A constant speed of light in all reference frames? Surely you can't be serious.
in [Relativity]
|
From: mpc755 on 19 Feb 2010 18:34 On Feb 19, 4:17 pm, Vern <vthod...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Feb 19, 3:48 pm, Paul Stowe <theaether...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Feb 19, 5:35 am, Vern <vthod...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > <snip> > > > > > > I understand that the Lorentz contraction formula works for both > > > velocities. The CMBR is certainly evidence of a stationary ether, but > > > the Sagnac effect and ether drag affecting orbits if we assume the > > > higher velocities of planets and stars through that stationary ether > > > are correct would seem to indicate circulatory flows around the > > > planets and stars. The MMX can also be explained if there is a local > > > circulatory flow. Does the pushing gravity model work for either a > > > stationary ether or local circulatory flows? Or does the Le Sage > > > model favor one over the other? Tom VanFlandern was adamantly against > > > a local circulatory flow (for other reasons), but I'm not sure Tom had > > > considered the Le Sage model with the higher orbital velocities wrt to > > > the CMBR. > > > > Vern > > > First of all the CMBR isn't evidence of a stationary aether, just the > > aether, no more that the oceanic background white noise is evidence of > > a stationary ocean. Sagnac (optical gyro) isn't a dragged aether > > affect but Sagnac's original version was. You really are describing > > Fizeau's experiment (effect) > > > "A light beam is passed perpendicularly through > > a flowing water stream. Differences in the index > > of refraction is to be measured relative to > > stationary water. The resulting measurements > > were fully consistent with both relativity and > > the aether concept." > > > If Maxwell was right the universe is highly turbulent and organized > > vortices. Thus circulations abound. > > > Paul Stowe > > Thanks Paul, I couldn't agree more. But modeling gravity is the key > to understanding exactly what is going on with the ether, if you > assume that it causes gravity as well as being the medium for emr. > I'm just not that familiar with the Le Sage model to know whether it > would work if there is a local circulatory motion. The sink-vortex > model is the other alternative. Kepler's Laws supposedly can be > explained by object's slip-streaming the filament lines. > > Vern Aether is displaced by matter. The aether is not at rest when displaced and 'displaces back'. How do we know the aether displaces back? Because light from where Jupiter was in its orbit still reaches us from distant stars (i.e. Jupiter does not leave a void it its wake). The pushing back is the pressure the aether exerts towards the matter. The pressure associated with the aether displaced by massive objects is gravity.
From: BURT on 19 Feb 2010 21:03 The speed of light is through space-time. Frames can move below the speed of light through the same space-time. MItch Raemsch - Light is turning at C in the sky
From: Inertial on 19 Feb 2010 23:22 "BURT" <macromitch(a)yahoo.com> wrote in message news:eb1db695-ccf9-4bbf-8446-9dce4203e2cd(a)o16g2000prh.googlegroups.com... > The speed of light is through space-time. Well .. derr .. Any speed is just a change in position over some a duration of time as measured in some frame of reference. There is nothing special about speed when referring to light. Its still just speed > Frames can move below the > speed of light They have to .. if you are talking about inertial frames between which the PoR says the laws of physics apply the same. They must always travel relative to each other slower than c. Because c is c in every inertial frame. > through the same space-time. Again .. derr. Though speed is not a movement through space-time .. that makes no sense as movement means change in position over time. Speed is a set of events in space-time. > MItch Raemsch - Light is turning at C in the sky
From: Ste on 19 Feb 2010 23:25 On 18 Feb, 21:48, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Feb 18, 3:12 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > On 18 Feb, 16:35, mpalenik <markpale...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Feb 18, 9:43 am, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > I'm confused Mark. > > > > > My position is that someone must hold a priori that alternate > > > > dimensions are a real possibility, in order to hold that any theory > > > > that employs alternate dimensions is credible. Some here do hold that > > > > alternate dimensions are a real possibility, so of course they hold > > > > theories that employ them as credible. > > > > > I don't hold that alternate dimensions are a real possibility, so of > > > > course I don't accept that theories that employ them are credible. > > > > The problem is, you act like everybody in this group went into physics > > > classes knowing and believing everything that was taught in the > > > physics classes. > > > No, I'm basically saying that the only people who came *out* of those > > classes, and went into theoretical or experimental physics, are the > > people who by the end believed any of that nonsense. > > Hmmm. So there appears to be two models for what has happened in such > cases: > 1) the student who went through those classes had reason and good > sense *stripped* of them to the point where they would believe > nonsense, and this result is inherent to the process undergone. > 2) the student who went through those classes learned something new, > including how to test unambiguously for extra dimensions (regardless > whether it has been yet determined by test) and what the motivations > for even considering them might be, so that what seems like nonsense > to the novice no longer seems like nonsense. I dare say there is a third. The student went into the class without having any "good sense" in the first place, and therefore they were willing to accept anything that they were told there. Of course I'd rather avoid saying that these students have "no sense". I'm much more willing to believe that they are simply not concerned with a practical-mechanical explanation, possibly because beforehand they don't have any well-developed intuitions for it, and secondly it's vogue in science at the moment to emphasise purely mathematical explanations over practical-mechanical explanations. > Now, how might one test which of these two claims is what has really > happened? > > Let me suggest one. If (1) were the case, then because of the inherent > flaw in the process, then it would have likely been observed up to > this point that there is a whole class of former students who have > come to believe some principle that is objectively falsifiable. It > would be falsifiable perhaps by the construction of a whole class of > devices whose design is based on that principle and which (because the > principle is false) obviously don't work in practice. Perhaps you can > point to some cases like that where devices with designs based on > relativity or quantum mechanics simply do not work because the > principles are wrong. Or is it your claim that all such devices happen > to work by accident, even though the design principles are