Philosophy of mind is more important than the philosophy of language and epistemology
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From: Immortalist on 1 Jun 2010 23:22 On May 31, 10:12 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > huge : > > > > > Immortalist : > > >>> >> > Well if you learned to read properly you would see that he was > >>> >> > comparing three branches of philosophy and which have declined > >>> >> > somewhat > > >>> >> What, exactly, would you accept as signs of decline? > > >>> > Maybe "decline" isn't the right word. I should have said which are > >>> > currently more important in light of the current issues, > >>> > technologies and research, needs philosophical analysis. > > >>> > Personally I see the emergence of fMRI scanners and the associated > >>> > "newly" invented research methodology, as probably causing > >>> > mind/brain philosophy to accend in relative importance. Just as > >>> > particular social and political issues cause applied ethics to punk > >>> > the rest of philosophy and the philosophers better adapted to deal > >>> > with where the world is going and not worried about some academic > >>> > dispute wank off. > > >>> That is all very good, but what I know about Searle suggests that he > >>> is one of the most persistent wankers. See my other answer posted > >>> recently. > > >> Thank you, his is a good idea on the direction of philosophy and the > >> need for good philosophers to step up to the task of these brain > >> scanners, current brain science, and recent Evolutionary Psychology. > > >> Is there any way to summarize your complaints about some of Searle's > >> old stuff when he was making up the subject? > > > Searle made up > > Typo. Insert 'neither' here. > > > the subject of either philosophy of mind nor of cognitive > > science. I'm not sure that he made up the subject of philosophical > > zombies. He probably did make up the Chinese Room argument. I find > > both philosophical zombies and the Chinese Room argument unconvincing. > > I hinted as what is known as the "Robot Reply" to the Chinese Room > > argument in the Hofstadter quote, and there are other replies I also > > agree with. As to philosophical zombies, I just don't see something > > that behaves exactly like a real human as possibly not having human > > experiences. Dualism just does not hold water. > Ya me to, but I won't destroy any chance for good philosophy by making the history of philosophy illegitimate or off limits. All philosophers have made some mistakes but you seem to be implying that some should be crucified for theirs. Is this like a circumstantial ad hominem where seem to promote the idea that all of Searle's ideas are bad if some of them are? Circumstantial ad Hominem A Circumstantial ad Hominem is a fallacy in which one attempts to attack a claim by asserting that the person making the claim is making it simply out of self interest and or circumstances. In some cases, this fallacy involves substituting an attack on a person's circumstances (such as the person's religion, political affiliation, ethnic background, etc.) instead of and in place of the truth or falsity of the claim being made. A Circumstantial ad Hominem is a fallacy because a person's interests and circumstances have no bearing on the truth or falsity of the claim being made. While a person's interests will provide them with motives to support certain claims, the claims stand or fall on their own. It is also the case that a person's circumstances (religion, political affiliation, etc.) do not affect the truth or falsity of the claim. This is made quite clear by the following example: "Bill claims that 1+1=2. But he is a Republican, so his claim is false." http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/circumstantial-ad-hominem.html > -- > huge: Not on my time you don't.
