Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
in [Logic]
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From: Patricia Aldoraz on 20 Dec 2009 17:26 On Dec 21, 12:34 am, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > On Dec 19, 5:18 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > On Dec 20, 2:02 am, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > On Dec 18, 5:12 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > On Dec 19, 12:49 am, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > If a fair coin is flipped, logic cannot demonstrate that it will end > > > > > up as tails even though if it has ended up as tails in the previous > > > > > 200 flips. However, in this case I would bet on tails on the basis > > > > > that the coin may not be fair. That is I would be use induction to > > > > > make a pragmatic rather than a logical choice. > > > > > If you had merely said that you would bet on the coin coming up > > > > tails again if it had always come up tails on countless occasions > > > > in the past, then no one would dispute your reasonableness. > > > > But you go on to say you use induction as if this is some sort of > > > > technique. And it is here where the real disagreements start. > > > > Induction is either not an argument form, or if it is, > > > > it is a manifestly inadequate one. > > > > So let us accept that it is "a manifestly inadequate " argument. Then > > > maybe we can go on to decide by which criteria it is assessed as being > > > inadequate. > > > An argument *form* can be seen to be a bad one if one can easily think > > of fleshing it out with instances that are obviously bad reasoning. > > The main criterion is as simple as that.- Hide quoted text - > > An increasing number of pebbles at a location makes a pile. An > increasing number of identical outcomes makes for inductions > adequate for reasonable conclusions. Essentially, you are espousing the Gambler's Fallacy as *a good form of argument*, with the vague rider that the more tosses of tails in a row, the more the likelihood of a heads next...
From: Zinnic on 21 Dec 2009 09:55 On Dec 20, 4:26 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 21, 12:34 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > > On Dec 19, 5:18 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > > On Dec 20, 2:02 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > On Dec 18, 5:12 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Dec 19, 12:49 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > > If a fair coin is flipped, logic cannot demonstrate that it will end > > > > > > up as tails even though if it has ended up as tails in the previous > > > > > > 200 flips. However, in this case I would bet on tails on the basis > > > > > > that the coin may not be fair. That is I would be use induction to > > > > > > make a pragmatic rather than a logical choice. > > > > > > If you had merely said that you would bet on the coin coming up > > > > > tails again if it had always come up tails on countless occasions > > > > > in the past, then no one would dispute your reasonableness. > > > > > But you go on to say you use induction as if this is some sort of > > > > > technique. And it is here where the real disagreements start. > > > > > Induction is either not an argument form, or if it is, > > > > > it is a manifestly inadequate one. > > > > > So let us accept that it is "a manifestly inadequate " argument. Then > > > > maybe we can go on to decide by which criteria it is assessed as being > > > > inadequate. > > > > An argument *form* can be seen to be a bad one if one can easily think > > > of fleshing it out with instances that are obviously bad reasoning. > > > The main criterion is as simple as that.- Hide quoted text - > > > An increasing number of pebbles at a location makes a pile. An > > increasing number of identical outcomes makes for inductions > > adequate for reasonable conclusions. > > Essentially, you are espousing the Gambler's Fallacy as *a good form > of argument*, with the vague rider that the more tosses of tails in a > row, the more the likelihood of a heads next...- Hide quoted text - > It is clear from my previous posts that I am well aware of that fallacy. There comes a time, sooner or later, when repetitions become significant not because of influence by past chance outcomes but because of an underlying cause. What I am espousing is the pragmatic consideration of the contingency that more than chance is influencing the outcome. For example, a coin being flipped is possibly, not necessarily, unfair. If this does not explain my position to you, then I can only assume that there is an underlying cause (motivation) for the long repetition of your attempts to belittle others.
