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From: Immortalist on 19 May 2010 22:38
On May 19, 3:50 am, Michael Gordge <mikegor...(a)xtra.co.nz> wrote:
> On May 19, 11:29 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > some subject that Ayn Rand didn't address,
>
> On the contray, Rand's specialty was the law of identity, non-
> contradictory identification and integration of the data of man's
> senses.
>
> Your dopey idea failed to address what triggers the mind.
>

Michael Gordge" has said something like;

> Non-contradictory identification; you cant
> deny something exists without first accepting
> that thing exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction.
>
> Therefore existence is an axiomatic principle of
> your knowledge, a fact of reality and it doesn't
> matter what we may call it.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivist_epistemology
> [see "concept formation"]
>

Your trying to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a single,
undeniable truth which you seem to imply is fixed and assured.

Your first principle that "we cannot deny that something exists
without first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without
contradiction" depends upon a logical structure which is really a
second postulate.

Your unjustifiably claiming that the capacity to judge correctly, to
distinguish the true from the false and to determine what is
contradictory or non-contradictory cannot be mistaken or has no chance
for error, and this non-contradictory identification remains
theoretical, but theoretically it is the best theory, that is all.

A revised version that is theoretically and inductively [tight] might
go, "IF the capacity to judge correctly, to distinguish the true from
the false and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory,
is completely certain and cannot be mistaken, THEN it is the case that
we cannot deny that something exists without first accepting that
thing exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction.

Adapted from Descartes' -circle-game- [out of print]
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/439d949cee00a1a9

----------------------------------

1. If logical structures are true they can
transfer evidence to a conclusion.

2. Contradiction depends upon a
logical structure

3. If you deny that something exists without
first accepting that things exists to deny you
violate a inductively justified logical structure
which necessitates that this would
be a contradiction.

The real question here is, what justification is there that logical
structures are true and corespond to what happens in the world.
Therefore it is not the case that the content of the argument is
circular but that the justification of logical structures may or may
not be circular and there is no way to decide between the two
alternatives.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

> Non-contradictory identification;

If it is believed that you can't deny something exists without first
accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction then
it is an attempt to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a
single, undeniable truth which seemingly implies that it is fixed and
assured; but this supposed first principle that "we cannot deny that
something exists without first accepting that thing exists to deny,
i.e. without contradiction" depends upon a logical structure which is
really a second postulate whch unjustifiably makes claim that the
capacity to judge correctly, to distinguish the true from the false
and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory cannot be
mistaken or has no chance for error, THEN this first principle remains
theoretical, but theoretically the best theory.

Adapted from Descartes' -circle-game- [out of print]
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/439d949cee00a1a9


> MG

From: sarge on 19 May 2010 23:21
On 19 Maj, 10:28, Giga2 <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On 19 May, 04:09, sarge <greasethew...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 18 Maj, 10:11, Giga2 <justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > > > These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> > > > memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> > > > world that make them the same person...
>
> > > > ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> > > > linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> > > > that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> > > > direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> > > > conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> > > > the self...
>
> > > > ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> > > > over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> > > > is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> > > > particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> > > > over and above the states themselves.
>
> > > > When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> > > > the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> > > > is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.
>
> > > > ------------------------------
>
> > > > Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> > > > David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> > > > object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> > > > or tropes.
>
> > > > According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> > > > nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> > > > nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> > > > theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> > > > its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> > > > its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> > > > asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> > > > properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> > > > properties inhere.
>
> > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt...
>
> > > This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> > > nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> > > view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> > > time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.
>
> > That's relevent, perhaps, from the outside.  But from the inside one
> > might want to believe it will be me who experiences my daughter's
> > upcoming child, my grandchild.  The experiencer may not persist and
> > this experiencer may not be concerned about logical uses of language
> > in nominalism or whatever.
>
> From the inside it is a different issue, but I personally don't doubt
> the 'persistence of identity' from my own point of view. I know I am
> the same person as I have always been. I have changed, as well, but I
> am still me, and I'm quite sure that I will always be me in that
> sense. And of course all this stuff about 'objects being events' is
> actually strictly 'all objects are events in consciousness' for me
> inside. Because I never have direct access to the World (from a
> scientific view again, as far as we understand things) but only
> indirect, through the senses, which generate data that is used to
> produce a internal world-simulation, which is all I ever experience
> directly.

