Philosophy of mind is more important than the philosophy of language and epistemology
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From: Tim Golden BandTech.com on 2 Jun 2010 12:55 On Jun 1, 11:25 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > On May 31, 9:25 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > > > > > Immortalist : > > > > On May 31, 6:33 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > > >> Immortalist : > > >> <snippage> > > > >> > Then you agree that Searle's version of Monist token/token theory is > > >> > not false or explains best empirical science's finding on the brain, > > >> > or were you trying to say that absolutely all and any theory of the > > >> > mind is false? > > > >> Is this really an either - or type of problem? Who, besides Searle, > > >> even still address token/token theory? > > > >> Here is Hofstadter on Searle's philosophy of mind from "I Am a Strange > > >> Loop, p. 81: > > > >> "...it makes perfect sense to discuss living animals and self-guiding > > >> robots in the same part of this book, for today's technological > > >> achievements are bringing us ever closer to understanding what goes on > > >> in living systems that survive in complex environments. Such successes > > >> give the lie to the tired dogma endlessly repeated by John Searle that > > >> computers are forever doomed to mere 'simulation' of the processes of > > >> life. If an automaton can drive itself a distance of two hundred miles > > >> across a tremendously forbidding desert terrain, how can this feat be > > >> called merely a 'simulation"? It is certainly as genuine an act of > > >> survival in the hostile environment as that of a mosquito flying about > > >> a room and avoiding being swatted." > > > >> <snip pages of quotes> > > >> -- > > >> huge: Not on my time you don't. > > > > Ya, I read that old book and agree. I think I still support some sort of > > > functionalism but am not sure. I am just open. But all these > > > philosophers have made new trails in discovering how to communicate > > > about things and processes that recent research deems necessarily to be > > > discussed. I think most philosophers or anyone who writes stuff down has > > > made some mistakes but still there is something right about what they > > > say, even Plato was correct on a bunch of things and still is. > > > > So let us think with applied ethics here about what your saying. You > > > have some sort of standard about how many mistakes a philosopher can > > > make before he is to be ignored and shunned. You have not describe the > > > criteria for such a standard nor have you provided any examples of some > > > philosophers who pass your little test. > > > As I said, if you enjoy reading Searle, more power to you. But his arguments > > about the impossibility of strong AI, like the Chinese Room, are just wrong. > > When you've got a robot that can go across a desert without help, that is > > the beginning of strong AI, and it will just get stronger. A great *part* of Searle's > > career has been of no more importance than being a nay-sayer. I've been reading > > him, unfortunately, since the late '70s. > > I try and read all philosophers and I like the parts where they make > mistakes. I think it is good to understand the mistakes well. I don't > know if I agree with any mind/brain philosophers. I like reading books > about the brain better, these make the current arguments in mind/brain > philosophy seem shallow and weak, missing the point even. But there is > hope because everything changes, even neurophilosophy. > > > -- > > huge: Not on my time you don't. There is some fairly recent stuff on glia, and I haven't gotten into it much yet, but it made some NPR show and sounded fascinating. Sort of a longer term type of mechanism that has been overlooked by the neuro people; presumed inactive, but recently exposed as active. - Tim
From: RayLopez99 on 3 Jun 2010 08:48 On Jun 1, 1:30 am, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > RayLopez99 : > > > On May 31, 4:12 am, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > >> Immortalist : > > >> Searle's reputation itself has fallen because of the failures > >> intuition pumps like 'philosophical zombies' and 'Chinese symbols' have > >> been largely destroyed, IMNSHO, by the likes of Minsky, Dennett, and > >> Hofstadter. If he thinks philosophy of mind is important, he should > >> do it better! > > > Destroyed? I doubt it. If I say I've programmed a machine to be just > > like you, would you volunteer to commit suicide? The machine would > > "live on" on your behalf, so why not? > > Can you be specific about the argument against Searle that would fail because > of this? Until then I can't know what I'm responding to. > Seales argument is that humans are singletons. A computer term of art, look it up. > > > > Ditto with the thought experiment where a teleporter can transport a > > copy of you anywhere in the universe, so there are two "yous" now. Does > > the first copy (the 'original') volunteer to commit suicide? > > And ditto as to the specific argument being responded to here. > Are meat computers (Minsky's pejorative term) singletons? That's the issue. > I'm guessing that you believe there could not be two instantiations of a specific > person, and therefore there is something outside the natural world that constitutes > that person. > > I really have no problem (at least in principle!) that two copies could exist, each > instantiation wishing to continue its life, each valuable to a community. I don't > know how this would have any influence whatever on the fact that each instantiation > was, indeed, just a physical process. > Ergo, you believe meat computers are not singletons. That's fine, but no evidence for this exists. So you believe in metaphysics, or a hypothesis. Great, but don't believe in it too strongly is my advice-- otherwise you come across as kooky as the Young Earth Creationists. :-) RL
