Is it time to stop research in Computer Architecture ?
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From: Del Cecchi on 24 Oct 2009 00:30 "Bill Todd" <billtodd(a)metrocast.net> wrote in message news:n56dnSJGq7FwDnzXnZ2dnUVZ_hadnZ2d(a)metrocastcablevision.com... > nmm1(a)cam.ac.uk wrote: >> In article >> <DcudnTf8XIfmmXzXnZ2dnUVZ_u2dnZ2d(a)metrocastcablevision.com>, >> Bill Todd <billtodd(a)metrocast.net> wrote: >>> The fact that Itanic came so close to world domination *despite* >>> its abject failure to deliver on the promises that had seemed to >>> make that domination inevitable tends to prove that the attempt to >>> bluff its way to success was a daring and risky move but hardly an >>> insane one. ... >> >> Not really. It was a lot further from that than the hype >> indicated. > > Not really. > > Consider, for example, just the VMS market (a not-inconsiderable > annual $4 billion system market all by itself before the Alphacide). > When Alpha got the axe in mid-2001, Compaq mounted a concerted, > fairly slick, and thoroughly disgusting effort to present Itanic as > an upgrade rather than a regrettable alternative - and the majority > of the VMS population seemed quite willing to go along with that > view until a small subset of us screamed bloody murder for several > years running setting the record straight. > > Enterprise customers tend to be slaves to their vendors - even more > so back then when open source was even less an option than it is > today. Being slaves, they seek desperately to believe that their > vendors will treat them well rather than screw them royally as > Compaq did. And in the absence of strong doses of reality therapy > that belief will prevail, simply because the alternative is too > uncomfortable to contemplate for the average Joe who just wants > things to run smoothly. > > Had the VMS market remained anywhere nearly as strong as it had been > Itanic would have gotten a significant credibility shot in the arm > simply by virtue of doubling its market share. That very likely > would have happened had the MBAs had their way without opposition. > While I wasn't as closely involved with such reality therapy for > other platforms (e.g., PA-RISC) I do know anecdotally that at least > somewhat similar events unfolded there as well: without the > existence of a vocal minority who had no real reason beyond pure > outrage to become involved, the sheep would have lined up docilely > to be shorn and Itanic would very likely merely have suffered a few > years' delay in its quest for world domination. > >> It made practical headway in two areas, so let's consider them. >> >> HPC was its most successful area, and something like two sites >> tried >> it and rejected it for every one that delivered a service using it. > > The importance of HPC to real-world success of a platform is pretty > debatable. > > ... > >> The other was Mission Critical computers for Big Business. > > Exactly. > > I met >> people from several of those, and they had all taken the position >> that they were going to run it in parallel with their existing >> systems for a year or more before making a decision. > > Which is what they would have done with virtually *any* new system, > no matter how wonderful it seemed: these people give new meaning to > the word 'cautious'. > > ... > >> My point here is that, if the Itanic had started to be pushed much >> harder, the real heavyweights would have joined the opposition. > > What earthly reason do you have to think that? IBM never lifted a > finger against Itanic but rather got on board early and shipped > product for several years. One might suggest that they were > confident that it would sink of its own weight if IBM had not become > a supporter (though certainly not an evangelist in the ways that HP > and Intel were) at a time when Itanic's perceived future was riding > very high indeed. IBM seemed relatively willing to give up its > processor business just as several others were if Itanic really > could cut the mustard, the main difference being that IBM, unlike > they, didn't do so prematurely. > >> It never had an earthly of doing what it was originally hyped to >> do (i.e. entirely replace x86). > > Save for the grace of AMD it still might have: without a credible, > inexpensive, and pervasive 64-bit alternative Intel could have just > waited until desktops began to demand 64-bit processors. > > Without real competition even otherwise ridiculous 'solutions' can > become successful (I'm sure you can think of as many examples of > this as I could). And when you've got as close to a monopoly on > developing solutions as Intel did back in the mid-'90s dividing up > and conquering the market in the way that it planned to doesn't take > technical excellence, just marginal adequacy. > > - bill I don't put the death of PA-Risc at Itaniums door, since HP was from all appearances one of the parents of the Itanium architecture and perhaps the ones that sold it to Intel, rather than vice versa. They certainly were co-conspirators, so to speak. del
