Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
in [Logic]
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From: Zinnic on 22 Dec 2009 16:05 On Dec 22, 4:11 am, "Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end) ho...(a)yahoo.co> wrote: > "Zinnic" <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote in message > > news:e34f3a51-fd97-4825-a97c-cfe4e73c7dd2(a)z41g2000yqz.googlegroups.com... > On Dec 20, 4:26 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > > On Dec 21, 12:34 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > On Dec 19, 5:18 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > On Dec 20, 2:02 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > On Dec 18, 5:12 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On Dec 19, 12:49 am,Zinnic<zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > > > > > > > > If a fair coin is flipped, logic cannot demonstrate that it will > > > > > > > end > > > > > > > up as tails even though if it has ended up as tails in the > > > > > > > previous > > > > > > > 200 flips. However, in this case I would bet on tails on the > > > > > > > basis > > > > > > > that the coin may not be fair. That is I would be use induction > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > make a pragmatic rather than a logical choice. > > > > > > > If you had merely said that you would bet on the coin coming up > > > > > > tails again if it had always come up tails on countless occasions > > > > > > in the past, then no one would dispute your reasonableness. > > > > > > But you go on to say you use induction as if this is some sort of > > > > > > technique. And it is here where the real disagreements start. > > > > > > Induction is either not an argument form, or if it is, > > > > > > it is a manifestly inadequate one. > > > > > > So let us accept that it is "a manifestly inadequate " argument. > > > > > Then > > > > > maybe we can go on to decide by which criteria it is assessed as > > > > > being > > > > > inadequate. > > > > > An argument *form* can be seen to be a bad one if one can easily think > > > > of fleshing it out with instances that are obviously bad reasoning. > > > > The main criterion is as simple as that.- Hide quoted text - > > > > An increasing number of pebbles at a location makes a pile. An > > > increasing number of identical outcomes makes for inductions > > > adequate for reasonable conclusions. > > > Essentially, you are espousing the Gambler's Fallacy as *a good form > > of argument*, with the vague rider that the more tosses of tails in a > > row, the more the likelihood of a heads next...- Hide quoted text - > > It is clear from my previous posts that I am well aware of that > fallacy. > There comes a time, sooner or later, when repetitions become > significant not because of influence by past chance outcomes but > because of an underlying cause. > What I am espousing is the pragmatic consideration of the contingency > that more than chance is influencing the outcome. For example, a coin > being flipped is possibly, not necessarily, unfair. > If this does not explain my position to you, then I can only assume > that there is an underlying cause (motivation) for the long repetition > of your attempts to belittle others. > > =May I interject something. I've heard that a fair coin can only come up > tails (or heads) 68 times in a row maximum (normally 5 times in row comes up > quite often and I would be pretty sure it was unfair the first time it came > up 6 in row). But certainly 200 times tails would be an unfair coin. Just > for interest.- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -
From: jbriggs444 on 22 Dec 2009 16:18 On Dec 22, 11:30 am, Keth <kethiswo...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > On Dec 22, 11:24 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Dec 22, 8:03 am, Keth <kethiswo...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > On Dec 12, 9:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > What is the justification for either: > > > > > 1. generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on > > > > some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for > > > > example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and > > > > therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans) > > > > or > > > > > 2. presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as > > > > it always has in the past (for example, that the laws of physics will > > > > hold as they have always been observed to hold). > > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction > > > > > ------------------------------------------ > > > > > Two views of Deduction & Induction: > > > > > View 1: conclusion; > > > > Deduction = infers particular from general truths > > > > Induction = infers general from particular truths > > > > > View 2: conclusion; > > > > Deduction = follows with absolute necessity > > > > Induction = follows with some degree of probability > > > > > Deduction and Induction From > > > > Introduction to Logic Irving M. Copihttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/ > > > > Both deduction and induction method are based on the underlying > > > causations such as logics and physical laws. > > > > Some causations are of 100 percent certainty. For example, formal > > > logics. We can safely use deduction to draw conclusion. > > > > Some causations are of high but less than 100 percent certainty. For > > > example, most physical laws (except speed of light, etc) are near > > > perfect but with deviations, thus we can use deduction to estimate the > > > result, and it will not be 100 percent accurate. > > > > Cognitive causations are even lower certainty. Thus it is even less > > > certain when we apply deduction method. > > > > As to induction, it is the first step in finding causation. It is the > > > start before we can use deduction method. > > > I would only like to add that it is our imaginations that induce a > > causation. However I don't believe induction can be confined to causal > > relationships, there are many types of relationships as Aristotle > > outlined. > > I thought if B "always" follows A (or A-> B) then A->B is considered a > causation. I do not agree that it is our imagination. Jeez. Who told you that fairy tale? Correlation and causation are not the same thing. Not even if they happen to be observed in some particular order. Not even if the correlation is remarkable. There's a reason for randomly selected samples, double blind trials and confidence testing. Maybe people prone to cancer tend to smoke cigarettes. Maybe smoking cigarettes gives you cancer. Maybe country music makes you smoke cigarettes and get cancer. How will you test these hypotheses? There are at least three general types of valid causal correlations. 1. A causes B. (So if we see A we expect to see B with some certainty) 2. B causes A. (So if we see A we expect to see B with somewhat less certainty depending on what else can cause A). 3. x causes both A and B. (So if we see A we can infer x and if we infer x we can infer B) The one that doesn't fly is if A and B both cause x. You can infer x from A but you can't then infer B from x as a further consequence. > There are times that B happens to follow A, but this is not considered > a causation. This is the imagination that you are talking about. I call it "superstition". Remarkably easy to pick up a superstition from a randomly generated data set. (If I knock on this door three times and kill the kobold on the left then a +2 longsword will drop). Pavlov did some work and found that intermittent rewards condition more strongly than consistent rewards iirc. > I personal believe that induction that is not based on solid causation > cannot produce reliable conclusion. If you put garlic into your child's lunch the chances that he will be bitten by a vampire at school is negligible. Induction proves me right! I think I agree with what I think you're trying to say, but I'd still like you to say it correctly. It's something like "I believe that the Universe is weird but not that it is malicious", yes?
From: Keth on 22 Dec 2009 12:29 On Dec 22, 12:14 pm, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > On Dec 22, 8:30 am, Keth <kethiswo...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > On Dec 22, 11:24 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > > > On Dec 22, 8:03 am, Keth <kethiswo...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > On Dec 12, 9:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > What is the justification for either: > > > > > > 1. generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on > > > > > some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for > > > > > example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and > > > > > therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans) > > > > > or > > > > > > 2. presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as > > > > > it always has in the past (for example, that the laws of physics will > > > > > hold as they have always been observed to hold). > > > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction > > > > > > ------------------------------------------ > > > > > > Two views of Deduction & Induction: > > > > > > View 1: conclusion; > > > > > Deduction = infers particular from general truths > > > > > Induction = infers general from particular truths > > > > > > View 2: conclusion; > > > > > Deduction = follows with absolute necessity > > > > > Induction = follows with some degree of probability > > > > > > Deduction and Induction From > > > > > Introduction to Logic Irving M. Copihttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/ > > > > > Both deduction and induction method are based on the underlying > > > > causations such as logics and physical laws. > > > > > Some causations are of 100 percent certainty. For example, formal > > > > logics. We can safely use deduction to draw conclusion. > > > > > Some causations are of high but less than 100 percent certainty. For > > > > example, most physical laws (except speed of light, etc) are near > > > > perfect but with deviations, thus we can use deduction to estimate the > > > > result, and it will not be 100 percent accurate. > > > > > Cognitive causations are even lower certainty. Thus it is even less > > > > certain when we apply deduction method. > > > > > As to induction, it is the first step in finding causation. It is the > > > > start before we can use deduction method. > > > > I would only like to add that it is our imaginations that induce a > > > causation. However I don't