From: herbzet on


Aatu Koskensilta wrote:
> herbzet writes:
>
> > If the system is consistent, then there is a structure in which
> > B -> A is true.
>
> Sure, but what of it? Whenever we speak of truth or falsity we must have
> some specific interpretation in mind.

The interpretation which most naturally suggests itself is one in which
the axioms are true.
From: herbzet on


Aatu Koskensilta wrote:
> herbzet writes:
>
> > If this consistent system, so interpreted such that it has false
> > axioms, proves that A -> B, does that mean that A implies B?
>
> No.

That's what I'm saying.

> What of it?

That we need to clarify what it means to assert that a true
statement can imply a false statement in a consistent system.

--
hz
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
herbzet <herbzet(a)gmail.com> writes:

> The interpretation which most naturally suggests itself is one in which
> the axioms are true.

Suggests how? If we consider for instance the theory PA + "PA is
inconsistent" I doubt any interpretation on which the axioms are true
suggests itself to anyone. In any case, my point was simply that
whenever we have some interpretation of a formal language in mind there
are many consistent theories that prove falsehoods, and in particular
prove false implications; and if we don't have some specific
interpretation in mind it makes no sense to speak of a theory proving
truths or falsehoods. The completeness theorem is wholly irrelevant.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
herbzet <herbzet(a)gmail.com> writes:

> That we need to clarify what it means to assert that a true
> statement can imply a false statement in a consistent system.

What's there to clarify? The observation that a consistent system can
prove false implications is on the face of it completely transparent.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From: herbzet on


Aatu Koskensilta wrote:

> In any case, my point was simply that
> whenever we have some interpretation of a formal language in mind there
> are many consistent theories that prove falsehoods,

Sure.

> and in particular prove false implications;

By "false implications" here you mean sentences of the form 'A -> B'
with A true and B false under interpretation.

However, this is a misleading use of the term "implication", as you
have agreed that a formal proof in T of 'A -> B' does not mean that
A implies B.

> and if we don't have some specific
> interpretation in mind it makes no sense to speak of a theory proving
> truths or falsehoods.

Of course -- tell it to Charlie-Boo.

> The completeness theorem is wholly irrelevant.

Oh, I don't know about that.

--
hz