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From: Michael Gordge on 19 May 2010 06:50
On May 19, 11:29 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:

> some subject that Ayn Rand didn't address,

On the contray, Rand's specialty was the law of identity, non-
contradictory identification and integration of the data of man's
senses.

Your dopey idea failed to address what triggers the mind.

MG
From: Errol on 19 May 2010 08:16
On May 18, 3:52 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:

> According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> properties inhere.
>

In that case we might as well say that objects exist only as neural
patterns in the brain. How are the properties related to each without
a
physical substance to adhere to?
From: Anthony Buckland on 19 May 2010 13:08

"Giga2" <justholme(a)yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:ab59b2e0-ef2a-4d21-8409-7922b669b2d6(a)a16g2000vbr.googlegroups.com...
> On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>> At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
>> These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
>> memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
>> world that make them the same person...
>>
>> ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
>> linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
>> that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
>> direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
>> conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
>> the self...
>>
>> ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
>> over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
>> is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
>> particular time ...

Actually a person is a colony of a great many cells,
which constantly divide and/or die, and some of which
participate in an organizing pattern that keeps the
other cells (other than those which have turned
cancerous or otherwise destructive) maintaining
all the person's functions. One of those functions
is perception. Another is self-consciousness.
In our evolution, keeping going a perception of
being an enduring self has been strongly adaptive.


From: Giga2 on 19 May 2010 15:52
On 19 May, 18:08, "Anthony Buckland" <anthonybucklandnos...(a)telus.net>
wrote:
> "Giga2" <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
> news:ab59b2e0-ef2a-4d21-8409-7922b669b2d6(a)a16g2000vbr.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
> > On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> >> At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> >> These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> >> memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> >> world that make them the same person...
>
> >> ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> >> linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> >> that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> >> direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> >> conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> >> the self...
>
> >> ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> >> over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> >> is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> >> particular time ...
>
> Actually a person is a colony of a great many cells,
> which constantly divide and/or die, and some of which
> participate in an organizing pattern that keeps the
> other cells (other than those which have turned
> cancerous or otherwise destructive) maintaining
> all the person's functions.  One of those functions
> is perception.  Another is self-consciousness.
> In our evolution, keeping going a perception of
> being an enduring self has been strongly adaptive.

are each one of those cells events as well?
From: Immortalist on 19 May 2010 22:37
On May 19, 1:18 am, Giga2 <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On 19 May, 03:16, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On May 18, 1:11 am, Giga2 <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > > > These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> > > > memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> > > > world that make them the same person...
>
> > > > ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> > > > linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> > > > that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> > > > direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> > > > conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> > > > the self...
>
> > > > ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> > > > over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> > > > is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> > > > particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> > > > over and above the states themselves.
>
> > > > When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> > > > the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> > > > is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.
>
> > > > ------------------------------
>
> > > > Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> > > > David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> > > > object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> > > > or tropes.
>
> > > > According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> > > > nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> > > > nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> > > > theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> > > > its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> > > > its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> > > > asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> > > > properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> > > > properties inhere.
>
> > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt...
>
> > > This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> > > nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> > > view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> > > time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.
>
> > But at the different times the properties and aspects of the object or
> > self are different.
>
> There again this same underlying misconception appears to be there. If
> you talk about 'properties of objects' then the confusion starts right
> there it seems.

I disagree and you have set yourself up for the "infinite regress".
You should have admitted that what your proposing is just a better
theory, but your seeming implication that your somehow certain that
your theory makes mine impossible instead of less possible, makes your
position epistemologically false.

Let me ask then, at two different times the person is thinking the
exact same thing? If not there is a difference that is discernible and
since all we have to determine things are discernible properties and
aspect, you are wrong.

> As objects are naively consider to be permanent,
> whereas events have properties, take the formation of the Solar
> System, but are not thought to be unchanging. In reality a human being
> is really an event, just like the formation of the SS, but on a much
> quicker time scale (taking the scientific view again), and a glass
> falling off a table and breaking just the same, but on an even quicker
> time scale. Even a diamond is an event, but on such a slow time scale,
> at our level of perception, that it appears to be unchanging, this is
> only an illusion. It is really loads of atoms and particles buzzing
> around, and is in fact mostly 'empty' space as well.
>
> The properties are all you can use to determine
>
> > anything about or that something is an object (base substrata) But you
> > say it is the same self. Please explain.
>
> Again it is more correct to think of an 'object' as an event (and an
> event that is part of a wider event, which is the World).

I do think of all things as processes and have for quite some time.

> Then it
> becomes clearer why this event may be changing but be continuous as
> well (all part of the same event). Take a human being, he/she is one
> event because the current state, though perhaps very different from
> previous states, has been arrived at because of those previous states.
> IOW he/she can be seen as a continuous integrated event, plus all the
> other markers of identity of course (such as genes, memories, history,
> social markers etc etc).

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