Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
in [Logic]
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From: Immortalista on 12 Dec 2009 21:01 What is the justification for either: 1. generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans) or 2. presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as it always has in the past (for example, that the laws of physics will hold as they have always been observed to hold). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction ------------------------------------------ Two views of Deduction & Induction: View 1: conclusion; Deduction = infers particular from general truths Induction = infers general from particular truths View 2: conclusion; Deduction = follows with absolute necessity Induction = follows with some degree of probability Deduction and Induction From Introduction to Logic Irving M. Copi http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/
From: Sam Wormley on 12 Dec 2009 21:08 On 12/12/09 8:01 PM, Immortalista wrote: > What is the justification for either: > There isn't any.
From: Immortalista on 12 Dec 2009 21:10 On Dec 12, 6:08 pm, Sam Wormley <sworml...(a)mchsi.com> wrote: > On 12/12/09 8:01 PM, Immortalista wrote: > > > What is the justification for either: > > There isn't any. The Problem of the Criterion A general argument against the invocation of any standard for knowledge has come to be known as "the problem of the criterion." ...there have been disputes about standards of knowledge. Some are about particular kinds of arguments that provide evidence for knowledge claims. ...others are about the degree of evidential support or reliability required for knowledge. The Pyrrhonian skeptics used an argument designed to instill doubt that any such standard can be established. Suppose there is a dispute about a standard of knowledge. If the dispute is to be settled rationally, there must be some means for settling it. It would do no good of each side simply to assert its position without argument. So how would a standard of knowledge (or "criterion of truth," in the language of the Stoics) be defended? It could only be defended by reference to some standard or other. If the standard under dispute is invoked, then the question has been begged. If another standard is appealed to, the question arises again, to be answered either by circular reasoning or by appeal to yet another standard. So either the process of invoking standards does not terminate, or it ends in circular reasoning, and in neither case would the dispute be settled rationally.
From: Marshall on 12 Dec 2009 22:39 On Dec 12, 6:10 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 12, 6:08 pm, Sam Wormley <sworml...(a)mchsi.com> wrote: > > > On 12/12/09 8:01 PM, Immortalista wrote: > > > > What is the justification for either: > > > There isn't any. > > The Problem of the Criterion > > [blah blah blah] Immortalist is an automated clipping service. It posts a long article, then some guy replies, and 2 minutes later, a lengthy counterresponse that has nothing to do with the post it's replying to. Not a reply a human could or would have typed in that time. At least it's a roughly on-topic clipping service, and not a spambot. Marshall
From: Immortalista on 12 Dec 2009 22:53
On Dec 12, 7:39 pm, Marshall <marshall.spi...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 12, 6:10 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > On Dec 12, 6:08 pm, Sam Wormley <sworml...(a)mchsi.com> wrote: > > > > On 12/12/09 8:01 PM, Immortalista wrote: > > > > > What is the justification for either: > > > > There isn't any. > > > The Problem of the Criterion > > > [blah blah blah] > > Immortalist is an automated clipping service. It posts a long > article, then some guy replies, and 2 minutes later, a lengthy > counterresponse that has nothing to do with the post it's > replying to. Not a reply a human could or would have typed > in that time. > This is I the clipper! He responded that there was no justification for either of the two alternatives I presented, and I asked what was his criterion or standard? Epistemologists find a number of problems with finding an meta- justification standard for justifying emperical beliefs. http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm 1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose justification does not depend on that of any further emperical beliefs. 2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a reason why it is likely to be true. 3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a reason. 4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is likely to be true. 5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least one empirical premise. 6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting 1. 7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified sceptical beliefs. The 7 propositions seem to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress" of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so on: If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic emperical beliefs, then it must either: (1) terminate in unjustified beleifs (2) go on infinitely (without circularity) (3) circle back upon itself in some way. If we think about justification moving in a linear direction, with one proposition becomeing the justification for another we run into an viscious regress that doesnt seem to end. It can be open ended and go on forever or it can become circular where each support depending on the last leads to the same supports over time. This is how scepticism defeated foundationalism. It seems that all we were left with a hope for escape from this dilemma of no certain knowledge is a modified version of the circular argument. Instead of a linear regress of justifiactions we seek a nonlinear context of groups of evidences or propositions emerging more evidence than other means of gaining supports from evidences and propositions. Though we close the circle, different circlular arguments, corespond to, predict, and manilulate, events in the world, than other such arguments. If we have a competition amoungst such partial certainties, we gain at least the best knowledge we can find. > At least it's a roughly on-topic clipping service, and not a > spambot. > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laAgZaHhT1A http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52xoRLh2dWw > Marshall |