Philosophy of mind is more important than the philosophy of language and epistemology
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From: RayLopez99 on 4 Jun 2010 12:02 On Jun 3, 4:34 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > > I can run the suite of Open Office programs on my Linux desktop, a Windows laptop, > or an all-in-one Apple desktop. Three very different hardware machines, but > the same program. Well that's not a singleton, so far so theory that you think humans are not singletons. > I take the thing that constitutes what I consider important > about "identity" to be the highest level processes of a human, the ideas > the human houses in her wetware, not the wetware itself. Well, that *is* a kind of singleton, one that produces ideas. Make up your mind, no pun intended. > Of course you can look at identity differently. It is, in fact, > a kind of vague word; there are ways of seeing it such that 'singleton' > would be the right way to see humans. Vague is right. > To really make sense one has to be more > specific than just the vague word 'identity' and be quite specific. Further confusing > the issue is the difference between 'identity' and a personal sense of identity. > The evidence for identity in the sense I am using it has to do with the way > ideas and large sets of ideas spread from person to person while remaining > the very same idea; one might say that I am housing a little bit of Democritus > and Xenophon in my head right now. You probably have a bit of Plato's "Forms" in your head. I thought Democritus was dealing with Atoms and Xenophon--don't recall what his contribution was...I confuse him with the mercenary who led the 10000 out of Persia. RL
From: huge on 4 Jun 2010 12:58 RayLopez99 : > On Jun 3, 4:34 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > > >> I can run the suite of Open Office programs on my Linux desktop, a >> Windows laptop, or an all-in-one Apple desktop. Three very different >> hardware machines, but the same program. > > Well that's not a singleton, so far so theory that you think humans are > not singletons. > >> I take the thing that constitutes what I consider important >> about "identity" to be the highest level processes of a human, the >> ideas the human houses in her wetware, not the wetware itself. > > Well, that *is* a kind of singleton, one that produces ideas. Make up > your mind, no pun intended. > >> Of course you can look at identity differently. It is, in fact, a kind >> of vague word; there are ways of seeing it such that 'singleton' would >> be the right way to see humans. > > Vague is right. > > >> To really make sense one has to be more specific than just the vague >> word 'identity' and be quite specific. Further confusing the issue is >> the difference between 'identity' and a personal sense of identity. The >> evidence for identity in the sense I am using it has to do with the way >> ideas and large sets of ideas spread from person to person while >> remaining the very same idea; one might say that I am housing a little >> bit of Democritus and Xenophon in my head right now. > > You probably have a bit of Plato's "Forms" in your head. He thought physical things we see come from the forms. I think high level abstractions like software and thought emerge from simpler physical things. So it is almost exactly the opposite view. > I thought > Democritus was dealing with Atoms and Xenophon--don't recall what his > contribution was...I confuse him with the mercenary who led the 10000 > out of Persia. > > RL -- huge: Not on my time you don't.
From: John Stafford on 4 Jun 2010 15:25 In article <7ZqdnXks169PrZTRnZ2dnUVZ_uSdnZ2d(a)earthlink.com>, huge <huge(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > RayLopez99 : > > > On Jun 3, 4:34 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > > > > > >> I can run the suite of Open Office programs on my Linux desktop, a > >> Windows laptop, or an all-in-one Apple desktop. Three very different > >> hardware machines, but the same program. > > > > Well that's not a singleton, so far so theory that you think humans are > > not singletons. > > > >> I take the thing that constitutes what I consider important > >> about "identity" to be the highest level processes of a human, the > >> ideas the human houses in her wetware, not the wetware itself. > > > > Well, that *is* a kind of singleton, one that produces ideas. Make up > > your mind, no pun intended. > > > >> Of course you can look at identity differently. It is, in fact, a kind > >> of vague word; there are ways of seeing it such that 'singleton' would > >> be the right way to see humans. > > > > Vague is right. > > > > > >> To really make sense one has to be more specific than just the vague > >> word 'identity' and be quite specific. Further confusing the issue is > >> the difference between 'identity' and a personal sense of identity. The > >> evidence for identity in the sense I am using it has to do with the way > >> ideas and large sets of ideas spread from person to person while > >> remaining the very same idea; one might say that I am housing a little > >> bit of Democritus and Xenophon in my head right now. > > > > You probably have a bit of Plato's "Forms" in your head. > > He thought physical things we see come from the forms. > I think high level abstractions like software and thought > emerge from simpler physical things. So it is almost > exactly the opposite view. The Ancient Greeks considered vision a deep mystery and the source of insight, knowledge. To 'see' something was the human being casting his vision upon an object, illuminating it as if the eyes were penetrating the darkness of reality. Look to their concept of aletheia which means something becoming unhidden, seen. Aletheia is not the thing being seen, but the becoming visible - the very moment of the unveiling by human vision. So the Forms never become seen, but aspects of them are seen.
