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From: Immortalist on 18 May 2010 22:47
On May 18, 6:59 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
> Giga2 wrote:
> > On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> >> At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> >> These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> >> memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> >> world that make them the same person...
>
> >> ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> >> linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> >> that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> >> direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> >> conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> >> the self...
>
> >> ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> >> over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> >> is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> >> particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> >> over and above the states themselves.
>
> >> When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> >> the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> >> is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.
>
> >> ------------------------------
>
> >> Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> >> David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> >> object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> >> or tropes.
>
> >> According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> >> nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> >> nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> >> theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> >> its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> >> its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> >> asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> >> properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> >> properties inhere.
>
> >>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt....
>
> > This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> > nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> > view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> > time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.
>
> Yes.

Then please explain how the same person has different processes going
on at two different times. Or are you trying to imply that the person
is thinking the same indiscernible thing at two different times. This
time dimensional outlook is the weakness of QM noted by string
theorists, example, you look at a map of where you are at and where
you will be and simply declare I am in both place "then?"
From: Immortalist on 18 May 2010 22:50
On May 18, 7:00 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
> Michael Gordge wrote:
> > On May 18, 10:52 am,

>>> Immortalist <r cunttwaytboloocksewe sort that one out, idiot.
>

Untrue, you have not made the case.

The Appeal to Ridicule is a fallacy in which ridicule or mockery is
substituted for evidence in an "argument." This sort of "reasoning" is
fallacious because mocking a claim does not show that it is false.
This is especially clear in the following example: "1+1=2! That's the
most ridiculous thing I have ever heard!"

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-ridicule.html


> > MG

From: sarge on 18 May 2010 23:09
On 18 Maj, 10:11, Giga2 <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> > memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> > world that make them the same person...
>
> > ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> > linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> > that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> > direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> > conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> > the self...
>
> > ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> > over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> > is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> > particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> > over and above the states themselves.
>
> > When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> > the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> > is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.
>
> > ------------------------------
>
> > Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> > David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> > object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> > or tropes.
>
> > According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> > nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> > nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> > theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> > its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> > its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> > asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> > properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> > properties inhere.
>
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt...
>
> This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.

That's relevent, perhaps, from the outside. But from the inside one
might want to believe it will be me who experiences my daughter's
upcoming child, my grandchild. The experiencer may not persist and
this experiencer may not be concerned about logical uses of language
in nominalism or whatever.
From: Giga2 on 19 May 2010 04:18
On 19 May, 03:16, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On May 18, 1:11 am, Giga2 <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > > These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> > > memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> > > world that make them the same person...
>
> > > ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> > > linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> > > that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> > > direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> > > conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> > > the self...
>
> > > ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> > > over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> > > is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> > > particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> > > over and above the states themselves.
>
> > > When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> > > the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> > > is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.
>
> > > ------------------------------
>
> > > Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> > > David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> > > object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> > > or tropes.
>
> > > According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> > > nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> > > nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> > > theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> > > its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> > > its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> > > asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> > > properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> > > properties inhere.
>
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt....
>
> > This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> > nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> > view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> > time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.
>
> But at the different times the properties and aspects of the object or
> self are different.

There again this same underlying misconception appears to be there. If
you talk about 'properties of objects' then the confusion starts right
there it seems. As objects are naively consider to be permanent,
whereas events have properties, take the formation of the Solar
System, but are not thought to be unchanging. In reality a human being
is really an event, just like the formation of the SS, but on a much
quicker time scale (taking the scientific view again), and a glass
falling off a table and breaking just the same, but on an even quicker
time scale. Even a diamond is an event, but on such a slow time scale,
at our level of perception, that it appears to be unchanging, this is
only an illusion. It is really loads of atoms and particles buzzing
around, and is in fact mostly 'empty' space as well.

The properties are all you can use to determine
> anything about or that something is an object (base substrata) But you
> say it is the same self. Please explain.

Again it is more correct to think of an 'object' as an event (and an
event that is part of a wider event, which is the World). Then it
becomes clearer why this event may be changing but be continuous as
well (all part of the same event). Take a human being, he/she is one
event because the current state, though perhaps very different from
previous states, has been arrived at because of those previous states.
IOW he/she can be seen as a continuous integrated event, plus all the
other markers of identity of course (such as genes, memories, history,
social markers etc etc).

From: Giga2 on 19 May 2010 04:28
On 19 May, 04:09, sarge <greasethew...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On 18 Maj, 10:11, Giga2 <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > > These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> > > memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> > > world that make them the same person...
>
> > > ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> > > linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> > > that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> > > direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> > > conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> > > the self...
>
> > > ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> > > over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> > > is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> > > particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> > > over and above the states themselves.
>
> > > When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> > > the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> > > is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.
>
> > > ------------------------------
>
> > > Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> > > David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> > > object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> > > or tropes.
>
> > > According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> > > nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> > > nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> > > theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> > > its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> > > its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> > > asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> > > properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> > > properties inhere.
>
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt....
>
> > This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> > nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> > view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> > time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.
>
> That's relevent, perhaps, from the outside.  But from the inside one
> might want to believe it will be me who experiences my daughter's
> upcoming child, my grandchild.  The experiencer may not persist and
> this experiencer may not be concerned about logical uses of language
> in nominalism or whatever.

From the inside it is a different issue, but I personally don't doubt
the 'persistence of identity' from my own point of view. I know I am
the same person as I have always been. I have changed, as well, but I
am still me, and I'm quite sure that I will always be me in that
sense. And of course all this stuff about 'objects being events' is
actually strictly 'all objects are events in consciousness' for me
inside. Because I never have direct access to the World (from a
scientific view again, as far as we understand things) but only
indirect, through the senses, which generate data that is used to
produce a internal world-simulation, which is all I ever experience
directly.
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