Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
in [Logic]
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From: Patricia Aldoraz on 21 Dec 2009 18:55 On Dec 22, 1:55 am, Zinnic <zeenr...(a)gate.net> wrote: > What I am espousing is the pragmatic consideration of the contingency > that more than chance is influencing the outcome. For example, a coin > being flipped is possibly, not necessarily, unfair. No one has ever denied this. There is no point in stating the obvious and repeatedly. > If this does not explain my position to you, I cannot see any *position*? You are no different to anyone else in suspecting a crook coin in a coin that comes up tails lots and lots of times in a row... > then I can only assume > that there is an underlying cause (motivation) for the long repetition > of your attempts to belittle others. I did not think it would take long for you to crack and turn to wholly unjustified *personal* insults. Naturally, you turn to such insults when you cannot make any headway that suits you in a perfectly non- personal-vilification discussion so far. If you could succeed in shifting the ground to personal vilification, no doubt, this will make you more intellectually comfortable because there does not seem to be a whole lot of intellectual curiosity going on up there in what is likely to be *a simple extension* of the backbone in your case.
From: M Purcell on 21 Dec 2009 19:14 On Dec 21, 2:33 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > In article > <16d16b5b-83b8-4523-82fa-9d71f9c90...(a)v25g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > ... > > > The theories are derived by the process of induction I described > > earlier. Please see my earlier note about this. > > I did see them and I commented on them. You are using the word induction > to wave at roughly *whatever scientists do* and that is not really > helpful. > > > From these theories, predictions are *deduced* from the models. > > > The experimental test involves neither deduction nor induction. It is > > a simple comparison -- the prediction and the measurement overlap or > > they don't. Period. > > No. Deduction is involved. If have the theory that my kettle will always > boil in under two minutes and I see it does not in certain conditions, > it is a deductive matter that the generalisation is false. > > > Note, however, that a favorable bit of experimental evidence does not > > allow you to *deduce* anything about the truth of the theory. You only > > have a bit of experimental support. In science, nothing is ever > > proven. In this sense, nothing is deductively certain, either. > > It is the nature of this support that I am interested in. The > traditional philosophical problem of induction in philosophy has been > the difficulties with the idea that more and more cases consistent with > a generalization go to more and more confirm that generalisation. I am > denying this. Do you also deny the validity of statistics?
From: Patricia Aldoraz on 21 Dec 2009 20:31 On Dec 22, 11:14 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > On Dec 21, 2:33 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > > > In article > > <16d16b5b-83b8-4523-82fa-9d71f9c90...(a)v25g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > ... > > > > The theories are derived by the process of induction I described > > > earlier. Please see my earlier note about this. > > > I did see them and I commented on them. You are using the word induction > > to wave at roughly *whatever scientists do* and that is not really > > helpful. > > > > From these theories, predictions are *deduced* from the models. > > > > The experimental test involves neither deduction nor induction. It is > > > a simple comparison -- the prediction and the measurement overlap or > > > they don't. Period. > > > No. Deduction is involved. If have the theory that my kettle will always > > boil in under two minutes and I see it does not in certain conditions, > > it is a deductive matter that the generalisation is false. > > > > Note, however, that a favorable bit of experimental evidence does not > > > allow you to *deduce* anything about the truth of the theory. You only > > > have a bit of experimental support. In science, nothing is ever > > > proven. In this sense, nothing is deductively certain, either. > > > It is the nature of this support that I am interested in. The > > traditional philosophical problem of induction in philosophy has been > > the difficulties with the idea that more and more cases consistent with > > a generalization go to more and more confirm that generalisation. I am > > denying this. > > Do you also deny the validity of statistics? Doesn't everyone! <g> Seriously, what is a statistical argument? If I say there are 50 red balls in this bag and 50 of other colours, I might conclude that there is a 50% chance of pulling out a red ball if one is blindfolded and all the balls feel exactly the same. Is this a statistical argument? Is this an inductive argument? It seems to me to be a very tightly necessary argument at first sight! How can the conclusion ever be shown to be false on the basis of the premises being true? Perhaps the red balls have an internal mechanism unknown to us and they subtly cause hands to grab them in favour of other balls? But that is another matter! Without any knowledge of these other things, just on the evidence alone, the above 50% argument is pretty tight. So, here, I have no reason not to believe in *statistical arguments*. But perhaps you mean something else?
From: tadchem on 21 Dec 2009 20:42 On Dec 12, 9:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > *snip* The biggest problem in epistemology is finding a *definition* for the word knowledge. Different 'philosophers' come from different backgrounds and have different semantic frameworks upon which they build. My epistemology course taught me, above all else, that they were all discussing different concepts under the same name - "knowledge". German, for example, has at least five different single words which are all translated by the word "knowledge", but which have totally different meanings and are applied in different contexts. It is all equivocation until a mutually acceptable set of definitions can be agreed upon. To address your question, inductive reasoning leads to *conclusions* like any other form of formal logic. Those conclusions can only become "knowledge" when they can by repeatibly and independently verified, without exceptions, through empirical observations, by non-dollaborating observers. Nature does not answer questions with lies. Those who ask questions often misunderstand the answers, or mis-speak the questions. Google "filchers"+"james lett" Tom Davidson Richmond, VA
From: M Purcell on 21 Dec 2009 20:43
On Dec 21, 5:31 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Dec 22, 11:14 am, M Purcell <sacsca...(a)aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Dec 21, 2:33 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...(a)optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > > > In article > > > <16d16b5b-83b8-4523-82fa-9d71f9c90...(a)v25g2000yqk.googlegroups.com>, PD <thedraperfam...(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > ... > > > > > The theories are derived by the process of induction I described > > > > earlier. Please see my earlier note about this. > > > > I did see them and I commented on them. You are using the word induction > > > to wave at roughly *whatever scientists do* and that is not really > > > helpful. > > > > > From these theories, predictions are *deduced* from the models. > > > > > The experimental test involves neither deduction nor induction. It is > > > > a simple comparison -- the prediction and the measurement overlap or > > > > they don't. Period. > > > > No. Deduction is involved. If have the theory that my kettle will always > > > boil in under two minutes and I see it does not in certain conditions, > > > it is a deductive matter that the generalisation is false. > > > > > Note, however, that a favorable bit of experimental evidence does not > > > > allow you to *deduce* anything about the truth of the theory. You only > > > > have a bit of experimental support. In science, nothing is ever > > > > proven. In this sense, nothing is deductively certain, either. > > > > It is the nature of this support that I am interested in. The > > > traditional philosophical problem of induction in philosophy has been > > > the difficulties with the idea that more and more cases consistent with > > > a generalization go to more and more confirm that generalisation. I am > > > denying this. > > > Do you also deny the validity of statistics? > > Doesn't everyone! <g> > > Seriously, what is a statistical argument? If I say there are 50 red > balls in this bag and 50 of other colours, I might conclude that there > is a 50% chance of pulling out a red ball if one is blindfolded and > all the balls feel exactly the same. Is this a statistical argument? > Is this an inductive argument? It seems to me to be a very tightly > necessary argument at first sight! How can the conclusion ever be > shown to be false on the basis of the premises being true? > > Perhaps the red balls have an internal mechanism unknown to us and > they subtly cause hands to grab them in favour of other balls? But > that is another matter! Without any knowledge of these other things, > just on the evidence alone, the above 50% argument is pretty tight. > > So, here, I have no reason not to believe in *statistical arguments*. > But perhaps you mean something else? The example you gave was a probablistic argument, as is a coin toss or the roll of a couple of dice. A statistical argument is based on sampling. |