From: Del Cecchi on 24 Oct 2009 00:34 <nmm1(a)cam.ac.uk> wrote in message news:hbs87o$h27$1(a)smaug.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk... > In article > <n56dnSJGq7FwDnzXnZ2dnUVZ_hadnZ2d(a)metrocastcablevision.com>, > Bill Todd <billtodd(a)metrocast.net> wrote: >> >>>> The fact that Itanic came so close to world domination *despite* >>>> its >>>> abject failure to deliver on the promises that had seemed to make >>>> that >>>> domination inevitable tends to prove that the attempt to bluff >>>> its way >>>> to success was a daring and risky move but hardly an insane one. >>>> ... >>> >>> Not really. It was a lot further from that than the hype >>> indicated. >> >>Not really. > > See below :-) > >>Consider, for example, just the VMS market (a not-inconsiderable >>annual >>$4 billion system market all by itself before the Alphacide). ... > > The association of VMS and $4 billion with "world domination" in > the late 1990s is amusing :-) Sorry, but .... >>> It made practical headway in two areas, so let's consider them. >>> >>> HPC was its most successful area, and something like two sites >>> tried >>> it and rejected it for every one that delivered a service using >>> it. >> >>The importance of HPC to real-world success of a platform is pretty >>debatable. > > Even in the late 1990s, it had more influence than VMS. It's not > the money, it's the USA military-industrial establishment, and the > political power they wield. > >>> The other was Mission Critical computers for Big Business. >> >>Exactly. >> >> I met >>> people from several of those, and they had all taken the position >>> that they were going to run it in parallel with their existing >>> systems for a year or more before making a decision. >> >>Which is what they would have done with virtually *any* new system, >>no >>matter how wonderful it seemed: these people give new meaning to >>the >>word 'cautious'. > > You missed the point of my posting. It wasn't that they were being > cautious - they had taken a decision, and it was "not with a barge > pole" - that's not something the technical people are even allowed > to hint to outsiders, but I have been a future watcher for a long > time now. > > Any other experience gets "How's it going" with "OK, but we're only > part-way through our testing." And that wasn't just one company. > >>> My point here is that, if the Itanic had started to be pushed much >>> harder, the real heavyweights would have joined the opposition. >> >>What earthly reason do you have to think that? IBM never lifted a >>finger against Itanic but rather got on board early and shipped >>product >>for several years. ... > > I was informally contacted by one important group, and had contacts > with others. It wasn't quite like that .... > > My comment was based on gleanings of throw-away remarks from a large > number of people in very important customers. A few explicitly said > "over my dead body", but one hell of a lot hinted it, often by being > quite open about everything else but clamming up about the Itanic. > This was when they were using publicly available systems, so the > draconian pre-release NDAs did not apply. Virtually none were in > favour. > >>> It never had an earthly of doing what it was originally hyped to >>> do (i.e. entirely replace x86). >> >>Save for the grace of AMD it still might have: without a credible, >>inexpensive, and pervasive 64-bit alternative Intel could have just >>waited until desktops began to demand 64-bit processors. > > No way. Sorry. HP had restarted the PA-RISC line by then, IBM had > restarted POWER, MIPS was available for purchase (and there were > many companies with the resources to take it over and restart it), > SPARC was still very much alive, and doubtless there were other > plots > and plans. IBM had never stopped Power development. It did get side tracked a little since RS6000 wasn't exactly setting world on fire. And Iliad was in there somewhere. (power derivative) Did HP ever do another PARISC post Itanium? What do HP servers have in them now? Itanium and X86? > > I don't think that you realise just how badly the IA64 behaved on > desktop and similar workloads. Even Sun's SPARC (let alone > Fujitsu's) > beat it into a cocked hat. And I don't just mean performance, but > usability and reliability. > > > Regards, > Nick Maclaren.
From: Joe Pfeiffer on 24 Oct 2009 00:48 "Del Cecchi" <delcecchiofthenorth(a)gmail.com> writes: > > I don't put the death of PA-Risc at Itaniums door, since HP was from > all appearances one of the parents of the Itanium architecture and > perhaps the ones that sold it to Intel, rather than vice versa. > > They certainly were co-conspirators, so to speak. So... not at Intel's door, perhaps. Still Itanium. -- As we enjoy great advantages from the inventions of others, we should be glad of an opportunity to serve others by any invention of ours; and this we should do freely and generously. (Benjamin Franklin)
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler on 24 Oct 2009 01:37 "Del Cecchi" <delcecchiofthenorth(a)gmail.com> writes: > I don't put the death of PA-Risc at Itaniums door, since HP was from > all appearances one of the parents of the Itanium architecture and > perhaps the ones that sold it to Intel, rather than vice versa. > > They certainly were co-conspirators, so to speak. from HP archives (PA-RISC was suppose to be replaced by PA-WW which morphed into Itanium) Inventing Itanium: How HP Labs Helped Create the Next-Generation Chip Architecture http://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2001/apr-jun/itanium.html Bill Worley: Captaining the Next Generation http://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2001/apr-jun/worley.html some other notes ... http://www.cs.clemson.edu/~mark/epic.html -- 40+yrs virtualization experience (since Jan68), online at home since Mar1970
From: Robert Myers on 24 Oct 2009 02:21
On Oct 24, 1:37 am, Anne & Lynn Wheeler <l...(a)garlic.com> wrote: > > from HP archives (PA-RISC was suppose to be replaced by PA-WW which > morphed into Itanium) > > Inventing Itanium: How HP Labs Helped Create the Next-Generation Chip Architecturehttp://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2001/apr-jun/itanium.html > > Bill Worley: Captaining the Next Generationhttp://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2001/apr-jun/worley.html Some broken links. I had better luck searching hp.com using google. Tons of stuff. Robert. |