From: Kevin B. Murphy on 14 Dec 2009 16:53 On 12-Dec-2009, Immortalista <extropy1(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > 1. generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on > some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for > example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and > therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans) > or Generalizing doesn't lead to knowledge... If someone harbors a suspicion of me based on a generalization then it is incumbent of me to confirm that suspicion... but only if I am made aware of what I am suspected of. -- Denial of Free Will makes the Knowledge of Order Absolute.
From: Patricia Aldoraz on 14 Dec 2009 17:32 On Dec 15, 12:58 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > Justifying your experience because it is your experience is a circular > argument. But no one has proposed doing this?
From: Patricia Aldoraz on 14 Dec 2009 17:36 On Dec 15, 3:38 am, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 12, 8:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > The rationale for inductive reasoning is that it works expeditiously > in matters of science. You seem unaware of the basic objection to this idea, namely that we could only have confidence in it to the extent that we could be confident that it go on working. And this latter is one of the main problems in the idea of justifying induction in the first place.
From: M Purcell on 14 Dec 2009 17:46 On Dec 14, 2:32 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 15, 12:58 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > > Justifying your experience because it is your experience is a circular > > argument. > > But no one has proposed doing this? Are you kidding?
From: Daniel T. on 14 Dec 2009 19:41
dorayme <doraymeRidThis(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > "Daniel T." <daniel_t(a)earthlink.net> wrote: > > dorayme <doraymeRidThis(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > "Daniel T." <daniel_t(a)earthlink.net> wrote: > > > > > > > .... all deductive arguments rely on either arbitrary > > > > definitions or inductive arguments. > > > > > > > > > > How so? > > > > Every sound deductive argument requires true premises. > > Soundness in the sense of validity of argument has nothing to do > with the truth per se of the premises or the conclusions. Soundness and validity have two different meanings. A "sound" argument requires true premises, a "valid" argument does not. |