Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Vend on 26 May 2010 16:27 On 26 Mag, 16:13, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavall...(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > Again, I think our positions are irreconcilable. You think the concept > of free will can be reformulated to be compatible with determinism; I > think it is an inherent part of the *definition* of free will that it > is non-deterministic. We are talking about two separate things, using > the same term (i.e., "free will"), so there's really no point in > continuing; our positions are *definitionally* irreconcilable. Even if physics is possibly deterministic at subatomic level, human behavior is still non-deterministic for all practical purposes (which means, to any human observer with realistic resources).
From: Bob Felts on 26 May 2010 17:27 Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > > On 2010-05-26 11:20:46 -0400, Bob Felts said: > >> I understand that. However, what makes the choice is, IMO, irrelevant, > >> whether it is an "immortal non-physical soul", or a meat machine > >> containing a random number generator. > > Bob, you need to keep in mind that there are more alternatives than just > either a soul, or a random number generator. Despite my numerous posts > on this thread explaining how free will is compatible with determinism, > you nonetheless continue to come back to your random number idea. > > I'm beginning to wonder if you simply don't understand what I've been > saying... > Well, let's see. In <87bpcf9qhc.fsf_-_(a)mail.geddis.org>, you wrote to Raffael: | But how does one make a "choice of hand" anyway? Presumably, they | just let their mind drift, and random neurons fire, and at some point | one hand or the other "feels" like it might as well be the one to | choose "randomly" this time. | ... | Really, this universe has only determinism or randomness. There isn't | any third thing. | .... | That's your mistake. Thinking that free will must be outside of | physics and determinism. For the sake of this discussion, I don't disagree with any of this. A theist might say, "I him we live and move and have our being", and that would put it outside physics and determinism. I'm not trying to argue for a theistic view here -- I've tried to keep to a strictly non-theistic viewpoint here -- but sometimes comparing/contrasting is useful. In another post (I'm going to stop including message ID's) you wrote: | What most people don't realize, is that their "self" is implemented | using biology, which runs on ordinary physics. And so, "what their | self wants" is "constrained" by physics, and biology, and the | structure of their brain, etc. Not going to argue. | "Free choice" is not necessarily incompatible with determinism. Up to this point, we agree. So the question becomes, "how is freedom compatible with determinism?" You wrote: | I would recommend Chapter 5 of Gary Drescher's "Good and Real" | Chapter 5 is titled | Deterministic Choice, Part 1: | Inalterability Does Not Imply Futility | | I can't do the discussion justice in just a few sentences, but the | basic idea is that a decision-machine really does make choices (even | in a deterministic world), and there really isn't any way of knowing | how those choices will come out, other than running the algorithm of | the machine. The fact that the future is determined (in principle), | does NOT make the future predictable (in practice). Here you base freedom as a relationship with knowledge. I understand your point, but I happen to disagree with it since knowledge isn't predestination. Correct me if I'm wrong, but you're using the "determinism" in the sense of "able to be foreknown"; I'm using it in the sense of "predestined". | Your decision-making process is attempting (with perhaps some errors) | to maximize your goals, given your potential actions. This is what | people generally mean by "free will", as contrasted with an entity | making decisions which are coerced by the goals of some different | entity. Maybe. On the one hand, this can depend on the worldview of the person you're talking to. A theist will drag another entity into the picture, a non-theist won't. But in just a bit, I'm going to create a purely naturalistic secnario that isn't any different, in principle, from the theistic one. | This kind of free will is easily compatible with determinism. You | could put it in a computer program written in some ordinary | programming language, for example. |... | Randomess is the opposite of control, so it doesn't help at all. I disagree with this last sentence. Not only does it help, I think it's critical. Demolish the following as necessary: Suppose we want to create an AI that mimics people. I know, from self-reflection, that we're going to need a module that simulates the imagination. I don't know what gives a person creative power, but I suspect that some type of random number generator could be used, especially since the imagination isn't limited by reality. I know, from self-reflection, that our moral sense is based on some kind of "distance" measurement between "is" and "ought", and that "ought" resides in the realm of imagination. So I'm going to need heuristics that "measure" goals against imagination space, i.e. converts "ought" to "is". So I'm going to use both randomness and determinism and somehow tie this in with the module that provides self-awareness. That is, I'm going to harness randomness and determinism to create the AI. Now, suppose we've done this. Then the theist will ask, "does this creation have free will?" All of a sudden, that pesky other entity appears in the equation, and you get arguments along the line Pascal advanced. Out of the 23 messages you've posted on the subject, that encompasses most of what I think the issues are. The one remaining one is: | What Bob is looking for is, are we able to make whatever choices we | wish to make? The answer is yes. Even if I grant this (and if I have a problem with it, I'm not sure I know what it is, except an as-yet-unexamined sense of unease), that's typically not what is meant by free will. We're running into definitional issues. Some would contend that the proper way to ask this question is "are we able to make whatever/some choices that we ought to make?" But that opens up a can of worms. So, do I not understand what you're saying, or is disagreement being taken as lack of understanding? If I don't understand you, it certainly isn't because I don't want to, nor am I being contrary simply for the sake of being contrary.
