Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
in [Logic]
|
From: Patricia Aldoraz on 2 Jan 2010 20:10 On Jan 3, 11:34 am, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote: > In article > <243fe1c0-6252-4582-a1a1-8d0d391a8...(a)h9g2000yqa.googlegroups.com>, > Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Jan 3, 12:51 am, jmfbahciv <jmfbahciv(a)aol> wrote: > > > > Well, now I'm considering that I don't know when I'm using > > > inductive reasoning when I'm thinking about a problem. > > > Neither does Stafford. He just waves his hand to websites and to > > Scientific Method. You are so gullible! > > > Consider seeking professional help. After you. Tell me how you go. If it is costly etc....
From: David Bernier on 2 Jan 2010 20:22 Patricia Aldoraz wrote: > On Jan 3, 2:27 am, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.ten> wrote: >> In article >> <247354ca-0913-4639-a138-d2db6bcb8...(a)e37g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>, >> Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Your contributions have been obscure shitty little statements like >>> "Deduction depends on induction" >> I never wrote that. >> > I never said you did. > >>> "induction is well known to be used to gain knowledge". >> I never wrote that. >> > > I never said you did > >>> This sort of limp nonsense. >> >> By definition, induction does not pretend to guarantee a truth. >> > > There is no definition of induction, certainly not one you have ever > outlined. So who would know. You are talking through your hat as > usual. At least dorayme and I have laid out one possible form. > >>> It is not just that they >>> are not deductive, it is that they do not seem to have any *reasoning >>> power*, there seems not even a *weak* force between the premises and >>> the conclusion. >> If there were no deductive properties and also not a weakness in the >> premises, there would be no probability possible, so the argument would >> not even be induction. It would be nonsense. You see, a probability of >> zero is still a probability, a statement of falsehood. >> > > This is a completely obscure followup to the paragraph you are > quoting. The task is to identify a form of reasoning that is not > deductive but which exhibits reasoning force, that means lifting the > probability to the conclusion to over 50% > >>> "Reasoning power? I refer to the power that avoids The Gambler's >>> Fallacy. You see, no matter how many times a penny comes up tails, it >>> does not follow in any way at all that it will come up tails on the >>> next throw. It is not even probable! Nor is the likelihood of heads >>> any better. There is no reasoning connection between the premise data >>> and the conclusion. >> False. If a coin comes up tails a hundred times in a row, then it is >> proper induction to state that it will come up tails on the 101th toss. >> > > If a coin comes up tails a hundred times in a row, then it is > likely to come up tails on the 101th toss. But this is different to > that there is "a proper induction". The latter is an obscure thing and > you will never, because you are one of Plato's deep-in-the-cave men > always playing with shadows. > >> Why? Because we know from hard-science and statistics that 100 tails in >> a row indicates that the coin is probably not a fair coin and/or the >> toss is not a fair toss. >> > > That is irrelevant to the problem of induction. Sensible curiosity > about induction starts with accepting that these are likelihoods. You, > in your philosophical naivet�, seem to think it is denying that > scientists and mathematicians do a good job. > > >>> "Some people say that there is a more sophisticated idea of induction >>> that does not involve the above simplistic patterns." >> Attribution confusion. I did not write that. > > Never said you did. >>> OK. I am >>> listening. What are these more sophisticated ideas that identify >>> something aptly to be called induction? >> >>> "That scientist X thinks up one pattern and scientist Y thinks up >>> another contrary pattern can be described as both of them inducing >>> different things from the data. But there is nothing in this kind of >>> psychological induction to say the least thing about whether one is >>> good *reasoning* and the other bad. >> Let's sort this out. Induction does not pretend to produce a perfect >> truth, only a probability. >> > This is irrelevant. No one is seeking certainty. That is your > confusion. dorayme and I are actually seeking mere probability, > reasoning power, logical force. > >>> "It is just a psychological trick that trained and gifted scientists >>> get up to! The testing of theories is the main game but that game is >>> a game of deduction." >> Who wrote that? Not me. >> > > Never said you did. (Have you taken your pills today?) This truth was > written, I think by dorayme, with its usual brilliant pithyness. > >> What you are trying to say is quite simple. You are saying that >> induction does not tell us whether a posit is reasonable thinking, and >> my response is that inductive reasoning does not pretend to issue a >> truth, but only a likelihood. >> > > No, I am saying we have yet to identify this beast of induction. And > when we do, I am not wanting or expecting to find more than liklihood. I think there's a part of the mind that produces assumptions, the assumption-maker. Five minutes pass by and already a dozen new assumptions ... David Bernier
From: Patricia Aldoraz on 2 Jan 2010 20:49 On Jan 3, 12:22 pm, David Bernier <david...(a)videotron.ca> wrote: > Patricia Aldoraz wrote: > > No, I am saying we have yet to identify this beast of induction. And > > when we do, I am not wanting or expecting to find more than liklihood. > > I think there's a part of the mind that produces assumptions, > the assumption-maker. Five minutes pass by and already a dozen > new assumptions ... > This is a fair enough way of putting it, yes, I guess. Or we could just simply say that one of the advanced capacities of human is to pattern recognise and not actually commit to whether it is a literal part of the mind.
From: Michael Gordge on 3 Jan 2010 06:31 On Jan 3, 4:48 pm, Marshall <marshall.spi...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Right. And someone with a false pregnancy............ The diagnosis was made by a Kantian? > and the vice president is the top person in charge. Only when the president is out of the country. Clue - knowledge is contextual. The meaning of neither pregnancy or president was changed by the noun that preceeded them. > Unless you're somehow wrong about how adjectives work. Nope, certainty has a meaning of its own and no preceeding adjective can change it. > You wouldn't be able to tell if we did. Which of course ewe are uncertain about, you'll get giddy, the regress cant stop. MG
From: Michael Gordge on 3 Jan 2010 06:40
On Jan 3, 4:48 pm, Marshall <marshall.spi...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > You wouldn't be able to tell if we did. Perpetual motion is an oxymoron, it cant happen in reality, therefore it cant happen with ideas about reality, your uncertainty idiotic Kantian diatribe is the regress that cant stop, identical in principle to the perpetual motion oxymoron. MG |