From: Torkel Franzen on
Barb Knox <see(a)sig.below> writes:

> At the risk of appearing to give aid and comfort to the crackpots, let
> me make the pedantic point that non-standard models of the (1st-order)
> Peano axioms DO contain numbers which are infinite.

To say that non-standard elements are "infinite" is only to say that
they satisfy a certain infinite set of formulas.
From: Daryl McCullough on
Han de Bruijn says...

>No contradiction. That's perhaps the only good thing about it [set theory].
>If that is the only thing you care about, let me tell you that most of
>us care about other things, such as a physics that has a reliable
>mathematical machinery at its disposal.

Give an example of a calculation in physics in which using modern
("Cantorian") mathematics gives you the wrong answer, and using
some other kind of mathematics gives you the right answer.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

From: malbrain on
David Kastrup wrote:
> Robert Kolker <nowhere(a)nowhere.com> writes:
>
> > Peter Webb wrote:
> >> How do you disagree with an axiom?
> >
> > By assuming a contrary axiom, as is done in non-Euclidean
> > geometry.
>
> Oh, but that is not disagreeing with it. In fact, it is expressing
> faith that the axiom indeed _is_ an axiom.

Axioms are agreements -- an shared expression of faith.

> If I use a hammer for driving a nail, this does not mean that I
> disagree with a screwdriver. I'll still use the screwdriver when
> having to drive a screw.
>
> > The parallel postulate is denied in non-euclidean geometry.
>
> It is not as much denied as exchanged.

What does this mean, it seems backward? You deny one axiom in favor of
agreement with another.

> > Axioms are posits, or assumptions. They are NOT self evidence
> > truths.
>
> They are not truths at all, they are tools.
>

Axioms are agreements to share pre-conceived truths. Yes, they are
also tools.

karl m

From: david petry on


Han de Bruijn wrote:

> Indeed, idealizations
> don't necessarily obey the same laws of logic as the directly observable
> objects. But, at least, there should exist a path from the abstractions
> back to the observable objects. Directly observable sets are idealized -
> and that's a good thing - but idealized sets must also be "materialized"
> again, for the sake of _applications_. The latter tends to be forgotten.

That hit's the nail on the head. Thanks Han.

For those who missed it, the key sentence is:

"But, at least, there should exist a path from the abstractions
back to the observable objects."

From: David Kastrup on
malbrain(a)yahoo.com writes:

> David Kastrup wrote:
>> Robert Kolker <nowhere(a)nowhere.com> writes:
>>
>> > Peter Webb wrote:
>> >> How do you disagree with an axiom?
>> >
>> > By assuming a contrary axiom, as is done in non-Euclidean
>> > geometry.
>>
>> Oh, but that is not disagreeing with it. In fact, it is expressing
>> faith that the axiom indeed _is_ an axiom.
>
> Axioms are agreements -- an shared expression of faith.

Uh, no. Axioms have nothing to with faith at all. If you are playing
chess, you don't have _faith_ that a knight moves always two squares
and then one perpendicular. If it moves differently, that does not
cause you to lose faith in the knight, but rather in your opponent's
mental sanity.

Axioms are the rules of the game. They are arbitrary, but it does not
usually make sense to question them, since the purpose is to _play_
the game. Only when you are intend to design a new game does it make
sense playing with the rules.

>> If I use a hammer for driving a nail, this does not mean that I
>> disagree with a screwdriver. I'll still use the screwdriver when
>> having to drive a screw.
>>
>> > The parallel postulate is denied in non-euclidean geometry.
>>
>> It is not as much denied as exchanged.
>
> What does this mean, it seems backward? You deny one axiom in favor
> of agreement with another.

I don't deny it. I just decide I want to play a game with different
rules. That does not make the rules for the original game less valid.

> Axioms are agreements to share pre-conceived truths. Yes, they are
> also tools.

Then the movements of pieces in chess are also pre-conceived truths.
I find this an odd way of looking at them.

--
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum
First  |  Prev  |  Next  |  Last
Pages: 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
Prev: Derivations
Next: Simple yet Profound Metatheorem