From: Immortalist on 1 Jun 2010 23:25 On May 31, 9:25 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > Immortalist : > > > > > On May 31, 6:33 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > >> Immortalist : > >> <snippage> > > >> > Then you agree that Searle's version of Monist token/token theory is > >> > not false or explains best empirical science's finding on the brain, > >> > or were you trying to say that absolutely all and any theory of the > >> > mind is false? > > >> Is this really an either - or type of problem? Who, besides Searle, > >> even still address token/token theory? > > >> Here is Hofstadter on Searle's philosophy of mind from "I Am a Strange > >> Loop, p. 81: > > >> "...it makes perfect sense to discuss living animals and self-guiding > >> robots in the same part of this book, for today's technological > >> achievements are bringing us ever closer to understanding what goes on > >> in living systems that survive in complex environments. Such successes > >> give the lie to the tired dogma endlessly repeated by John Searle that > >> computers are forever doomed to mere 'simulation' of the processes of > >> life. If an automaton can drive itself a distance of two hundred miles > >> across a tremendously forbidding desert terrain, how can this feat be > >> called merely a 'simulation"? It is certainly as genuine an act of > >> survival in the hostile environment as that of a mosquito flying about > >> a room and avoiding being swatted." > > >> <snip pages of quotes> > >> -- > >> huge: Not on my time you don't. > > > Ya, I read that old book and agree. I think I still support some sort of > > functionalism but am not sure. I am just open. But all these > > philosophers have made new trails in discovering how to communicate > > about things and processes that recent research deems necessarily to be > > discussed. I think most philosophers or anyone who writes stuff down has > > made some mistakes but still there is something right about what they > > say, even Plato was correct on a bunch of things and still is. > > > So let us think with applied ethics here about what your saying. You > > have some sort of standard about how many mistakes a philosopher can > > make before he is to be ignored and shunned. You have not describe the > > criteria for such a standard nor have you provided any examples of some > > philosophers who pass your little test. > > As I said, if you enjoy reading Searle, more power to you. But his arguments > about the impossibility of strong AI, like the Chinese Room, are just wrong. > When you've got a robot that can go across a desert without help, that is > the beginning of strong AI, and it will just get stronger. A great *part* of Searle's > career has been of no more importance than being a nay-sayer. I've been reading > him, unfortunately, since the late '70s. > I try and read all philosophers and I like the parts where they make mistakes. I think it is good to understand the mistakes well. I don't know if I agree with any mind/brain philosophers. I like reading books about the brain better, these make the current arguments in mind/brain philosophy seem shallow and weak, missing the point even. But there is hope because everything changes, even neurophilosophy. > -- > huge: Not on my time you don't.
From: Immortalist on 1 Jun 2010 23:29 On Jun 1, 7:19 am, "Tim Golden BandTech.com" <tttppp...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > On May 31, 8:43 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > On May 31, 5:10 am, "Tim Golden BandTech.com" <tttppp...(a)yahoo.com> > > wrote:> On May 31, 6:48 am, Spade <javed47ras...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > On May 31, 5:25 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > > ...For a number of important historical reasons, the philosophy of > > > <-> > > > > Whatever communication we attempt on the mind will have to be in > > > language. This restriction is unconditional, except for what one > > > attempts within one's own mind. > > > Straw man argument. Searle never made such a claim. He just proposes > > Hmmmm.... I don't understand the straw man argument. Searle seems to > be your straw man. > I am not arguing for Searle. I am making an informational statement. > I would lean on the Buddhists first to posit a practice of mind > awareness. > They are full of a tricky language of abstractions that expose the > struggle to express the places that they can go in their minds. Well, > they have proof of some of these abilities within the material world. > > To what degree is the language of expression done evolving? There, thats what I want to hear, "degrees" instead of "kinds" or in this case "permanent places" for each branch of philosophy instead of degrees of positioning of various branches of philosophy in order to better adapt to the current state of and evolution of culture and technology. Thats what Searle was saying. He didn't claim it was the end of the philosophy of language and the theory of knowledge, he claims that these branches of philosophy are changing positions. > This > awareness that the procedure is not complete brings these subjects to > life. We do not merely practice completed ideas. We develop new ideas. > The structure is incomplete, and at the basis of the propagation of > information is language, but the notion of language itself as a set of > prefixed entities is a false assumption. This goes in tension with the > difficulty of creating new language, for that relies upon the > propagation of that language. The internal self that you discover will > likely be hampered, not only here, but even from within. The > practitioners of the internal mind know how to quiet the word > generating facilities and look with something more fundamental. As to > their ability to describe what they find, well, they are very > intelligent to dissuade this attempt, but perhaps equally caught with > the puzzle as we are. If one finds an internal language of coherence > then it probably should be expressed, even if fraudulently, and this > is the procedure of how we arrive in this language that we are using, > and the undeniable effect that a basis of mind as prelingual will > suffer an informatic breakdown, regardless of anything that Searle has > to say, unless you have something relevant. This is a mathematical > argument. This piece of swiss cheese may be quite tasty, but I am open > to there being holes in it, and definitely curious as what those holes > are. > > Just as a Buddhist can slow his heartrate to a crawl, we could posit > some device that would allow two Buddhists to connect to each other > through a direct neural channel, somewhat alternative to a linguistic > restriction. I am thinking more of an electronic device rather than > the claims on ESP and so forth, but I suppose those who believe in > that effect are not so far away, informationally speaking. > Scientifically we would like the sort of proof as a man who can hold > his breath for long periods of time. > > We are not so far away from that interconnected practice here on > usenet. But the language barrier is very apparent. Then too, > emotionality is likewise blatant. Still Immoralist, I know you are a > very strong poster and I enjoy reading you, and do not mean harm by > dismantling the straw man argument. It would be great to work out some > agreement from first order principles. > > - Tim > > > that areas of philosophy will become more or less important as > > knowledge of the world increases. Of course language philosophy will > > always be needed as grammar will always be needed to use any kind of > > predicate logic or common language. > > > Again Searle merely claims that philosophers of mind will be in a > > better position that other philosophers since their system is already > > designed to deal with the metaphysics of whatever brain researchers > > discover; namely when time goes on and these researchers discover how > > the activities of the brain are completely enough to explain even the > > most complex human experiences. > > > > It would be hoped that such a > > > discovery could be translated out into a language, though this could > > > require a new word, and perhaps many pages of dialog to even attempt a > > > clean translation. I'm not clear on whether internal thought can > > > transcend language completely, but it must to some degree, otherwise > > > there would be no language development. The trouble runs into a big > > > slowdown when one attempts to communicate in a language that others do > > > not understand. Until adopters of the language communicate back and > > > forth there is no actual verification that the translation is clean. > > > There can be alot of miscommunication going on. There can be > > > fraudulent language. There can be false belief systems. We are stuck > > > with this. In some ways better off than when there were just maybe > > > five unique words uttered by hominids, but worse off for all of the > > > conflicts. > > > > Is what I just wrote what you will read? Taking your mind awareness as > > > fundamental then my thoughts were first translated into a language, > > > transferred, and then reverse translated by your mind. There are two > > > option for miscommunication on a potentially flawed basis. I don't > > > wish to be completely discouraging and prefer to simply state that the > > > problem is open. As to which is the basis; the language or the mind; > > > we have to grant the mind as more fundamental, but as to the freedoms > > > of the mind, well, they are hampered by the language, presuming that > > > communication to another is desired. Even communication to ones self > > > may be possible, as a man might draw something on paper without ever > > > sharing it. Especially mistaken thoughts not fully developed are a > > > fine instance, but here if we presume the mistake is of the mind, then > > > we will never expose the mistakes of the language. > > > > - Tim
From: Olrik on 2 Jun 2010 00:32 Le 2010-06-01 23:25, Immortalist a �crit : > On May 31, 9:25 pm, huge<h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: >> Immortalist : >> >> >> >>> On May 31, 6:33 pm, huge<h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: >>>> Immortalist : >>>> <snippage> >> >>>>> Then you agree that Searle's version of Monist token/token theory is >>>>> not false or explains best empirical science's finding on the brain, >>>>> or were you trying to say that absolutely all and any theory of the >>>>> mind is false? >> >>>> Is this really an either - or type of problem? Who, besides Searle, >>>> even still address token/token theory? >> >>>> Here is Hofstadter on Searle's philosophy of mind from "I Am a Strange >>>> Loop, p. 81: >> >>>> "...it makes perfect sense to discuss living animals and self-guiding >>>> robots in the same part of this book, for today's technological >>>> achievements are bringing us ever closer to understanding what goes on >>>> in living systems that survive in complex environments. Such successes >>>> give the lie to the tired dogma endlessly repeated by John Searle that >>>> computers are forever doomed to mere 'simulation' of the processes of >>>> life. If an automaton can drive itself a distance of two hundred miles >>>> across a tremendously forbidding desert terrain, how can this feat be >>>> called merely a 'simulation"? It is certainly as genuine an act of >>>> survival in the hostile environment as that of a mosquito flying about >>>> a room and avoiding being swatted." >> >>>> <snip pages of quotes> >>>> -- >>>> huge: Not on my time you don't. >> >>> Ya, I read that old book and agree. I think I still support some sort of >>> functionalism but am not sure. I am just open. But all these >>> philosophers have made new trails in discovering how to communicate >>> about things and processes that recent research deems necessarily to be >>> discussed. I think most philosophers or anyone who writes stuff down has >>> made some mistakes but still there is something right about what they >>> say, even Plato was correct on a bunch of things and still is. >> >>> So let us think with applied ethics here about what your saying. You >>> have some sort of standard about how many mistakes a philosopher can >>> make before he is to be ignored and shunned. You have not describe the >>> criteria for such a standard nor have you provided any examples of some >>> philosophers who pass your little test. >> >> As I said, if you enjoy reading Searle, more power to you. But his arguments >> about the impossibility of strong AI, like the Chinese Room, are just wrong. >> When you've got a robot that can go across a desert without help, that is >> the beginning of strong AI, and it will just get stronger. A great *part* of Searle's >> career has been of no more importance than being a nay-sayer. I've been reading >> him, unfortunately, since the late '70s. >> > > I try and read all philosophers and I like the parts where they make > mistakes. You can't make "mistakes" in philosophy. > I think it is good to understand the mistakes well. I don't > know if I agree with any mind/brain philosophers. I like reading books > about the brain better, these make the current arguments in mind/brain > philosophy seem shallow and weak, missing the point even. But there is > hope because everything changes, even neurophilosophy. > >> -- >> huge: Not on my time you don't. >
From: Immortalist on 2 Jun 2010 01:27
On Jun 1, 9:32 pm, Olrik <olrik...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Le 2010-06-01 23:25, Immortalist a écrit : > > > > > On May 31, 9:25 pm, huge<h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > >> Immortalist : > > >>> On May 31, 6:33 pm, huge<h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > >>>> Immortalist : > >>>> <snippage> > > >>>>> Then you agree that Searle's version of Monist token/token theory is > >>>>> not false or explains best empirical science's finding on the brain, > >>>>> or were you trying to say that absolutely all and any theory of the > >>>>> mind is false? > > >>>> Is this really an either - or type of problem? Who, besides Searle, > >>>> even still address token/token theory? > > >>>> Here is Hofstadter on Searle's philosophy of mind from "I Am a Strange > >>>> Loop, p. 81: > > >>>> "...it makes perfect sense to discuss living animals and self-guiding > >>>> robots in the same part of this book, for today's technological > >>>> achievements are bringing us ever closer to understanding what goes on > >>>> in living systems that survive in complex environments. Such successes > >>>> give the lie to the tired dogma endlessly repeated by John Searle that > >>>> computers are forever doomed to mere 'simulation' of the processes of > >>>> life. If an automaton can drive itself a distance of two hundred miles > >>>> across a tremendously forbidding desert terrain, how can this feat be > >>>> called merely a 'simulation"? It is certainly as genuine an act of > >>>> survival in the hostile environment as that of a mosquito flying about > >>>> a room and avoiding being swatted." > > >>>> <snip pages of quotes> > >>>> -- > >>>> huge: Not on my time you don't. > > >>> Ya, I read that old book and agree. I think I still support some sort of > >>> functionalism but am not sure. I am just open. But all these > >>> philosophers have made new trails in discovering how to communicate > >>> about things and processes that recent research deems necessarily to be > >>> discussed. I think most philosophers or anyone who writes stuff down has > >>> made some mistakes but still there is something right about what they > >>> say, even Plato was correct on a bunch of things and still is. > > >>> So let us think with applied ethics here about what your saying. You > >>> have some sort of standard about how many mistakes a philosopher can > >>> make before he is to be ignored and shunned. You have not describe the > >>> criteria for such a standard nor have you provided any examples of some > >>> philosophers who pass your little test. > > >> As I said, if you enjoy reading Searle, more power to you. But his arguments > >> about the impossibility of strong AI, like the Chinese Room, are just wrong. > >> When you've got a robot that can go across a desert without help, that is > >> the beginning of strong AI, and it will just get stronger. A great *part* of Searle's > >> career has been of no more importance than being a nay-sayer. I've been reading > >> him, unfortunately, since the late '70s. > > > I try and read all philosophers and I like the parts where they make > > mistakes. > > You can't make "mistakes" in philosophy. > By mistake I mean turning out to be wrong and having to upgrade or improve your models of events in the world. > > I think it is good to understand the mistakes well. I don't > > know if I agree with any mind/brain philosophers. I like reading books > > about the brain better, these make the current arguments in mind/brain > > philosophy seem shallow and weak, missing the point even. But there is > > hope because everything changes, even neurophilosophy. > > >> -- > >> huge: Not on my time you don't. |