinkingly (and mistakenly) in precisely this sort of free will. > He's right. He can choose whatever it is he wants. > > However, what he wants, is constrained by physics (and the structure of > his brain). He can't choose to want something different than his brain > does in fact want. You seem to have an odd notion of what the term free will means. It means that choice is unconstrained. We cannot say that a person has free will, and also say that his choices are constrained in some way. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: RG on 17 May 2010 02:46 In article <hsqgjc$t7$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-16 23:06:23 -0400, Don Geddis said: > > > Really, this universe has only determinism or randomness. There isn't > > any third thing. > > I'm inclined to agree. > > > But that only outlaws the most naive form of free > > will. > > Well, given that the overwhelming majority of people who have ever > lived were/are fairly naive, I'd say that most people believe > unthinkingly (and mistakenly) in precisely this sort of free will. > > > He's right. He can choose whatever it is he wants. > > > > However, what he wants, is constrained by physics (and the structure of > > his brain). He can't choose to want something different than his brain > > does in fact want. > > You seem to have an odd notion of what the term free will means. It > means that choice is unconstrained. We cannot say that a person has > free will, and also say that his choices are constrained in some way. If course we can. Repeat after me: "I have free will, and (or, if you prefer, despite the fact that) my choices are constrained by the laws of physics." Voila! I think you are making the classic reductionist mistake of applying induction to complex systems. Systems can be greater than the sum of their parts. Configuration matters. As a software engineer you should understand this better than most people. None of the atoms that comprise my computer can play tetris, but my computer manages to do it nonetheless. Similarly I can have free will even if all the atoms that comprise me don't. BTW, my choices are constrained by more than just the laws of physics. They are also constrained by the laws of economics: I can't choose to buy myself a Gulfstream V, much as I may want to do so. They are constrained by the laws of society: I can't choose to become the king of England. They are constrained by my evolved moral intuition: I can't choose to walk up to a random stranger and kill them (though there are some people who are capable of that). Despite all these constraints, I have free will. At some point in time I will freely decide to stop editing this message and go do something else instead. And lo and behold, here I go. rg
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 17 May 2010 10:59 On 2010-05-17 02:46:10 -0400, RG said: > If course we can. Repeat after me: > > "I have free will, and (or, if you prefer, despite the fact that) my > choices are constrained by the laws of physics." "Free will is the purported ability of agents to make choices free from constraints." <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will> Yours is the compatibilist position. It is only tenable if you redefine free will; i.e., there may very well be some concept that is compatible with the notion of constraint by the laws of physics, constraint by existing brain state, constraint by existing personal psychology, etc., but that thing certainly isn't free will as traditionally defined above. What you are describing, is the *appearance* of free will, both outwardly and subjectively, not true unconstrained choice. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: RG on 17 May 2010 11:56
In article <hsrlk5$acl$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-17 02:46:10 -0400, RG said: > > > If course we can. Repeat after me: > > > > "I have free will, and (or, if you prefer, despite the fact that) my > > choices are constrained by the laws of physics." > > > "Free will is the purported ability of agents to make choices free from > constraints." > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will> And Wikipedia is always right about everything. > Yours is the compatibilist position. It is only tenable if you redefine > free will; i.e., there may very well be some concept that is compatible > with the notion of constraint by the laws of physics, constraint by > existing brain state, constraint by existing personal psychology, etc., > but that thing certainly isn't free will as traditionally defined above. > > What you are describing, is the *appearance* of free will, both > outwardly and subjectively, not true unconstrained choice. Of course. So what? If you get right down to the nitty gritty physics, you and I don't really exist either. We are not really physical beings as we perceive ourselves to be, we are really highly entangled systems of quantum wave functions. For you to say that free will doesn't exist because it is incompatible with fundamental physics is no different from saying that physical objects don't exist for the same reason. At root it is actually true -- free will doesn't really exist, and neither do we. But most people find that believing in the existence of physical objects and free will to be a useful approximation to the truth. Note that even Wikipedia's definition by making reference to "agents" has already abandoned ultimate physical truth because there are no such things as agents. In fact, at root there are no such things as *things*. Furthermore, the definition doesn't specify whether free will is the ability to make choices free from ALL constraints, or merely free from CERTAIN constraints. Clearly in a world governed by physical laws, free will of the first sort cannot exist, but that is not a very interesting observation. rg |