From: RG on 26 May 2010 18:20 In article <1jj3vlb.34i945vdg9tuN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > > > In article <1jj3f74.150oc7skfxkhsN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > > > And yet you went to the trouble to write a post on "Morality without > > > God" which used the PD as a basis for moral behavior. > > > > My essay does not "use PD as a basis for moral behavior." It uses PD as > > the basis of a scientific model of how moral intuition can arise by > > Darwinian evolution. Until you understand the significant difference > > between my actual thesis and your straw-man recasting of it you may as > > well go argue with yourself. > > > > BTW, this is the THIRD TIME I have had to point out to you that you are > > raising a straw man. It's really getting tiresome. > > > > I assure you, I'm not trying to manufacture non-existant issues. Then you need to learn to read more carefully. > But > you did write, "The third feature that makes evolved intuition > attractive as a basis for morality...". If that's not what you were > trying to convey, then I'll accept that. A *possible* basis for morality. Look at the title of the post. > But I will say, morality is both descriptive (what we do, in fact, do -- > the "is") and prescriptive (what we "ought" to do). I can appreciate > wanting to develop a narrative for how we came to do what we do. > Perhaps the disconnect comes from my focus on the prescriptive, and > yours on the descriptive. Could be. rg
From: Bob Felts on 26 May 2010 18:47 Don Geddis <don(a)geddis.org> wrote: > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Wed, 26 May 2010: > >> >> > > > Is the universe deterministic at the quantum level? > >> >> The propagation of the wave function is deterministic, yes. > >> And the spin of a [electron] when the wave function collapses? > > Thanks. I'm familiar with the many worlds theory. > > Then I wonder why you seemed so confused about whether quantum mechanics > is deterministic (it is), and what happens when the wave function > "collapses" (it doesn't). > Because, to the best of my knowledge, no experiment has been performed that confirms MWI over Copenhagen. {If I'm wrong, both I (and Wikipedia) would be grateful for the reference.} Old fart that I am, MWI wasn't ever mentioned in school so I'm using terminology that I'm familiar with since I'm barely a lay physicist. > > In these types of essays what is being sought never has the attribute of > > _intelligence_. For then you'd have to develop a scientific definition > > of intelligence and a scientific test for intelligence. But this would > > give science fits, since intelligence doesn't conform itself to > > laboratory conditions. > > Intelligence is not a simple binary property, where you might imagine > some machine that does an evaluation, and either a light comes on ("yes, > the entity is intelligent!") or not. That's just a broken model. I never said that intelligence was a simple binary property. Are you intelligent? Is Ron? [...] > It's foolish to think science can have nothing to say about > intelligence. That's not what I said. At some level, intelligence includes the ability to refuse to submit to experiments. I look forward to see how science deals with that.
From: Bob Felts on 26 May 2010 19:02
RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <1jj3vlb.34i945vdg9tuN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > > > > > In article <1jj3f74.150oc7skfxkhsN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > > > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > > > > > And yet you went to the trouble to write a post on "Morality without > > > > God" which used the PD as a basis for moral behavior. > > > > > > My essay does not "use PD as a basis for moral behavior." It uses PD > > > as the basis of a scientific model of how moral intuition can arise by > > > Darwinian evolution. Until you understand the significant difference > > > between my actual thesis and your straw-man recasting of it you may as > > > well go argue with yourself. > > > > > > BTW, this is the THIRD TIME I have had to point out to you that you > > > are raising a straw man. It's really getting tiresome. > > > > > > > I assure you, I'm not trying to manufacture non-existant issues. > > Then you need to learn to read more carefully. > Now I am going to be cantankerous. If it were only that simple. Interpretation is hard, even for careful readers. Good grief, the US Supreme Court was split, 5-4, on whether or not the 2nd Amendment confers the right to bear arms on individuals or militias. So I'm not going to engage in a pissing contest by saying that either the justices should have been more careful readers, or the framers of the Constitution more careful writers. I want to engage in the clash of ideas, hopefully well articulated, hopefully properly understood, hopefully well supported. I don't want to engage in underhanded slights. > > But you did write, "The third feature that makes evolved intuition > > attractive as a basis for morality...". If that's not what you were > > trying to convey, then I'll accept that. > > A *possible* basis for morality. Look at the title of the post. > An *attractive* basis for morality - your words from the body of the post. Should one receive more weight than the other? Doesn't the body of a work expand on, and perhaps take new direction, from the title? See? Interpretation can hard. I'll take you at your subsequent word that the purpose of that post was to provide a possible explanation for how our moral intuitions came to be; and that it shouldn't be taken as a naturalistic explanation for what our moral intuitions ought to be. And I didn't find it necessary to insult you in the process. [...] |