Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
in [Logic]
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From: Patricia Aldoraz on 28 Dec 2009 17:03 On Dec 28, 8:59 pm, chazwin <chazwy...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > On Dec 27, 9:55 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > On Dec 27, 9:52 pm, chazwin <chazwy...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > On Dec 27, 5:56 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > A random event is an event for which there is no reason for it to have > > > > happened the way it did rather than another way. > > > > But can such an event EVER take place? > > > Is not the throw of a penny bound by the laws of physics? > > > Yes, sure. But it depends on what the physics is, it is not the direct > > concern of the philosopher in this issue of induction. > > The assertion as to whether there are truly random events is of vital > importance in the question of induction. If you can't see that then > you will be forever running round in circles with this question. > I hope you are going to say what the "vital importance" is. And I hope you are going to give your analysis of the meaning of "X is a random event' . I defended a particular interpretation of it in a previous thread. And I hope I am going to get a sense of what you are understanding as "this question of induction". I have characterised the nature of the puzzle a few times. No time like the present to expand on these matters chazwin and distinguish yourself from the likes of the average usenet guy. > > > irrelevant in a way: the penny example is a mere example of an ideal > > random event. The main relevant feature of such an example is to > > illustrate that mere sequence does not give ground for reasoning to > > above 50% for the next outcome. Something more is needed. > > What 'more' is needed is that you need to abandon the fiction that > there is any such thing as a real random event. One the penny leaves > the hand it is set on a course of action that is determined by the > force and sped of the the throw, the spin of the coin, the resistance > of the air, and the reflective ability of the table and the coin. > There is a misunderstanding here. I only use the penny example to emphasise and reemphasise that mere sequence is not a ground for prediction. Plus it does not matter to the problem of induction how determined or not determined the penny is to fall one way or the other, what matters is what information we are privy to. The distinction between matters of fact and matters of how we know things is crucial here. > > > > There is a lot more to good reasoning that cannot be described as > > deductive. > > All deduction can do is to confirm an anticipation, either good or > ill. Once a deduction is made is inevitably is used only to confirm > its own premise. Induction is the only thing able to find something > new. > This is a very wooly and vague description of deduction. I have given (many times) as precise a characterization as is possible. In long chains of deductive reasons, for example mathematical reasoning, your description seems thoroughly ill-equipped. 'anticipation' gives no real insight at all. You "new" is quite left in the air. And your statement that induction is the only thing capable of giving new knowledge implies that there is an argument form that is usefully and naturally to be called induction. This is the very question we are exploring. No use simply stating it at this stage. We need details. We need answers to the questions I have been putting. > > But I have yet to see some one element that can be usefully > > called an inductive element. > > Eh? What do yo mean by 'element'? > In the search for what might be the "reasonable part" of so called inductive processes, one can declare that there are forms in the way that there are forms of deductive arguments or one might simply note that not all deductive arguments have a form but are simply such that one cannot reasonably assert the premises and deny the conclusion and be reasonable in doing so. Either way, the problem of induction is to identify if there is *any general circumstances* that can be described in which one can assert a set of premises and conclude something where it would always be unreasonable to deny that at least the premises give the conclusion some weight of probability.
