From: Don Geddis on 26 May 2010 12:03 wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote on Wed, 26 May 2010: >> >> > > > Is the universe deterministic at the quantum level? >> >> The propagation of the wave function is deterministic, yes. >> And the spin of a [electron] when the wave function collapses? > Thanks. I'm familiar with the many worlds theory. Then I wonder why you seemed so confused about whether quantum mechanics is deterministic (it is), and what happens when the wave function "collapses" (it doesn't). > In these types of essays what is being sought never has the attribute > of _intelligence_. For then you'd have to develop a scientific > definition of intelligence and a scientific test for intelligence. > But this would give science fits, since intelligence doesn't conform > itself to laboratory conditions. Intelligence is not a simple binary property, where you might imagine some machine that does an evaluation, and either a light comes on ("yes, the entity is intelligent!") or not. That's just a broken model. Intelligence is more a matter of capability of problem solving. It's a spectrum. And entity can have more or less of it. It's foolish to think science can have nothing to say about intelligence. Biologists already study tool-using in chimps (e.g., long sticks to get tasty ants out of an anthill), "money" as a store of future value in chimps, maze behavior in rats, lock picking in octopuses, recognition of self in a mirror by dolphins and elephants (via forehead smudges), etc. All of this is science, exploring the kinds and levels of intelligence in various entities. Intelligence is by no means "beyond" the reach of science. (And of course, I didn't even mention AI, or cognitive psych studies of humans.) -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org Native Americans used every part of the buffalo, including the wings.
From: Raffael Cavallaro on 26 May 2010 13:33 On 2010-05-26 11:20:46 -0400, Bob Felts said: > I understand that. However, what makes the choice is, IMO, irrelevant, > whether it is an "immortal non-physical soul", or a meat machine > containing a random number generator. OK, sorry if you were just playing devil's advocate, etc. I think the crux of this discussion is this: Although it doesn't matter to you (and others in this discussion) whether it is an "immortal non-physical soul," or a meat machine containing a random number generator, I think it matters very much to those people who do believe in non-deterministic, immortal souls. example: Green Cheeser: The moon is made of green cheese; if I went there I would be able to just reach down and take a chunk of moon and make a cheese sandwich which would be tasty and delicious! Compatibilist: The moon is made of rock. However, we have done some measurements on a particular kind of cheese from the french pyrenees that reflects pretty much the same exact portion of the visible spectrum as the moon! So the moon can, for all intents and purposes be said to be made of green cheese, as long as by "green cheese" we mean, rock that reflects light in much the same way as a particular cheese. Green Cheeser: So I could eat moon rocks, like cheese? Compatibilist: No, you would break your teeth. When you say "the moon is made of green cheese," what you *really* mean is, the moon is made of rock that looks just like a particular cheese. Green Cheese: But that's not what I mean at all! I mean that the moon is *really* made of cheese, not rock. Compatibilist: No; you really *do* mean that the moon is made of rock that looks like cheese. I can *prove* that's what you mean scientifically! Something of a category error here; when speaking of what people believe, science can only prove whether that belief is consistent or inconsistent with experimental evidence; science cannot prove what people do or don't believe except by conducting statistical polls. Redefining the terms of their beliefs to be consistent with experimental evidence does not prove that they believe that redefinition of terms. warmest regards, Ralph -- Raffael Cavallaro
From: Bob Felts on 26 May 2010 15:51 RG <rNOSPAMon(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <1jj3f74.150oc7skfxkhsN%wrf3(a)stablecross.com>, > wrf3(a)stablecross.com (Bob Felts) wrote: > > > And yet you went to the trouble to write a post on "Morality without > > God" which used the PD as a basis for moral behavior. > > My essay does not "use PD as a basis for moral behavior." It uses PD as > the basis of a scientific model of how moral intuition can arise by > Darwinian evolution. Until you understand the significant difference > between my actual thesis and your straw-man recasting of it you may as > well go argue with yourself. > > BTW, this is the THIRD TIME I have had to point out to you that you are > raising a straw man. It's really getting tiresome. > I assure you, I'm not trying to manufacture non-existant issues. But you did write, "The third feature that makes evolved intuition attractive as a basis for morality...". If that's not what you were trying to convey, then I'll accept that. But I will say, morality is both descriptive (what we do, in fact, do -- the "is") and prescriptive (what we "ought" to do). I can appreciate wanting to develop a narrative for how we came to do what we do. Perhaps the disconnect comes from my focus on the prescriptive, and yours on the descriptive.
From: Don Geddis on 26 May 2010 16:07 > On 2010-05-26 11:20:46 -0400, Bob Felts said: >> I understand that. However, what makes the choice is, IMO, irrelevant, >> whether it is an "immortal non-physical soul", or a meat machine >> containing a random number generator. Bob, you need to keep in mind that there are more alternatives than just either a soul, or a random number generator. Despite my numerous posts on this thread explaining how free will is compatible with determinism, you nonetheless continue to come back to your random number idea. I'm beginning to wonder if you simply don't understand what I've been saying... Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote on Wed, 26 May 2010: > I think the crux of this discussion is this: Although it doesn't matter to > you (and others in this discussion) whether it is an "immortal non-physical > soul," or a meat machine containing a random number generator, I think it > matters very much to those people who do believe in non-deterministic, > immortal souls. Sure, of course it matters to a lot of those people. There are plenty of important consequences to life, depending on whether humans have immortal souls or not. I never meant to suggest that was not an important question. Only that it was not the question we were discussing. > example: > Green Cheeser: [...] > Compatibilist: The moon is made of rock. However [...] I understand your analogy. But it is misplaced. As you suggest, what matters is: do the differences of opinion, have consequences for the final questions you wish to ask? This part of the subthread started because you basically said: many believe that souls are required for free will; free will is required for the basis of our laws and morality; therefore if there are no souls, then all our laws and morality crumble. You are correct, that I have explained free will differently from the intuitions of many (e.g., religious) people. Nonetheless, the final question (are our laws and morality on firm ground?) remains unchanged. You are incorrect, that the absence of a soul necessarily means that our laws and morals crumble. Instead, even within determinism and science, there remains enough free will to form the basis of laws and morality. With or without souls. So the real finish to your analogy would be: "technically, the moon is not made out of green cheese, but it happens to be made out of a different substance that is also edible. Since your primary concern right now is whether you will starve if you visit the moon, you can be reassured that the moon is just as edible as you hoped, and you will not starve." -- Don _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org Rat: Do you think the world is fundamentally just? Pig: Fundamentally just what? -- Pearls Before Swine, 1/26/2008
From: Vend on 26 May 2010 16:21
On 25 Mag, 15:30, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavall...(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-25 04:28:35 -0400, Vend said: > > > Calvinists, for instance, believe in soul but not in free will. > > Compare the numbers of Calvinists in this world, and the number of > Roman Catholics for example; we are talking about what "most people" > believe, not what one small sect believes. The Calvinist notion of > predestination is so noteworthy precisely because it is as odds with > traditional christian doctrine. So what? Catholics believe that humans have souls which have free wills. That doesn't mean that "soul" and "free will" are the same concept. At most you can say that in Catholic theology, free will is a property of the soul. |