From: matdumi on
On Dec 13, 2:25 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
> ZerkonXXXX wrote:
> > On Fri, 11 Dec 2009 23:51:53 +0000, John Jones wrote:
>
> >> Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
> >> in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.
>
> >> Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
> >> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
> >> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>
> >> Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
> >> materially definable
>
> > 1) Object
> > 2) Use of object
>
> > The second gives a human meaning to the first. A car, for instance, can
> > be used as shelter, a piano for a bric-à-brac gallery.
>
> > The same can be said of objects organic to any environment, not
> > constructed for a specific purpose but only used for one. Water, as an
> > example.
>
> > The properties of object, constructed for a purpose or not, are neutrally
> > defined only given bias (animism) by need or want. One looks in a mirror
> > and sees only themselves as opposed to seeing only glass.
>
> Yes, and what I am also saying is that a description of the parts of a
> piano doesn't translate to a piano.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Matdumi write:
The identity,I can demonstrate,is the surphace structure for the depth
structure that is for the categorico-disjunctiv identity in
repetition.
((let be
1. p=p.
2.p/cvd
3.((cvd)=(cvd))
4.((cvd)->(cvd))((cvd)->(cvd))
5,((-c-dvcvd)(-c-dvcdv))
6.(((cvd)(-c)->(d))(((cvd)(-c)->(d))
QED
From: John Jones on
matdumi(a)gmail.com wrote:
> On Dec 13, 2:25 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> ZerkonXXXX wrote:
>>> On Fri, 11 Dec 2009 23:51:53 +0000, John Jones wrote:
>>>> Firstly: We associate material objects with their observed properties;
>>>> in this case they are spatio-temporal properties.
>>>> Secondly: However, if we do the same for piano's and cars then we would
>>>> be claiming that piano's make music and cars reach destinations. This is
>>>> animism, and animism isn't a property of material objects.
>>>> Conclusions: It follows that objects like piano's and cars are not
>>>> materially definable
>>> 1) Object
>>> 2) Use of object
>>> The second gives a human meaning to the first. A car, for instance, can
>>> be used as shelter, a piano for a bric-�-brac gallery.
>>> The same can be said of objects organic to any environment, not
>>> constructed for a specific purpose but only used for one. Water, as an
>>> example.
>>> The properties of object, constructed for a purpose or not, are neutrally
>>> defined only given bias (animism) by need or want. One looks in a mirror
>>> and sees only themselves as opposed to seeing only glass.
>> Yes, and what I am also saying is that a description of the parts of a
>> piano doesn't translate to a piano.- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
> Matdumi write:
> The identity,I can demonstrate,is the surphace structure for the depth
> structure that is for the categorico-disjunctiv identity in
> repetition.
> ((let be
> 1. p=p.
> 2.p/cvd
> 3.((cvd)=(cvd))
> 4.((cvd)->(cvd))((cvd)->(cvd))
> 5,((-c-dvcvd)(-c-dvcdv))
> 6.(((cvd)(-c)->(d))(((cvd)(-c)->(d))
> QED

Depth structure is another name for parts.