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From: Michael Gordge on 18 May 2010 18:28
On May 18, 10:52 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> These people............

Doing the math may help ewe sort that one out, idiot.

MG
From: John Jones on 18 May 2010 21:58
Immortalist wrote:
> At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> These people

There's only one person. Where did the other one come from?

> seem to be the same person.

One person is not the same person. There is only one person.

> Indeed, these people share

There is no "they".

> memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> world that make them the same person...

There can be no facts about it. There is only one person.


>
> ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> linked

There is no linkage.

> by relations of similarity and causality;

A single person does not have a similar or causal relationship with himself.

> or, more accurately,
> that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> the self...
>
> ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> over and above the states themselves.

Now you are just presenting the same argument that there is two people
in terms of mental "states" rather than in terms of "memories and
personality".

>
> When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> the person subsides and is replaced with another. .

Another what? Person? There is only one person.

> ..personal identity
> is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.

A degree of what? On what scale is the degree assessed?
From: John Jones on 18 May 2010 22:00
Michael Gordge wrote:
> On May 18, 10:52 am, Immortalist <r cunttwaytboloocksewe sort that one out, idiot.
>
> MG
From: Immortalist on 18 May 2010 22:16
On May 18, 1:11 am, Giga2 <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> > memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> > world that make them the same person...
>
> > ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> > linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> > that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> > direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> > conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> > the self...
>
> > ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> > over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> > is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> > particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> > over and above the states themselves.
>
> > When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> > the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> > is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.
>
> > ------------------------------
>
> > Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> > David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> > object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> > or tropes.
>
> > According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> > nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> > nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> > theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> > its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> > its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> > asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> > properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> > properties inhere.
>
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt...
>
> This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.

But at the different times the properties and aspects of the object or
self are different. The properties are all you can use to determine
anything about or that something is an object (base substrata) But you
say it is the same self. Please explain.
From: Immortalist on 18 May 2010 22:29
On May 18, 3:28 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...(a)xtra.co.nz> wrote:
> On May 18, 10:52 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > These people............
>
> Doing the math may help ewe sort that one out, idiot.
>

That is off topic. When will you learn to converse about a subject.
Maybe this is a blind spot, some subject that Ayn Rand didn't address,
so you don't know about it?

> MG

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