From: Patricia Aldoraz on 28 Dec 2009 17:17 On Dec 28, 9:25 pm, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > On Dec 27, 3:55 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > > On Dec 27, 9:52 pm, chazwin <chazwy...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > On Dec 27, 5:56 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > A random event is an event for which there is no reason for it to have > > > > happened the way it did rather than another way. > > > > But can such an event EVER take place? > > > Is not the throw of a penny bound by the laws of physics? > > > Yes, sure. But it depends on what the physics is, it is not the direct > > concern of the philosopher in this issue of induction. It is > > irrelevant in a way: the penny example is a mere example of an ideal > > random event. The main relevant feature of such an example is to > > illustrate that mere sequence does not give ground for reasoning to > > above 50% for the next outcome. Something more is needed. > > Jeeez Pa------aaatricia, Don't you get too folksy-fresh with me! > let us move on, we all are aware of this. You never seem aware of anything. But I will read on to see if you say the least sensible thing or are mired in your usual hazy confusions and ignorance... > But in reality lo--------ooong sequences in reality do happen to > repeat. This is a worthless trivial truism. *All* sequences repeat no matter how they go. You and that other superficial idiot Stafford could never in a million years understand this. Go and read dorayme's teachings on this in the thread on randomness. > That is why we do not step off a precipice and ignore your > 50% chance that we will walk on air. > That is not why at all. You don't know what you are talking about. And, by the way, 50% chances are not owned by me. > >There is a lot more to good reasoning that cannot be described as > > deductive. But I have yet to see some one element that can be usefully > > called an inductive element. So far, as I have said so many times, > > merely describing the brilliant reasoning of scientists (and the > > literature is chock o block of the stories of investigations and > > successes). > > So describe "good reasoning" that is neither deductive nor > inductive! Please include in your answer "the brilliant reasonings of > scientists" Why? The literature is full of them. Go do any half decent course in the history of science. What non of you usenet guys seem to understand is that the problem of induction is to isolate and understand if there is something that is to be usefully called induction. I am satisfied that it is probably a lost cause, and that what makes for reasonabless in argumeent is no such identifiable element. I quote: In the search for what might be the "reasonable part" of so called inductive processes, one can declare that there are forms in the way that there are forms of deductive arguments or one might simply note that not all deductive arguments have a form but are simply such that one cannot reasonably assert the premises and deny the conclusion and be reasonable in doing so. Either way, the problem of induction is to identify if there is *any general circumstances* that can be described in which one can assert a set of premises and conclude something where it would always be unreasonable to deny that at least the premises give the conclusion some weight of probability.
From: Patricia Aldoraz on 28 Dec 2009 17:22 On Dec 28, 9:36 pm, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > On Dec 27, 4:04 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > On Dec 28, 12:06 am, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol> wrote: > > > > Philosophy is not my strong point...not even my medium point ;-). > > > And it will never be unless you read and try to understand the many > > posts I have made with a lot of actual argument instead of being > > distracted by the posts that are to do with trolls that also do not > > understand philosophy. > > > What do you think you know about science that is relevant to the > > problem of induction that I do not know? Perhaps you should detail > > these things instead of making your silly opinions public. > > Hi Patsy! I guess that uncalled for 'put down' really recharged your > ego. Need I say more? It was called for. You can't see the cowardly nature of this jmfbahciv's post (which is close to being contentless pissing competition superficicialities), because you suffer the same disease yourself.
From: Patricia Aldoraz on 28 Dec 2009 17:43 On Dec 29, 12:19 am, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote: > In article > <0835d1d7-b36f-4e0e-b50d-505c9c9fe...(a)j19g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, > Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > The only interest I have in the Gambler's Fallacy is that it is an > > illustration that *mere sequence* and the piling up of data points is > > no ingredient in strengthening an argument. > > That is far, far too general a statement to be useful, The point of it is that it is mentioned for a very specific and limited purpose and this has been stated many times by me. You are the one that constantly misses this point. > and besides the > point of the case of the fallacy is not argument, but prediction. > What an idiotic thing to say as if there can only be one point to something! What's the matter with you and Zinnic and the other usenet guys on this group? What the hell is wrong with you? You are all a complete disgrace to the concept of amateurism.
From: John Stafford on 28 Dec 2009 20:59
In article <77a9ce41-d34f-46f3-a24d-586f144ce84c(a)a6g2000yqm.googlegroups.com>, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldoraz(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 29, 12:19�am, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote: > > In article > > <0835d1d7-b36f-4e0e-b50d-505c9c9fe...(a)j19g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, > > �Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > The only interest I have in the Gambler's Fallacy is that it is an > > > illustration that *mere sequence* and the piling up of data points is > > > no ingredient in strengthening an argument. � > > > > That is far, far too general a statement to be useful, > > The point of it is that it is mentioned for a very specific and > limited purpose and this has been stated many times by me. You are the > one that constantly misses this point. > > > and besides the > > point of the case of the fallacy is not argument, but prediction. > > > > What an idiotic thing to say as if there can only be one point to > something! > > What's the matter with you and Zinnic and the other usenet guys on > this group? What the hell is wrong with you? You are all a complete > disgrace to the concept of amateurism. No amount of screaming will change the case. |