From: PD on 21 Dec 2009 13:18 On Dec 16, 4:00 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > In article > <bc3b2827-08ec-43d5-98cf-391994bc3...(a)e7g2000vbi.googlegroups.com>, > > > > PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > On Dec 16, 3:45 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > In article > > > <fb79c657-8eb8-4910-b574-2679d3124...(a)g31g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>, > > > > PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > The induction is the intuiting of a general rule from the particulars. > > > > In my mind this is what induction MEANS. It means more than just > > > > saying that a pattern of particulars will continue to exhibit that > > > > pattern. > > > > > It is a *guess* of sorts, and this is what distinguishes it from being > > > > a *deduction* from the particulars, > > > > Yes, OK, you are talking psychology and human propensity, not logic. I > > > was thinking more about the claim that it is a *logical* form of > > > reasoning. > > > Induction IS a form of logic. > > I have yet to see what form it has or understand this. I have fully > understood your psychological remarks and agree with them. > > > It appears that what you consider logic > > is *constrained* to be either deduction > > Yes, this part is true > > > or a rather narrow assumption > > that a pattern observed will continue to be observed (and the latter > > isn't really "logic" in the sense you give the word, either). > > Not quite sure about this part though, it seems unclear to me. I would > think that if something is logical then there must be some rule like > ways about it. There seems nothing particularly clearly rule like about > the psychological processes you describe. The human brain uses all sorts of rational processes to acquire knowledge. The rigid, rule-like one you are thinking of, which is deduction, is only one of them. Science uses induction because it is effective, not because it is rule- like. It also uses deduction, but progress in science would be awfully slow without induction also. > > -- > dorayme
From: PD on 21 Dec 2009 13:19 On Dec 17, 12:12 am, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > In article <hgbr3n$vn...(a)news.eternal-september.org>, > Les Cargill <lcargil...(a)comcast.net> wrote: > > > PD wrote: > > >...Induction in the scientific sense does > > > not involve that sense of necessity. > > If it does not involve *some* sense of necessity, it cannot really be > considered a type of logical reasoning. I disagree. > Probability will do for me, I am > not wanting deductive certainty. But as far as I can see there is no > logical form of induction that makes any conclusion more likely than > not. And that's where scientific, experimental test is essential. Because experiment DOES make one conclusion more favored than another. > > -- > dorayme
From: PD on 21 Dec 2009 13:23
On Dec 17, 3:21 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 18, 12:44 am, jbriggs444 <jbriggs...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Dec 17, 4:27 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > > On Dec 17, 5:19 pm, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > On Dec 17, 12:12 am, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote:> In article <hgbr3n$vn...(a)news.eternal-september.org>, > > > > > . But as far as I can see there is no > > > > > > logical form of induction that makes any conclusion more likely than > > > > > not. > > > > > But as far as I can see there is no form of induction that is other > > > > than "more likely than not ". > > > > Please inform my naivette. > > > The scenario of "it hurt when I put my hand on the stove" is not "more > > likely than not" but rather "more than negligibly likely". However, > > even that tentative probability estimate is good enough to act on and > > avoid putting your hand on the stove a second time. > > > There's no 50/50 boundary condition on inductive reasoning. At least > > not in my book. Your definition may vary. > > > > Yes, sure, one can enumerate past instances of something and couch the > > > conclusion in cautious terms. This X was red, this Y was red..., > > > therefore This Z will probably be red. But this would not change the > > > problem of trying to justify that it is *logical* process. Anyone can > > > say the latter train of thoughts, the question is what makes it a > > > logical process rather than a description of how people behave. > > > Bayesian analysis? > > The fact that it is capable of generating a conclusion? (albeit an > > uncertain one) > > > Anyway, why do you care whether inductive reasoning is or is not > > _called_ a "logical" process? > > Because there is a problem if it is not. The idea of logical is the > idea of some sort of objective necessity. I disagree with this. That is true for deduction, but that is only one form of rational process for knowledge-gathering. Heck, not all knowledge is even objective. > Now this is not to insist > that a perfectly good logical argument must leave us with some > conclusion which points to an absolutely certain prediction. > > > It is what it is regardless of what it is called and regardless of > > which notional categories we choose to place it in or exclude it from. > > If one is questioning the idea, as dorayme is, that induction as he > defines it is any sort of logical reasoning, then it hardly helps to > say induction is what it is. What is it? |