The Definition of Points
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From: Lester Zick on 25 Apr 2007 15:36 On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 19:26:10 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> wrote: >Lester Zick wrote: >> On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 09:27:05 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> >> wrote: >> >>>>> If you want to talk about the truth values of individual facts used in >>>>> deduction, by all means, go for it. >>>> I don't; I never did. All I ever asked was how people who assume the >>>> truth of their assumptions compute the truth value of the assumptions. >>>> >>>> ~v~~ >>> By measuring the logical implications of their assumptions. >> >> Or perhaps by measuring the truth of their assumptions instead. >> >> ~v~~ > >How do you propose to do that? Well, Tony, my remark was really facetious more than substantive. The fact is I've given you some clue as to the considerations involved in evaluating "truth values" with compound predicates in previous replies here today. So I would ask that you concentrate on analyzing those replies instead of trying to address the comment above. If we restrict consideration to just the truth of "large green apples are large red apples" I think you'll find all pertinent considerations involved which depend on the difference between "green" and "red" in that context. However I think you'll also find the difference between "green" and "red" or "green - red" in that context to be subjective and effectively unmeasurable in terms of any objective "truth value". ~v~~
From: Ben newsam on 25 Apr 2007 21:19 On Wed, 25 Apr 2007 11:03:39 -0700, Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net> wrote: >On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 19:01:14 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> >wrote: > >>Lester Zick wrote: >>> On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 09:27:05 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> We already know you think there are any number of points in the >>>>> interval 0-1 so apriori declarations do not erase that inconsistency >>>>> between different sets of assumptions. >>>> I'm trying to keep it simple, and just discuss the mechanics of the most >>>> basic kind of logic, where absolute "truth" exists. It doesn't, in real >>>> science. >>> >>> I don't understand where you think absolute truth exists if not in >>> real science. >>> >>> ~v~~ >> >>Absolute truth underlies the universe. Science only confirms a >>theoretical truth to within some degree of accuracy, or disproves it. > >So this absolute truth thingie, Tony. Does it lie out there in space >with the conjunctions you hypothecate and the dimensions Ben >hypothecates? Er... is this me? What dimensions that I hypothecate? I presume that you no more know the meaning of the word "hypothecate" than you do the meaning of "meretricious", because I have not mortgaged any dimensions. Assuming that you mean "hypothesised about", I feel it only right to point out that I have not hypothesised the existence of any dimensions beyond the standard three, since that number seems to be sufficient to describe physical space as we percieve it. > Can we conduct some experiments to demonstrate what you >claim? Or are we forced to rely on your and Ben's philosophical tracts >on these subjects instead? I'm inclined to the incontrovertible >opinion personally there are three plus or minus 1/2pi dimensions, >seven plus or minus 0.01 conjunctions, and two plus or minus e >absolute truths but one can hardly ever tell for sure I suppose. Oh >and don't forget the "is is" principle of Isis nee Parmenides. I'm >sure we'll have to make room for it somewhere out there in space too. Now you're just, as usual, beginning to be silly.
From: Ben newsam on 25 Apr 2007 21:21 On Wed, 25 Apr 2007 11:27:00 -0700, Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net> wrote: >The fact is two of the predicates are true and one false. Does that >mean t=0.000 or t=0.667? The same would apply to combinations of >propositions. Are we supposed to be taking an arithmetic average or >exercising some kind of intuitional insight? Not even to mention the >weighting of predicates. I just can't imagine that all predicates have >the same significance in terms of probablistic truth. Are we supposed >to just adopt someones weighting opinions on the subject of truth? Porridge dancing again, Lester
From: Ben newsam on 25 Apr 2007 21:25 On Wed, 25 Apr 2007 12:24:17 -0700, Lester Zick <dontbother(a)nowhere.net> wrote: >On Wed, 25 Apr 2007 01:39:21 +0100, Ben newsam ><ben.newsam.remove.this(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >>On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 15:15:45 -0700, Lester Zick >><dontbother(a)nowhere.net> wrote: >> >>>On Tue, 24 Apr 2007 09:27:05 -0400, Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> >>>wrote: >>> >>>>>> If I say a or not a, that's true for all a. a and b are >>>>>> variables, which may each assume the value true or false. >>>>> >>>>> Except you don't assign them the value true or false; you assign them >>>>> the value 1 or 0 and don't bother to demonstrate the "truth" of either >>>>> 1 or 0. >>>>> >>>> >>>>1 is true, 0 is false. If a is 0 or 1, then we have "0 or 1", or "1 or >>>>0", respectively. Since or(a,b) is true whenever a is true or b is true, >>>>or both, or(1,0) and or(0,1), the only possible values for the >>>>statement, are both true. So, or(a,not(a)) is always true, in boolean >>>>logic, or probability. >>>> >>>>Intuitively, if a is a subset of the universe, and not(a) is everything >>>>else, then the sum of a and not(a) is very simply the universe, which is >>>>true. >>> >>>Yeah but you still haven't proven that 1 is true and 0 false or what >>>either of these terms has to mean in mechanically exhaustive terms. >> >>Try this: "1" is everything or anything. "0" is whatever "1" is not. >>You may assign the terms "true" and "false" if you wish. Or vice >>versa. > >Yeah and when you do, Ben, all you'll have are TvN binary 1 and 0 and >not "true" and "false". A rose by any other name would still be binary >1 and 0 because all you've done is develop 1 and 0 mathematically and >not in terms of what true and false really mean and necessarily have >to mean in mechanically reduced exhaustive universal terms. What you fail to realise is that binary 1 and 0 are synonymous with the terms "true" and "false". Also synonymous would seem to be the terms "mathematical" and your odd phrase "mechanically reduced exhaustive universal".
From: Brian Chandler on 26 Apr 2007 02:11
stephen(a)nomail.com wrote: > In sci.math Tony Orlow <tony(a)lightlink.com> wrote: > > Well, if the axiom systems we develop produce the results we expect > > mathematically, then we can be satisfied with them as starting > > assumptions upon which to build. My issue with transfinite set theory is > > that it produces a notion of infinite "size" which I find > > unsatisfactory. I accept that bijection alone can define equivalence > > classes of sets, but I do not accept that this is anything like an > > infinite "number". So, that's why I question the axioms of set theory. > > Why would you question the axioms? The axioms do not contain the > words "number", "size", or "infinite". As you have been told over > and over again, the results do not depend on the names we use. Only the other day, Tony _appeared_ to agree that there was nothing at all "wrong" with cardinality, just as long as it wasn't called "size". Perhaps he really means he questions the names of the axioms of set theory... Well, who knows. He is spending his energies conversing with Liza at present, so give him a break. Brian Chandler http://imaginatorium.org |