believe induction can be confined to causal > > > relationships, there are many types of relationships as Aristotle > > > outlined. > > > I thought if B "always" follows A (or A-> B) then A->B is considered a > > causation. I do not agree that it is our imagination. > > Are you refering to a certain, somewhat certain, or less certain > causation? I did not mean observations are products of our > imaginations (although they occasionally are) but that any > relationship originates in our imagination (such as gravity in > Newton's imagination). However most such relationships are > contradicted by observation and logic. > > > There are times that B happens to follow A, but this is not considered > > a causation. This is the imagination that you are talking about. > > If B follows A then it is not unrealistic to wonder if it always does > so and why. > > > I personal believe that induction that is not based on solid causation > > cannot produce reliable conclusion. > > I believe you are refering to predictions. > > > Could you list some of the thing that Aristotle outlined? > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Aristotle) > > For example, generalizations of size or color can be made. Thanks for taking the time to direct me to the Aristotle's outline of categories! Aristotle's categories are linguistic oriented framework that correspond to the universe. If there is any discrepancies between categories and the reality then it is the categories that must be adjusted. We can use deduction method in either object-oriented path or category- oriented path. The former as I mentioned is based on causation -- including certain, somewhat certain, or less certain causations. We can also use deduction method in category-oriented path. The size or color is a generalized concept that do not need to be object oriented in the beginning but in the end must be verified with the physical world. Aristotle is making a linguistic model for the universe. In the end, whatever deduction we make with this framework must conform with the object-oriented empirical data.
From: M Purcell on 22 Dec 2009 13:02 On Dec 22, 9:29 am, Keth <kethiswo...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > On Dec 22, 12:14 pm, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Dec 22, 8:30 am, Keth <kethiswo...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > On Dec 22, 11:24 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > > > > On Dec 22, 8:03 am, Keth <kethiswo...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Dec 12, 9:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > What is the justification for either: > > > > > > > 1. generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on > > > > > > some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for > > > > > > example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and > > > > > > therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans) > > > > > > or > > > > > > > 2. presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as > > > > > > it always has in the past (for example, that the laws of physics will > > > > > > hold as they have always been observed to hold). > > > > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------ > > > > > > > Two views of Deduction & Induction: > > > > > > > View 1: conclusion; > > > > > > Deduction = infers particular from general truths > > > > > > Induction = infers general from particular truths > > > > > > > View 2: conclusion; > > > > > > Deduction = follows with absolute necessity > > > > > > Induction = follows with some degree of probability > > > > > > > Deduction and Induction From > > > > > > Introduction to Logic Irving M. Copihttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/ > > > > > > Both deduction and induction method are based on the underlying > > > > > causations such as logics and physical laws. > > > > > > Some causations are of 100 percent certainty. For example, formal > > > > > logics. We can safely use deduction to draw conclusion. > > > > > > Some causations are of high but less than 100 percent certainty. For > > > > > example, most physical laws (except speed of light, etc) are near > > > > > perfect but with deviations, thus we can use deduction to estimate the > > > > > result, and it will not be 100 percent accurate. > > > > > > Cognitive causations are even lower certainty. Thus it is even less > > > > > certain when we apply deduction method. > > > > > > As to induction, it is the first step in finding causation. It is the > > > > > start before we can use deduction method. > > > > > I would only like to add that it is our imaginations that induce a > > > > causation. However I don't believe induction can be confined to causal > > > > relationships, there are many types of relationships as Aristotle > > > > outlined. > > > > I thought if B "always" follows A (or A-> B) then A->B is considered a > > > causation. I do not agree that it is our imagination. > > > Are you refering to a certain, somewhat certain, or less certain > > causation? I did not mean observations are products of our > > imaginations (although they occasionally are) but that any > > relationship originates in our imagination (such as gravity in > > Newton's imagination). However most such relationships are > > contradicted by observation