From: John Stafford on 4 Jun 2010 18:44 In article <iq6dnYk2bK5DxpTRnZ2dnUVZ_sKdnZ2d(a)earthlink.com>, huge <huge(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > John Stafford : > > > In article <7ZqdnXks169PrZTRnZ2dnUVZ_uSdnZ2d(a)earthlink.com>, > > huge <huge(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > > > >> RayLopez99 : > >> > >> > On Jun 3, 4:34 pm, huge <h...(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> >> I can run the suite of Open Office programs on my Linux desktop, a > >> >> Windows laptop, or an all-in-one Apple desktop. Three very > >> >> different hardware machines, but the same program. > >> > > >> > Well that's not a singleton, so far so theory that you think humans > >> > are not singletons. > >> > > >> >> I take the thing that constitutes what I consider important > >> >> about "identity" to be the highest level processes of a human, the > >> >> ideas the human houses in her wetware, not the wetware itself. > >> > > >> > Well, that *is* a kind of singleton, one that produces ideas. Make > >> > up your mind, no pun intended. > >> > > >> >> Of course you can look at identity differently. It is, in fact, a > >> >> kind of vague word; there are ways of seeing it such that > >> >> 'singleton' would be the right way to see humans. > >> > > >> > Vague is right. > >> > > >> > > >> >> To really make sense one has to be more specific than just the vague > >> >> word 'identity' and be quite specific. Further confusing the issue > >> >> is the difference between 'identity' and a personal sense of > >> >> identity. The evidence for identity in the sense I am using it has > >> >> to do with the way ideas and large sets of ideas spread from person > >> >> to person while remaining the very same idea; one might say that I > >> >> am housing a little bit of Democritus and Xenophon in my head right > >> >> now. > >> > > >> > You probably have a bit of Plato's "Forms" in your head. > >> > >> He thought physical things we see come from the forms. I think high > >> level abstractions like software and thought emerge from simpler > >> physical things. So it is almost exactly the opposite view. > > > > The Ancient Greeks considered vision a deep mystery and the source of > > insight, knowledge. To 'see' something was the human being casting his > > vision upon an object, illuminating it as if the eyes were penetrating > > the darkness of reality. Look to their concept of aletheia which means > > something becoming unhidden, seen. Aletheia is not the thing being seen, > > but the becoming visible - the very moment of the unveiling by human > > vision. So the Forms never become seen, but aspects of them are seen. > > *I* was using seen -- in its usage as "understood." Seeing is not understanding.
From: John Stafford on 4 Jun 2010 19:12
In article <WOOdnQXlL70AH5TRnZ2dnUVZ_uSdnZ2d(a)earthlink.com>, huge <huge(a)nomailaddress.com> wrote: > John Stafford : > > Seeing is not understanding. > > No, *literally*, seeing is certainly not understanding. > But you can say "x sees it that way" and *mean* > the same thing as "x understands it that way." > It is idiomatic for native speakers of English. Within the most popular paradigm, we can presume that X sees something and I see the same. It is like seeing a color, perhaps pure red. It is provable that any person with the normative eyesight sees the same red. This is experience, not understanding. But for more complex events, seeing is not understanding. But you and I know that. |