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From: bigfletch8 on 11 Dec 2009 22:05
On Dec 12, 8:39 am, chazwin <chazwy...(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Dec 11, 11:51 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > (This is hard, so bear with it.)
>
> > Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
> > in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.
>
> > Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
> > be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
> > animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>
> > Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
> > materially definable -
>
> Why? This simply does not follow.
>
> they have no material sufficient conditions for
>
> > their description. But again, if we do the same for material objects and
> > declare that spatio-temporality is itself one of the choices we impose
> > on our world and by which we identify an object then we must conclude
> > that there are NO objects that are materially definable. And this, I
> > must say, is the truth of it.
>
> Why? First you define an object in spatio-temporal terms , and THEN in
> functional terms, claiming animism.
> You are employing different claims and then saying that nothing exists
> because different terms are different.
> Well - excuse me for saying so --BOLLLOCKS!
> Not only are you confusing terms but also indulging in self-
> contradiction.
>
>
>
> > -------------------
> > [I wouldn't want to forget the philosopher-logicians here. The reason
> > for the vague, largely pictorial, criteria that announces a logical or
> > mathematical "set" cannot be rooted in the fact that the elements of a
> > set are equally vaguely defined; for the elements of a set do not confer
> > their properties on the set. No, the reason for the dearth of definition
> > of a set is founded on the more general fact that there is an inherent
> > ontological ambivalence with any symbol of mathematics or logic. Their
> > symbols appear like spatio-temporal objects on the page (syntax).
> > However, they also non-materially vanish and appear according to a
> > variety of rules that are employed for their manipulation. Nevertheless,
> > despite this ambivalent object behaviour that syntax seems to present to
> > us, we could yet be tempted to say that the definition of a logical or
> > mathematical object is the minimal definition of an object with an
> > identity that is not its own, just like the piano or car. This amounts
> > to saying that all objects are animistic, and it only behoves us to find
> > what minimal state of animism is found in the logico-mathematical
> > symbol. For, all their signs are necessarily symbols and imbued with an
> > identity of some sort. There wouldn't, on this interpretation, be any
> > purely material objects, or any purely syntactical manoeuvres. Woof.]- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

"Excuse me for saying so and then exclaiming 'bollocks'"?

Your last sentence describes this very well.

Many deeper thinkers get caught up in these parallel realities. Even
the scientists are conjecturing on this reality, regarding parallel
universes. The actuality, is what JJ is wrestling with, and that is
'parallel perceptions', the source of all non biologically based
mental traumas.

BOfL
From: ZerkonXXXX on 12 Dec 2009 08:08
On Fri, 11 Dec 2009 23:51:53 +0000, John Jones wrote:


> Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
> in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.
>
> Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>
> Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
> materially definable

1) Object
2) Use of object

The second gives a human meaning to the first. A car, for instance, can
be used as shelter, a piano for a bric-à-brac gallery.

The same can be said of objects organic to any environment, not
constructed for a specific purpose but only used for one. Water, as an
example.

The properties of object, constructed for a purpose or not, are neutrally
defined only given bias (animism) by need or want. One looks in a mirror
and sees only themselves as opposed to seeing only glass.
From: John Jones on 12 Dec 2009 19:13
Enkidu wrote:
> John Jones wrote:
>
>> However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
>> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
>> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>
> Bullshit. A piano creates a note only due to the nature of its
> construction and the action of the person seated at the bench.

If a piano makes a note then you are saying that a piano makes music. A
note is defined in terms of music!

> To claim
> that such is "animism" or the investing of a living force or nature to
> the piano is stupid beyond belief.

Yes. That is why we cannot define the piano materially. You think you
are disagreeing with me but you are not.
From: John Jones on 12 Dec 2009 19:22
chazwin wrote:
> On Dec 11, 11:51 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> (This is hard, so bear with it.)
>>
>> Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
>> in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.
>>
>> Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
>> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
>> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>>
>> Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
>> materially definable -
>
> Why? This simply does not follow.

A piano's parts can be defined materially but the reason for choosing
those particular parts that constitute a piano, is not defined
materially. Hence we cannot describe an object except to imbue it with
our own intentions. This is animism.

>
>
>
> they have no material sufficient conditions for
>> their description. But again, if we do the same for material objects and
>> declare that spatio-temporality is itself one of the choices we impose
>> on our world and by which we identify an object then we must conclude
>> that there are NO objects that are materially definable. And this, I
>> must say, is the truth of it.
>
> Why? First you define an object in spatio-temporal terms , and THEN in
> functional terms, claiming animism.

"Materially definable" imposes a foundational animism on objects. There
are no material rules for outlining or particularizing an object.

> You are employing different claims and then saying that nothing exists
> because different terms are different.

I'm not saying that nothing exists. I am saying that grammar can say
nothing about existence, if the description of existence presupposes
difference.

From: John Jones on 12 Dec 2009 19:25
ZerkonXXXX wrote:
> On Fri, 11 Dec 2009 23:51:53 +0000, John Jones wrote:
>
>
>> Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
>> in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.
>>
>> Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
>> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
>> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>>
>> Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
>> materially definable
>
> 1) Object
> 2) Use of object
>
> The second gives a human meaning to the first. A car, for instance, can
> be used as shelter, a piano for a bric-à-brac gallery.
>
> The same can be said of objects organic to any environment, not
> constructed for a specific purpose but only used for one. Water, as an
> example.
>
> The properties of object, constructed for a purpose or not, are neutrally
> defined only given bias (animism) by need or want. One looks in a mirror
> and sees only themselves as opposed to seeing only glass.

Yes, and what I am also saying is that a description of the parts of a
piano doesn't translate to a piano.
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