From: huge on 3 Jun 2010 09:34 RayLopez99 : > On Jun 1, 1:30 am, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: >> RayLopez99 : >> >> > On May 31, 4:12 am, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: >> >> Immortalist : >> >> >> Searle's reputation itself has fallen because of the failures >> >> intuition pumps like 'philosophical zombies' and 'Chinese symbols' >> >> have been largely destroyed, IMNSHO, by the likes of Minsky, >> >> Dennett, and Hofstadter. If he thinks philosophy of mind is >> >> important, he should do it better! >> >> > Destroyed? I doubt it. If I say I've programmed a machine to be >> > just like you, would you volunteer to commit suicide? The machine >> > would "live on" on your behalf, so why not? >> >> Can you be specific about the argument against Searle that would fail >> because of this? Until then I can't know what I'm responding to. >> >> > Seales argument is that humans are singletons. A computer term of art, > look it up. > > >> >> > Ditto with the thought experiment where a teleporter can transport a >> > copy of you anywhere in the universe, so there are two "yous" now. >> > Does the first copy (the 'original') volunteer to commit suicide? >> >> And ditto as to the specific argument being responded to here. >> >> > Are meat computers (Minsky's pejorative term) singletons? That's the > issue. > > >> I'm guessing that you believe there could not be two instantiations of >> a specific person, and therefore there is something outside the natural >> world that constitutes that person. >> >> I really have no problem (at least in principle!) that two copies >> could exist, each instantiation wishing to continue its life, each >> valuable to a community. I don't know how this would have any >> influence whatever on the fact that each instantiation was, indeed, >> just a physical process. >> >> > Ergo, you believe meat computers are not singletons. That's fine, but > no evidence for this exists. So you believe in metaphysics, or a > hypothesis. Great, but don't believe in it too strongly is my advice-- > otherwise you come across as kooky as the Young Earth Creationists. :-) > > RL I can run the suite of Open Office programs on my Linux desktop, a Windows laptop, or an all-in-one Apple desktop. Three very different hardware machines, but the same program. I take the thing that constitutes what I consider important about "identity" to be the highest level processes of a human, the ideas the human houses in her wetware, not the wetware itself. Of course you can look at identity differently. It is, in fact, a kind of vague word; there are ways of seeing it such that 'singleton' would be the right way to see humans. To really make sense one has to be more specific than just the vague word 'identity' and be quite specific. Further confusing the issue is the difference between 'identity' and a personal sense of identity. The evidence for identity in the sense I am using it has to do with the way ideas and large sets of ideas spread from person to person while remaining the very same idea; one might say that I am housing a little bit of Democritus and Xenophon in my head right now. -- huge: Not on my time you don't.
From: bigfletch8 on 3 Jun 2010 11:31 On Jun 1, 1:55 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > bigflet...(a)gmail.com : > > > > > > > On Jun 1, 9:33 am, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > >> Immortalist : > >> <snippage> > > >> > Then you agree that Searle's version of Monist token/token theory is > >> > not false or explains best empirical science's finding on the brain, > >> > or were you trying to say that absolutely all and any theory of the > >> > mind is false? > > >> Is this really an either - or type of problem? Who, besides Searle, > >> even still address token/token theory? > > >> Here is Hofstadter on Searle's philosophy of mind from "I Am a Strange > >> Loop, p. 81: > > >> "...it makes perfect sense to discuss living animals and self-guiding > >> robots in the same part of this book, for today's technological > >> achievements are bringing us ever closer to understanding what goes on > >> in living systems that survive in complex environments. Such successes > >> give the lie to the tired dogma endlessly repeated by John Searle that > >> computers are forever doomed to mere 'simulation' of the processes of > >> life. If an automaton can drive itself a distance of two hundred miles > >> across a tremendously forbidding desert terrain, how can this feat be > >> called merely a 'simulation"? It is certainly as genuine an act of > >> survival in the hostile environment as that of a mosquito flying about > >> a room and avoiding being swatted." > > >> <snip pages of quotes> > >> -- > >> huge: Not on my time you don't. > > > Except one has life and on doesnt....and never the twain shall meet. > > "Frankie Steins Grandson." > > > BOfL > > That depends on what processes you consider significant. > > -- > huge: Not on my time you don't.- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - I can only consider 'I" things. BOfL
From: huge on 3 Jun 2010 13:10
bigfletch8(a)gmail.com : > On Jun 1, 1:55 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: >> bigflet...(a)gmail.com : >> >> >> >> >> >> > On Jun 1, 9:33 am, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: >> >> Immortalist : >> >> <snippage> >> >> >> > Then you agree that Searle's version of Monist token/token theory >> >> > is not false or explains best empirical science's finding on the >> >> > brain, or were you trying to say that absolutely all and any >> >> > theory of the mind is false? >> >> >> Is this really an either - or type of problem? Who, besides Searle, >> >> even still address token/token theory? >> >> >> Here is Hofstadter on Searle's philosophy of mind from "I Am a >> >> Strange Loop, p. 81: >> >> >> "...it makes perfect sense to discuss living animals and >> >> self-guiding robots in the same part of this book, for today's >> >> technological achievements are bringing us ever closer to >> >> understanding what goes on in living systems that survive in complex >> >> environments. Such successes give the lie to the tired dogma >> >> endlessly repeated by John Searle that computers are forever doomed >> >> to mere 'simulation' of the processes of life. If an automaton can >> >> drive itself a distance of two hundred miles across a tremendously >> >> forbidding desert terrain, how can this feat be called merely a >> >> 'simulation"? It is certainly as genuine an act of survival in the >> >> hostile environment as that of a mosquito flying about a room and >> >> avoiding being swatted." >> >> >> <snip pages of quotes> >> >> -- >> >> huge: Not on my time you don't. >> >> > Except one has life and on doesnt....and never the twain shall meet. >> > "Frankie Steins Grandson." >> >> > BOfL >> >> That depends on what processes you consider significant. >> >> -- >> huge: Not on my time you don't.- Hide quoted text - >> >> - Show quoted text - > > I can only consider 'I" things. > > BOfL You mean the sense of personal identity? |