And I actually beleive myself in the persistent self, but current
science creates problems for this position. All the matter is
replaced. The neurons change patterns and increase connections or
have connections die off. Each memory - which seems to support
identity - is actually a record of a change. It records something one
does not have in common with what went before it. Materialists or
their current incarnation as physicalists really have little to stand
on as persistent selves. But even others don't have much support.
The current computer world offers many examples of how identical
patterns can be copied without retaining identity.

None of this is meant to dissuade you, since, as I've said, I share
your position. However I do think one is being, by scientific
standards, speculative. Of course by scientific standards we all
believe in unsupported claims and if we solely relied on those
standards we would get nothing done at all.
From: Giga2 on 22 May 2010 05:32
On 20 May, 03:37, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On May 19, 1:18 am,Giga2<justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 19 May, 03:16, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On May 18, 1:11 am,Giga2<justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > > > > These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> > > > > memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> > > > > world that make them the same person...
>
> > > > > ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> > > > > linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> > > > > that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> > > > > direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> > > > > conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> > > > > the self...
>
> > > > > ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> > > > > over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> > > > > is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> > > > > particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> > > > > over and above the states themselves.
>
> > > > > When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> > > > > the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> > > > > is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree..
>
> > > > > ------------------------------
>
> > > > > Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> > > > > David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> > > > > object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> > > > > or tropes.
>
> > > > > According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> > > > > nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> > > > > nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> > > > > theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> > > > > its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> > > > > its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> > > > > asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> > > > > properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> > > > > properties inhere.
>
> > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt...
>
> > > > This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> > > > nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> > > > view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> > > > time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.
>
> > > But at the different times the properties and aspects of the object or
> > > self are different.
>
> > There again this same underlying misconception appears to be there. If
> > you talk about 'properties of objects' then the confusion starts right
> > there it seems.
>
> I disagree and you have set yourself up for the "infinite regress".
> You should have admitted that what your proposing is just a better
> theory,

It is not my theory, nfortunately can't remember the philosopher who
came up with it. (ah it was Van Inwagen: In his book Material
Beings[14], van Inwagen argues that all material objects are either
elementary particles or living organisms. Every composite material
object is made up of elementary particles, and the only such composite
objects are living organisms. A consequence of this view is that
everyday objects such as tables, chairs, cars, buildings, and clouds
do not exist. While there seem to be such things, this is only because
there are elementary particles arranged in specific ways. For example,
where it seems that there is a chair, van Inwagen says that there are
only elementary particles arranged chairwise. These particles do not
compose an object, any more than a swarm of bees composes an object.
Like a swarm of bees, the particles we call a chair maintain a more or
less stable arrangement for a while, which gives the impression of a
single object. An individual bee, by contrast, has parts that are
unified in the right way to constitute a single object (namely, a
bee).http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_van_Inwagen) I just happen to
agree with it.

but your seeming implication that your somehow certain that
> your theory makes mine impossible instead of less possible, makes your
> position epistemologically false.


I'm not sure I was implying that. I was merely pointing out that there
was this underlying asuumption that I didn't agree with, that objects
are almost permanent particulars which have properties. InWagen's idea
that they are really events, and if we remmeber this scientific fact
it is a way out of a lot of philosophical confusion in this regard.

>
> Let me ask then, at two different times the person is thinking the
> exact same thing? If not there is a difference that is discernible and
> since all we have to determine things are discernible properties and
> aspect, you are wrong.

You are again using the common way of speaking using the word
'things'. They are events and so are people. An event is changing, by
definition, but it may be still the same event.

>
>
> > > anything about or that something is an object (base substrata) But you
> > > say it is the same self. Please explain.
>
> > Again it is more correct to think of an 'object' as an event (and an
> > event that is part of a wider event, which is the World).
>
> I do think of all things as processes and have for quite some time.


Good. I think that is the most correct way we have to conceive of
identity of people and objects.