wrong? If you're suggesting that it's improbable that a theory could work not because its premises were correct, but because it simply promoted correct behaviours, then wonders why religion has fared so well. In any event, I'm willing to accept Feynman's argument, basically that QM amounts to a workable mathematical model, and makes no claim to any truth more fundamental than that. > > > The point is, your argument boils down to "the only people I see > > > convinced of alternate dimensions are the people who believe in > > > alternate dimensions," but that's a circular argument. > > > It's not circular. It's a simple statement that there is, to a certain > > degree, a self-selection process, wherein the people who have a > > susceptibility to these sorts of arguments are precisely the ones who > > adopt and build on them. > > Or, to couch this in terms of the second option listed above, this > selection process happens to find those who are susceptible to > learning something new and which is in conflict with their incoming > presuppositions? I really don't think everyone has particularly strong preconceptions (i.e. they'll believe anything), and nor do I think everyone has a taste for challenging authority. As I say, my argument is that the pre- existing interests, aptitudes, and psychology of students probably determines to a large extent what they're willing to accept as credible and coherent. To identify a relatively small minority of people (that is, physicists), who have necessarily been weeded from a very large population, and then appeal to a further subset of those in order to somehow prove that additional dimensions are credible is just silly. It is just as reasonable to say that the common views of these "experts" is as much a product of the weeding process. > > > The only way > > > for that to hold water would be if the people who believe in them had > > > always believed in them. Nobody is born knowing these things. We all > > > had to learn and change our opinions at some point. > > > It doesn't require that a person always believed something in > > particular. It can be as simple as, say, having a preference for > > mathematics and working with numbers in a very abstract sense. > > And by this do you mean "detached from reality"? Not really, and not in a cynical sense. I mean it simply in the way I said it, which is that a person may simply enjoy maths in itself, and they will find a way to see everything through that rubric. So when you mention "time", it evokes the image of the "t-axis" for such people, whereas for me I'm more likely to think of a pendulum or basically some sort of clock. And then, when one mentions "time slowing down", people who imagined the "t-axis" may be inclined to develop the view that time has "fundamentally" slowed down (because the mechanical details of how time is measured is not actually within the realm of their primary interests), whereas I'm more likely to say "well, what is to stop the clock slowing down without time itself slowing down?", or even "what if it just *appears to the eye* that the clock has slowed down?". > What do you think the > role of experimental testing of the quantitative predictions of > abstract models plays, then? It has been argued that the role of experimental testing is to find observations that can be interpreted to fit the pre-existing models. > > Whereas I have a preference for what might be called "practical > > mechanics" (and actually I think I'm going to adopt this phrase from > > now on to describe what I mean by a "physical explanation"), where > > there are mechanical relationships, moving parts, cause and effect, > > etc. And that's not to say I don't understand abstract mathematics or > > can't work with it, but in some sense I don't consider it synonymous > > with reality, so a mathematical explanation of physical phenomena, > > however obviously true, still doesn't suffice as a complete picture > > for me until I've distilled it out into some sort of consistent > > "practical mechanical" form. And I know Paul will laugh about this > > being all about "cogs and levers", but really the approach is a lot > > more flexible than that. > > Herein is the presumption that for every abstract and mathematically- > rich model that makes testable predictions that can be checked with > experiment, you have faith that there is an equally viable alternative > model that is not so abstract and is full of cogs-and-levers > concreteness that is just as successful in making the same > quantitative testable predictions in the same class of experiments. That's actually not what I said Paul. I quite clearly said that I do not see a practical mechanical model as being an "alternative" to the maths but rather I find it complementary. > What's amusing about this claim is that if pressed on demonstrating > the same success in making quantitative testable predictions, I've > gotten the following responses: > * "Oh, the math is fine. It's just the underlying concept that needs > to be swapped out." (Never mind that the math is *derived from* the > underlying concept.) > * "But I don't have the mathematical skill to demonstrate that the > cogs-and-lever model does in fact have the same quantitative testable > predictions. Some techno-drone should be asked to do that grunt > work." (This is the Of-course-it-will-work-just-let-worker-bees-show- > it defense.) > * "Why do I have to demonstrate that it makes accurate and testable > predictions of experimentally measurable phenomena at all? That's a > requirement of the self-serving scientific community. For my purposes, > it's sufficient to have a qualitative picture, and because that > qualitative picture involves cogs-and-levers and not abstract > concepts, then it's automatically better, at least in my eyes." (This > is the take-your-scientific-method-and-shove-it argument.) You may mock at will.
From: Ste on 19 Feb 2010 23:28
On 19 Feb, 01:53, mpalenik <markpale...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Feb 18, 4:12 pm, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 18 Feb, 16:35, mpalenik <markpale...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Feb 18, 9:43 am, Ste <ste_ro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > I'm confused Mark. > > > > > My position is that someone must hold a priori that alternate > > > > dimensions are a real possibility, in order to hold that any theory > > > > that employs alternate dimensions is credible. Some here do hold that > > > > alternate dimensions are a real possibility, so of course they hold > > > > theories that employ them as credible. > > > > > I don't hold that alternate dimensions are a real possibility, so of > > > > course I don't accept that theories that employ them are credible. > > > > The problem is, you act like everybody in this group went into physics > > > classes knowing and believing everything that was taught in the > > > physics classes. > > > No, I'm basically saying that the only people who came *out* of those > > classes, and went into theoretical or experimental physics, are the > > people who by the end believed any of that nonsense. > > So, you don't think educated people could possibly understand > something you don't. Interesting. That's not what I said. |