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From: John Jones on 11 Dec 2009 18:51
(This is hard, so bear with it.)

Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.

Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.

Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
materially definable - they have no material sufficient conditions for
their description. But again, if we do the same for material objects and
declare that spatio-temporality is itself one of the choices we impose
on our world and by which we identify an object then we must conclude
that there are NO objects that are materially definable. And this, I
must say, is the truth of it.
-------------------
[I wouldn't want to forget the philosopher-logicians here. The reason
for the vague, largely pictorial, criteria that announces a logical or
mathematical "set" cannot be rooted in the fact that the elements of a
set are equally vaguely defined; for the elements of a set do not confer
their properties on the set. No, the reason for the dearth of definition
of a set is founded on the more general fact that there is an inherent
ontological ambivalence with any symbol of mathematics or logic. Their
symbols appear like spatio-temporal objects on the page (syntax).
However, they also non-materially vanish and appear according to a
variety of rules that are employed for their manipulation. Nevertheless,
despite this ambivalent object behaviour that syntax seems to present to
us, we could yet be tempted to say that the definition of a logical or
mathematical object is the minimal definition of an object with an
identity that is not its own, just like the piano or car. This amounts
to saying that all objects are animistic, and it only behoves us to find
what minimal state of animism is found in the logico-mathematical
symbol. For, all their signs are necessarily symbols and imbued with an
identity of some sort. There wouldn't, on this interpretation, be any
purely material objects, or any purely syntactical manoeuvres. Woof.]
From: Enkidu on 11 Dec 2009 19:07
John Jones wrote:

> However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.

Bullshit. A piano creates a note only due to the nature of its
construction and the action of the person seated at the bench. To claim
that such is "animism" or the investing of a living force or nature to
the piano is stupid beyond belief.

--
Enkidu AA#2165
EAC Chaplain and ordained minister,
ULC, Modesto, CA

"Don't you know there ain't no devil, it's just god when he's drunk."
-- Tom Waits

From: chazwin on 11 Dec 2009 19:39
On Dec 11, 11:51 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
> (This is hard, so bear with it.)
>
> Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
> in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.
>
> Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>
> Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
> materially definable -

Why? This simply does not follow.



they have no material sufficient conditions for
> their description. But again, if we do the same for material objects and
> declare that spatio-temporality is itself one of the choices we impose
> on our world and by which we identify an object then we must conclude
> that there are NO objects that are materially definable. And this, I
> must say, is the truth of it.

Why? First you define an object in spatio-temporal terms , and THEN in
functional terms, claiming animism.
You are employing different claims and then saying that nothing exists
because different terms are different.
Well - excuse me for saying so --BOLLLOCKS!
Not only are you confusing terms but also indulging in self-
contradiction.



> -------------------
> [I wouldn't want to forget the philosopher-logicians here. The reason
> for the vague, largely pictorial, criteria that announces a logical or
> mathematical "set" cannot be rooted in the fact that the elements of a
> set are equally vaguely defined; for the elements of a set do not confer
> their properties on the set. No, the reason for the dearth of definition
> of a set is founded on the more general fact that there is an inherent
> ontological ambivalence with any symbol of mathematics or logic. Their
> symbols appear like spatio-temporal objects on the page (syntax).
> However, they also non-materially vanish and appear according to a
> variety of rules that are employed for their manipulation. Nevertheless,
> despite this ambivalent object behaviour that syntax seems to present to
> us, we could yet be tempted to say that the definition of a logical or
> mathematical object is the minimal definition of an object with an
> identity that is not its own, just like the piano or car. This amounts
> to saying that all objects are animistic, and it only behoves us to find
> what minimal state of animism is found in the logico-mathematical
> symbol. For, all their signs are necessarily symbols and imbued with an
> identity of some sort. There wouldn't, on this interpretation, be any
> purely material objects, or any purely syntactical manoeuvres. Woof.]

From: bigfletch8 on 11 Dec 2009 21:58
On Dec 12, 7:51 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
> (This is hard, so bear with it.)
>
> Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
> in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.
>
> Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>
> Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
> materially definable - they have no material sufficient conditions for
> their description. But again, if we do the same for material objects and
> declare that spatio-temporality is itself one of the choices we impose
> on our world and by which we identify an object then we must conclude
> that there are NO objects that are materially definable. And this, I
> must say, is the truth of it.
> -------------------
> [I wouldn't want to forget the philosopher-logicians here. The reason
> for the vague, largely pictorial, criteria that announces a logical or
> mathematical "set" cannot be rooted in the fact that the elements of a
> set are equally vaguely defined; for the elements of a set do not confer
> their properties on the set. No, the reason for the dearth of definition
> of a set is founded on the more general fact that there is an inherent
> ontological ambivalence with any symbol of mathematics or logic. Their
> symbols appear like spatio-temporal objects on the page (syntax).
> However, they also non-materially vanish and appear according to a
> variety of rules that are employed for their manipulation. Nevertheless,
> despite this ambivalent object behaviour that syntax seems to present to
> us, we could yet be tempted to say that the definition of a logical or
> mathematical object is the minimal definition of an object with an
> identity that is not its own, just like the piano or car. This amounts
> to saying that all objects are animistic, and it only behoves us to find
> what minimal state of animism is found in the logico-mathematical
> symbol. For, all their signs are necessarily symbols and imbued with an
> identity of some sort. There wouldn't, on this interpretation, be any
> purely material objects, or any purely syntactical manoeuvres. Woof.]

Now all as you have to do is apply what you have just identified,where
it belongs that is, to (not'of') the human mind,and recognise yourself
as unique.

Trancendence doesnt mean the 'other stuff' doesnt go away, but you can
see it, or in the case of the piano, hear it for what it is.

Next time you are listenng to Rachmaninov on a theme by Paganini, be
absorbed by the sound, and contemplate the journey of the piano, at
least back to its 'roots' as a tree.

BOfL
From: bigfletch8 on 11 Dec 2009 22:00
On Dec 12, 8:07 am, Enkidu <enk...(a)nogodhere.net> wrote:
> John Jones wrote:
> > However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
> > be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
> > animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>
> Bullshit. A piano creates a note only due to the nature of its
> construction and the action of the person seated at the bench. To claim
> that such is "animism" or the investing of a living force or nature to
> the piano is stupid beyond belief.
>
> --
> Enkidu AA#2165  
> EAC Chaplain and ordained minister,
> ULC, Modesto, CA
>
> "Don't you know there ain't no devil, it's just god when he's drunk."
> -- Tom Waits

Correct, except to say that stupid is an aspect of belief.

BOfL
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