From: Giga2 on 22 May 2010 05:39
On 20 May, 04:21, sarge <greasethew...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On 19 Maj, 10:28,Giga2<justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 19 May, 04:09, sarge <greasethew...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On 18 Maj, 10:11,Giga2<justho...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
> > > > > These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
> > > > > memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
> > > > > world that make them the same person...
>
> > > > > ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
> > > > > linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
> > > > > that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
> > > > > direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
> > > > > conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
> > > > > the self...
>
> > > > > ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
> > > > > over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
> > > > > is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
> > > > > particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
> > > > > over and above the states themselves.
>
> > > > > When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
> > > > > the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
> > > > > is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree..
>
> > > > > ------------------------------
>
> > > > > Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
> > > > > David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
> > > > > object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
> > > > > or tropes.
>
> > > > > According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
> > > > > nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
> > > > > nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
> > > > > theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
> > > > > its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
> > > > > its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
> > > > > asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
> > > > > properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
> > > > > properties inhere.
>
> > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt...
>
> > > > This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
> > > > nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
> > > > view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
> > > > time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.
>
> > > That's relevent, perhaps, from the outside.  But from the inside one
> > > might want to believe it will be me who experiences my daughter's
> > > upcoming child, my grandchild.  The experiencer may not persist and
> > > this experiencer may not be concerned about logical uses of language
> > > in nominalism or whatever.
>
> > From the inside it is a different issue, but I personally don't doubt
> > the 'persistence of identity' from my own point of view. I know I am
> > the same person as I have always been. I have changed, as well, but I
> > am still me, and I'm quite sure that I will always be me in that
> > sense. And of course all this stuff about 'objects being events' is
> > actually strictly 'all objects are events in consciousness' for me
> > inside. Because I never have direct access to the World (from a
> > scientific view again, as far as we understand things) but only
> > indirect, through the senses, which generate data that is used to
> > produce a internal world-simulation, which is all I ever experience
> > directly.
>
> And I actually beleive myself in the persistent self, but current
> science creates problems for this position.  All the matter is
> replaced.  The neurons change patterns and increase connections or
> have connections die off.  Each memory - which seems to support
> identity - is actually a record of a change.  It records something one
> does not have in common with what went before it.  Materialists or
> their current incarnation as physicalists really have little to stand
> on as persistent selves.  But even others don't have much support.
> The current computer world offers many examples of how identical
> patterns can be copied without retaining identity.
>
> None of this is meant to dissuade you, since, as I've said, I share
> your position.  However I do think one is being, by scientific
> standards, speculative.  Of course by scientific standards we all
> believe in unsupported claims and if we solely relied on those
> standards we would get nothing done at all.

I think if scientists remembered that really a human-being is a
process (or I prefer the word 'event') then would more easily see that
later aspects of that event have come about because of earlier
aspects, and this is one of the main ongoing links of identity.
Wittgenstein used a nice example (talking about categories but applies
here as well I think) of rope. No one strand runs the whole length of
the rope, but overlapping strands lead to the rope being continuous.
So with identity, from a scientific pov, there is no need to find this
possible imaginary continuous strand hat connect all time points of a
person's life.
From: John Jones on 29 May 2010 21:04
Immortalist wrote:
> On May 18, 6:59 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> Giga2 wrote:
>>> On 18 May, 02:52, Immortalist <reanimater_2...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>> At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person.
>>>> These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share
>>>> memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the
>>>> world that make them the same person...
>>>> ...the self is nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
>>>> linked by relations of similarity and causality; or, more accurately,
>>>> that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle... Without
>>>> direct impressions of a metaphysical "self," ...humans have no actual
>>>> conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with
>>>> the self...
>>>> ...it is tempting to assume that we do have identities that endure
>>>> over time and seek to explain that. [But] the idea of an enduring self
>>>> is an illusion. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a
>>>> particular time; there is no separate subject of these mental states
>>>> over and above the states themselves.
>>>> When the states subside, and are replaced with other states, so too
>>>> the person subsides and is replaced with another. ...personal identity
>>>> is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, it is a matter of degree.
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>> Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher
>>>> David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an
>>>> object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations
>>>> or tropes.
>>>> According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and
>>>> nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties
>>>> nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle
>>>> theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of
>>>> its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells,
>>>> its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory
>>>> asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its
>>>> properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the
>>>> properties inhere.
>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasons_and_Persons#Personal_identityhtt...
>>> This seems to be another example of the misunderstanding about the
>>> nature of 'objects'. A person is a human event that, in the scientific
>>> view at least, starts with conception and ends with death. As such
>>> time 1 and time 2 are linked in that they are both parts of this event.
>> Yes.
>
> Then please explain how the same person has different processes going
> on at two different times.

Name any process that isn't different.

> Or are you trying to imply that the person
> is thinking the same indiscernible thing at two different times. This
> time dimensional outlook is the weakness of QM noted by string
> theorists, example, you look at a map of where you are at and where
> you will be and simply declare I am in both place "then?"
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