From: George Greene on
On Sep 22, 7:56 am, Scott H <zinites_p...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> Are you sure? Kant believed that even the statement 7 + 5 = 12 is
> synthetic.

Kant is just old and irrelevant.
With respect to the modern paradigm,
Kant can't produce anything but cant.

And just in case you didn't know, 7+5=12 ISN'T synthetic.

From: Jesse F. Hughes on
Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi> writes:

> David C. Ullrich <dullrich(a)sprynet.com> writes:
>
>> Aatu may be a real mathematician, but _you've_ been essentially
>> ignoring his attempts to "do his job".
>
> As a mathematician you should know very well logicians aren't real
> mathematicians.

Perhaps he doesn't think you're a real logician.

--
Mo memorized the dictionary
But just can't seem to find a job
Or anyone who wants to marry "Memorizin' Mo",
Someone who memorized the dictionary. Shel Silverstein
From: Marshall on
On Sep 26, 5:06 pm, Marshall <marshall.spi...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Yes. I posted this at least a couple of times in the past. But basically,
> > for Godel's theorem to work with *all* formal systems (meeting certain
> > requirements of course), a reservoir of _infinite_ number of primes would
> > be needed, _without_ a constraints as to what value they might be.
>
> There is certainly an infinite number of primes. I don't know what
> "without constraints as to what they might be" means. The set
> of primes that I'm familiar with has constraints on it. For example,
> it has the constraint that 4 is not a member. This doesn't present
> a problem for using primes in encoding statements, however.
>
> (And anyway, aren't there other possible encoding techniques
> besides those using primes? I could be wrong.)

Apparently I wasn't wrong.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_sketch_for_Gödel%27s_first_incompleteness_theorem

gives an encoding scheme that does not use primes.
Still other schemes are possible.


Marshall
From: Scott H on
On Sep 27, 9:47 am, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
> Here t is a term, not a sentence "in the model G is about", whatever
> that means. I'm afraid your further elucidations are of little help. As
> noted, the Gödel sentence of a theory T, in the language of primitive
> recursive arithmetic, has the form (x)P(t,x) where t is a term the value
> of which is the code for G.

I assume that P(t,x) means, "x is not a proof of the arithmoquine of
t," and t is a term for the Goedel code of (x)P(y,x), where y is a
free variable. If so, then the statement [(x)P(t,x)] is a statement of
T, and

[(x)P(t,x)] <=> [(x)P([(x)P(t,x)],x)],

where [(x)P(t,x)] on the right-hand side is a statement of T'.

> What does it mean to say that "the truth
> value of G could turn out to be independent of its statement of
> reference, G'"?

If we added ~G as an axiom to ZFC, then G' would provable while G
would not be.
From: Aatu Koskensilta on
Scott H <zinites_page(a)yahoo.com> writes:

> I assume that P(t,x) means, "x is not a proof of the arithmoquine of
> t,"

No, P(t,x) is the formalisation, in the language of primitive recursive
arithmetic, of "x is not a proof in T of the sentence with code t",
where t is a term the value of which is the code for the sentence
(x)P(t,x).

> If we added ~G as an axiom to ZFC, then G' would provable while G
> would not be.

What is G'?

--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensilta(a)uta.fi)

"Wovon mann nicht sprechen kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus