From: M Purcell on
On Dec 21, 5:42 pm, tadchem <tadc...(a)comcast.net> wrote:
> On Dec 12, 9:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > *snip*
>
> The biggest problem in epistemology is finding a *definition* for the
> word knowledge.

I think Webster beat you to it.

> Different 'philosophers' come from different backgrounds and have
> different semantic frameworks upon which they build.  My epistemology
> course taught me, above all else, that they were all discussing
> different concepts under the same name - "knowledge". German, for
> example, has at least five different single words which are all
> translated by the word "knowledge", but which have totally different
> meanings and are applied in different contexts.

Everybody is different but communication is based on a mutual
understanding.

> It is all equivocation until a mutually acceptable set of definitions
> can be agreed upon.

Indeed.

> To address your question, inductive reasoning leads to *conclusions*
> like any other form of formal logic.

As does informal logic and false logic.

> Those conclusions can only become "knowledge" when they can by
> repeatibly and independently verified, without exceptions, through
> empirical observations, by non-dollaborating observers. Nature does
> not answer questions with lies. Those who ask questions often
> misunderstand the answers, or mis-speak the questions.

I believe you are refering to scientific knowledge, most things can't
be sent to the lab.
From: Patricia Aldoraz on
On Dec 22, 12:42 pm, tadchem <tadc...(a)comcast.net> wrote:
> On Dec 12, 9:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > *snip*
>
> The biggest problem in epistemology is finding a *definition* for the
> word knowledge.
>
I doubt it. How does it compare with the biggest problem for ontology?
Is that too a matter of finding a definition for a word?
...
> To address your question, inductive reasoning leads to *conclusions*
> like any other form of formal logic.
>

An example being?


> Those conclusions can only become "knowledge" when they can by
> repeatibly and independently verified, without exceptions, through
> empirical observations, by non-dollaborating observers.

This is either saying nothing at all or it is almost certainly wrong.
For a set of theories to be
known to be true, they must be true, no matter how many observations
'confirm' them. Using the word verified kind of gives the game away or
is simply circular.
From: Patricia Aldoraz on
On Dec 22, 12:43 pm, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote:
> On Dec 21, 5:31 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Dec 22, 11:14 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Dec 21, 2:33 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> > > > In article
> > > > <16d16b5b-83b8-4523-82fa-9d71f9c90...(a)v25g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > ...
>
> > > > > The theories are derived by the process of induction I described
> > > > > earlier. Please see my earlier note about this.
>
> > > > I did see them and I commented on them. You are using the word induction
> > > > to wave at roughly *whatever scientists do* and that is not really
> > > > helpful.
>
> > > > > From these theories, predictions are *deduced* from the models.
>
> > > > > The experimental test involves neither deduction nor induction. It is
> > > > > a simple comparison -- the prediction and the measurement overlap or
> > > > > they don't. Period.
>
> > > > No. Deduction is involved. If have the theory that my kettle will always
> > > > boil in under two minutes and I see it does not in certain conditions,
> > > > it is a deductive matter that the generalisation is false.
>
> > > > > Note, however, that a favorable bit of experimental evidence does not
> > > > > allow you to *deduce* anything about the truth of the theory. You only
> > > > > have a bit of experimental support. In science, nothing is ever
> > > > > proven. In this sense, nothing is deductively certain, either.
>
> > > > It is the nature of this support that I am interested in. The
> > > > traditional philosophical problem of induction in philosophy has been
> > > > the difficulties with the idea that more and more cases consistent with
> > > > a generalization go to more and more confirm that generalisation. I am
> > > > denying this.
>
> > > Do you also deny the validity of statistics?
>
> > Doesn't everyone! <g>
>
> > Seriously, what is a statistical argument? If I say there are 50 red
> > balls in this bag and 50 of other colours, I might conclude that there
> > is a 50% chance of pulling out a red ball if one is blindfolded and
> > all the balls feel exactly the same. Is this a statistical argument?
> > Is this an inductive argument? It seems to me to be a very tightly
> > necessary argument at first sight! How can the conclusion ever be
> > shown to be false on the basis of the premises being true?
>
> > Perhaps the red balls have an internal mechanism unknown to us and
> > they subtly cause hands to grab them in favour of other balls? But
> > that is another matter! Without any knowledge of these other things,
> > just on the evidence alone, the above 50% argument is pretty tight.
>
> > So, here, I have no reason not to believe in *statistical arguments*.
> > But perhaps you mean something else?
>
> The example you gave was a probablistic argument, as is a coin toss or
> the roll of a couple of dice. A statistical argument is based on
> sampling.

Is this like twenty questions? You say statistical and I write away
trying to give an example, you say no and leave it at that? What is a
statistical argument? I can think of lots of interpretations, but this
is your baby and maybe you should give a clear example of an argument
that is statistical and I will answer your prior question do I believe
it a good one.
From: Androcles on

"tadchem" <tadchem(a)comcast.net> wrote in message
news:faf7d4b9-d5ff-401f-88f8-65ff72cf13a6(a)z41g2000yqz.googlegroups.com...
On Dec 12, 9:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote:
> *snip*

The biggest problem in epistemology is finding a *definition* for the
word knowledge.

Different 'philosophers' come from different backgrounds and have
different semantic frameworks upon which they build. My epistemology
course taught me, above all else, that they were all discussing
different concepts under the same name - "knowledge". German, for
example, has at least five different single words which are all
translated by the word "knowledge", but which have totally different
meanings and are applied in different contexts.

It is all equivocation until a mutually acceptable set of definitions
can be agreed upon.

To address your question, inductive reasoning leads to *conclusions*
like any other form of formal logic.

Those conclusions can only become "knowledge" when they can by
repeatibly and independently verified, without exceptions, through
empirical observations, by non-dollaborating observers. Nature does
not answer questions with lies. Those who ask questions often
misunderstand the answers, or mis-speak the questions.

Google "filchers"+"james lett"

Tom Davidson
Richmond, VA

=====================================
Come off it, Tom.

To "know" is what Humpty (Tom) Roberts feels about relativity
and is blatantly subjective.

The definition of 'knowledge' is:

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/knowledge
1 obsolete : cognizance
2 a (1) : the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity gained
through experience or association (2) : acquaintance with or understanding
of a science, art, or technique b (1) : the fact or condition of being aware
of something (2) : the range of one's information or understanding <answered
to the best of my knowledge> c : the circumstance or condition of
apprehending truth or fact through reasoning : cognition d : the fact or
condition of having information or of being learned <a person of unusual
knowledge>
3 archaic : sexual intercourse
4 a : the sum of what is known : the body of truth, information, and
principles acquired by humankind b archaic : a branch of learning
synonyms knowledge, learning, erudition, scholarship mean what is or can be
known by an individual or by humankind. knowledge applies to facts or ideas
acquired by study, investigation, observation, or experience <rich in the
knowledge of human nature>. learning applies to knowledge acquired
especially through formal, often advanced, schooling <a book that
demonstrates vast learning>. erudition strongly implies the acquiring of
profound, recondite, or bookish learning <an erudition unusual even in a
scholar>. scholarship implies the possession of learning characteristic of
the advanced scholar in a specialized field of study or investigation <a
work of first-rate literary scholarship>.

3 above is clearly context sensitive and typically biblical.



From: Michael Gordge on
On Dec 18, 6:42 am, "Daniel T." <danie...(a)earthlink.net> wrote:

> Think of something you know, maybe something about sheep...

Ewe still haven't explained how preceeding fallacy with the adjective
logical changes the meaning of fallacy.

MG