and logic. > > > > There are times that B happens to follow A, but this is not considered > > > a causation. This is the imagination that you are talking about. > > > If B follows A then it is not unrealistic to wonder if it always does > > so and why. > > > > I personal believe that induction that is not based on solid causation > > > cannot produce reliable conclusion. > > > I believe you are refering to predictions. > > > > Could you list some of the thing that Aristotle outlined? > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Aristotle) > > > For example, generalizations of size or color can be made. > > Thanks for taking the time to direct me to the Aristotle's outline of > categories! > > Aristotle's categories are linguistic oriented framework that > correspond to the universe. If there is any discrepancies between > categories and the reality then it is the categories that must be > adjusted. > > We can use deduction method in either object-oriented path or category- > oriented path. The former as I mentioned is based on causation -- > including certain, somewhat certain, or less certain causations. > > We can also use deduction method in category-oriented path. The size > or color is a generalized concept that do not need to be object > oriented in the beginning but in the end must be verified with the > physical world. > > Aristotle is making a linguistic model for the universe. In the end, > whatever deduction we make with this framework must conform with the > object-oriented empirical data. Well yes, ultimatly it is observation that contradicts a premise. Deduction can only demonstrait that there is a contradiction. But we still need to make decisions (outside of science) based on incomplete knowledge where the exception to a rule is more important than the rule. But you seem to agree a premise is not necessarily restricted to causal relationships or do you wish to verify that the penis of a Native American is generally larger than that of an African-American?
From: PD on 22 Dec 2009 13:51
On Dec 22, 10:19 am, "Y.Porat" <y.y.po...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 22, 5:15 pm, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > On Dec 21, 4:33 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > > In article > > > <16d16b5b-83b8-4523-82fa-9d71f9c90...(a)v25g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > ... > > > > > The theories are derived by the process of induction I described > > > > earlier. Please see my earlier note about this. > > > > I did see them and I commented on them. You are using the word induction > > > to wave at roughly *whatever scientists do* and that is not really > > > helpful. > > > Oh, I think I was a little more elaborate than that. > > > > > From these theories, predictions are *deduced* from the models. > > > > > The experimental test involves neither deduction nor induction. It is > > > > a simple comparison -- the prediction and the measurement overlap or > > > > they don't. Period. > > > > No. Deduction is involved. If have the theory that my kettle will always > > > boil in under two minutes and I see it does not in certain conditions, > > > it is a deductive matter that the generalisation is false. > > > It is an experimental test of an induced generalization. > > > > > Note, however, that a favorable bit of experimental evidence does not > > > > allow you to *deduce* anything about the truth of the theory. You only > > > > have a bit of experimental support. In science, nothing is ever > > > > proven. In this sense, nothing is deductively certain, either. > > > > It is the nature of this support that I am interested in. The > > > traditional philosophical problem of induction in philosophy has been > > > the difficulties with the idea that more and more cases consistent with > > > a generalization go to more and more confirm that generalisation. I am > > > denying this. > > > And at no point does the generalization become completely confirmed. I > > don't know what issue you have with this. > > > A theory makes statements of this sort: > > "We observe the pattern Y in circumstances A, B, and C. From this we > > induce that there is a common principle P that will predict pattern Y > > in circumstances A, B, and C. Furthermore this principle P also > > predicts pattern X in untested circumstances D and E, and pattern W in > > untested circumstances F, G, and H, and pattern V in untested > > circumstances I, J, K, and L." Then science goes about the process of > > locating or creating circumstances D through L. Every successful match > > of a circumstance and the predicted pattern increases the confidence > > in the induced principle P, even before all untested circumstances are > > tested. And in fact, most models do not exhaust untested > > circumstances, so there is always the opportunity to continue to test > > the induced principle. > > ------------------ > now Mr PD > > after all that remarkable impressive abstract > knowledge about how theories and innovations are done > what are the innovations that you did > in physics ??? My record is public, Porat. You do know how to use the internet to look me up, right? > > (actually that question could be directed > to most people taking part in this > learned discussion ) > > Y.Porat > ------------------------- |