From: Frederick Williams on
Peter Olcott wrote:
>
> "rods" <rodpinto(a)gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:fb58bae7-2920-4b25-9887-0e4a5340b9bb(a)u31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...

> > there is no such thing as a empirical truth.
> >
> > Rodrigo
>
> You dip your hand in water, it feels wet, later on you
> remember feeling that your hand was wet, thus providing a
> single counter-example refuting your claim that empirical
> truth does not exist.

The problem is: how does one classify truths as being empirical or
logical? It is a matter of arbitrary convention.

--
I can't go on, I'll go on.
From: rods on
On 6 maio, 15:15, Frederick Williams <frederick.willia...(a)tesco.net>
wrote:
> Peter Olcott wrote:
>
> > "rods" <rodpi...(a)gmail.com> wrote in message
> >news:fb58bae7-2920-4b25-9887-0e4a5340b9bb(a)u31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com....
> > > there is no such thing as a empirical truth.
>
> > > Rodrigo
>
> > You dip your hand in water, it feels wet, later on you
> > remember feeling that your hand was wet, thus providing a
> > single counter-example refuting your claim that empirical
> > truth does not exist.
>
> The problem is: how does one classify truths as being empirical or
> logical?  It is a matter of arbitrary convention.

Yes, that's the problem. What I was saying in my other posts about
Tarski approach to this subject is to consider a purely semantical
truth.
I think is makes the subject much simpler. But it is for sure not the
only possibility.
Rodrigo
From: Peter Olcott on

"Frederick Williams" <frederick.williams2(a)tesco.net> wrote
in message news:4BE3072C.E5964BCF(a)tesco.net...
> Peter Olcott wrote:
>>
>> "rods" <rodpinto(a)gmail.com> wrote in message
>> news:fb58bae7-2920-4b25-9887-0e4a5340b9bb(a)u31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...
>
>> > there is no such thing as a empirical truth.
>> >
>> > Rodrigo
>>
>> You dip your hand in water, it feels wet, later on you
>> remember feeling that your hand was wet, thus providing a
>> single counter-example refuting your claim that empirical
>> truth does not exist.
>
> The problem is: how does one classify truths as being
> empirical or
> logical? It is a matter of arbitrary convention.
>
> --
> I can't go on, I'll go on.

Empirical truth is the direct first-hand memory of sensory
experience, close your eyes and picture a red rose.

Conceptual truth (of which logic is a part) must be
represented in the mind using language. You can't close your
eyes and picture the concept of square root.


From: David Bernier on
rods wrote:
> On 6 maio, 08:27, rods<rodpi...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 23 abr, 18:20, Aatu Koskensilta<aatu.koskensi...(a)uta.fi> wrote:
>>
>>> rods<rodpi...(a)gmail.com> writes:
>>>> Just to make it clear what I wanted to say.
>>>> I think that there is no such thing as a empirical truth.
>>>> I would call such a empirical truth as a tautology, in the end we are
>>>> always comparing things like 1=1. And this is a tautology.
>>
>>> I'm afraid this isn't very clear at all. Putting that to one side,
>>> perhaps you could explain what these odd proclamations have to do with
>>> the incompleteness theorem?
>>
>> Fromhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#S...
>>
>> For any formal effectively generated theory T including basic
>> arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability,
>> T includes a statement of its own consistency if and only if T is
>> inconsistent.
>>
>> So let's say a theory is consistent. I would prefer to use the word
>> model instead of theory.
>> Let's say a model is consistent. And let's say in this model we have
>> something called "empirical truth". My model cannot include a
>> "statement of its own consistency" because if it does so I can use
>> Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem to show that model is
>> inconsistent.
>> The way Tarski deals with this is to use a semantical approach. So
>> instead of saying that there is an "experimental truth" that would
>> lead to an inconsistent model we can just use "Truth". And it is not
>> required to have a "statement of its own consistency"
>> to prove that my "defined" is really "truth".
>
> I meant "And it is not required to have a "statement of its own
> consistency"
> to prove that my "truth" (or my "defined truth") is really "truth"."

Either truth is pi in the sky, or else it isn't pi in the sky.



From: Frederick Williams on
Peter Olcott wrote:
>
> "Frederick Williams" <frederick.williams2(a)tesco.net> wrote
> in message news:4BE3072C.E5964BCF(a)tesco.net...
> > Peter Olcott wrote:
> >>
> >> "rods" <rodpinto(a)gmail.com> wrote in message
> >> news:fb58bae7-2920-4b25-9887-0e4a5340b9bb(a)u31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...
> >
> >> > there is no such thing as a empirical truth.
> >> >
> >> > Rodrigo
> >>
> >> You dip your hand in water, it feels wet, later on you
> >> remember feeling that your hand was wet, thus providing a
> >> single counter-example refuting your claim that empirical
> >> truth does not exist.
> >
> > The problem is: how does one classify truths as being
> > empirical or
> > logical? It is a matter of arbitrary convention.
> >
> > --
> > I can't go on, I'll go on.
>
> Empirical truth is the direct first-hand memory of sensory
> experience, close your eyes and picture a red rose.
>
> Conceptual truth (of which logic is a part) must be
> represented in the mind using language. You can't close your
> eyes and picture the concept of square root.

Claiming that truth (of any kind) is to be equated with what one can
picture in one's mind's eye is clearly wrong.

--
I can't go on, I'll go on.