From: Nam Nguyen on
Chris Menzel wrote:
> On Tue, 27 Jul 2010 19:36:54 -0600, Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca> said:
>> Chris Menzel wrote:
>>> On Sat, 24 Jul 2010 00:27:52 -0600, Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca>
>>> said:
>>>> ...
>>>> Surely you must know, for example, it's impossible to disprove a
>>>> formula by rules of inference, because rules of inference can only
>>>> lead to proof, not to a disproof. That's how!
>>> You don't think a proof of ~A is simultaneously a disproof of A?
>>>
>> Of course not because in general there cases where there are proofs
>> for _both_ A and ~A.
>
> Then you simply have an inconsistent system in which everything is both
> provable and disprovable. So what?

Actually, what does it mean for a formula to be "disprovable" in an consistent
formal system?


--
---------------------------------------------------
Time passes, there is no way we can hold it back.
Why, then, do thoughts linger long after everything
else is gone?
Ryokan
---------------------------------------------------
From: Nam Nguyen on
Nam Nguyen wrote:
> Chris Menzel wrote:
>> On Tue, 27 Jul 2010 19:36:54 -0600, Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca>
>> said:
>>> Chris Menzel wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 24 Jul 2010 00:27:52 -0600, Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca>
>>>> said:
>>>>> ...
>>>>> Surely you must know, for example, it's impossible to disprove a
>>>>> formula by rules of inference, because rules of inference can only
>>>>> lead to proof, not to a disproof. That's how!
>>>> You don't think a proof of ~A is simultaneously a disproof of A?
>>>>
>>> Of course not because in general there cases where there are proofs
>>> for _both_ A and ~A.
>>
>> Then you simply have an inconsistent system in which everything is both
>> provable and disprovable. So what?
>
> Actually, what does it mean for a formula to be "disprovable" in an
> consistent
> formal system?

Sorry for a typo: I meant to ask:

> Actually, what does it mean for a formula to be "disprovable" in an
> _inconsistent_ formal system?


--
---------------------------------------------------
Time passes, there is no way we can hold it back.
Why, then, do thoughts linger long after everything
else is gone?
Ryokan
---------------------------------------------------
From: Nam Nguyen on
Nam Nguyen wrote:
> Chris Menzel wrote:
>> On Tue, 27 Jul 2010 19:36:54 -0600, Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca>
>> said:
>>> Chris Menzel wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 24 Jul 2010 00:27:52 -0600, Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca>
>>>> said:
>>>>> ...
>>>>> Surely you must know, for example, it's impossible to disprove a
>>>>> formula by rules of inference, because rules of inference can only
>>>>> lead to proof, not to a disproof. That's how!
>>>> You don't think a proof of ~A is simultaneously a disproof of A?
>>>>
>>> Of course not because in general there cases where there are proofs
>>> for _both_ A and ~A.
>>
>> Then you simply have an inconsistent system in which everything is both
>> provable and disprovable. So what?
>
> So:
>
> a) However much we _believe_ a formal system be consistent, especially
> one that is "sufficiently complex" (whatever that might mean) there's
> always a chance our belief might turn out to be simply incorrect!
>
> Iow, we shouldn't trust intuition and what's "clearly evident" too much!
>
> b) There's a chance that it's impossible (even in principle) to determine
> if a formula is provable in any extension of a formal system and the
> underlying extension is still consistent!

and

c) The concept of the natural numbers is a relative concept: at least
relative to whether or not a certain formulas, e.g. pGC, are true
or false.


--
---------------------------------------------------
Time passes, there is no way we can hold it back.
Why, then, do thoughts linger long after everything
else is gone?
Ryokan
---------------------------------------------------
From: Alan Smaill on
Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca> writes:

> Sorry for a typo: I meant to ask:
>
>> Actually, what does it mean for a formula to be "disprovable" in an
>> _inconsistent_ formal system?

That there is a proof of its negation.


--
Alan Smaill
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen(a)shaw.ca> writes:

> b) There's a chance that it's impossible (even in principle) to determine
> if a formula is provable in any extension of a formal system and the
> underlying extension is still consistent!

"There's a chance"? We know that in general the problem of determining
whether a formula is provable in a theory is undecidable.

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus