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From: John Jones on 21 Nov 2009 21:31 haiku jones wrote: > On Nov 17, 9:10 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: >> Marshall wrote: >>> On Nov 15, 11:45 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: >>>> Quantum mechanics employs everyday terms to support its mathematical >>>> structure. My complaint, a valid one, is that these terms are no longer >>>> employed with their standard meanings, thus making Quantum theory >>>> meaningfully vacuous. >>> That's obviously bullshit. >> It's obviously NOT. > > It obviously is. If I use the noun "set", it can mean > one thing to a mathematician, another thing to > a tennis pro, a third to a theatrical designer, > and a fourth to a dog breeder. Those are different signs. We are talking about using the smae sign to mean something else. which is an impossibility. you can't use the "same" sign in a non-standard way!
From: John Jones on 21 Nov 2009 21:34 haiku jones wrote: > On Nov 17, 9:10 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: >> Marshall wrote: >>> On Nov 15, 11:45 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: >>>> Quantum mechanics employs everyday terms to support its mathematical >>>> structure. My complaint, a valid one, is that these terms are no longer >>>> employed with their standard meanings, thus making Quantum theory >>>> meaningfully vacuous. >>> That's obviously bullshit. >> It's obviously NOT. It's self-evident. Look at it! am I talking to Mr. >> stupido? If you describe something in non-meaningful terms then it is >> meaningfully vacuous. Comprende? >> >>> If attempting to use a word in more than >>> one way were to be any impediment to meaning, then nothing >>> would mean anything. Every word is used more than one way; >> No. So far wrong it's a long time getting back. >> A word is a sign. The sign does not have a meaning. The meaning we >> 'give' the sign is nothing that the sign displays to us. > > Of course...and that in no way contradicts his assertion that > words can be given more than one meaning (and in English > at least, most are). A chemist and I can give "mole" one > meaning and a vertebrate biologist and I can give it another > meaning. And practitioners of each field would know what > I was talking about, know it to a degree of specificity > not usually found in casual conversation. > > > Haiku Jones > > But it's another thing to say that a meaning has been given a non-standard interpretation.
From: John Jones on 21 Nov 2009 21:38 James Burns wrote: > John Jones wrote: >> Jim Burns wrote: >>> tg wrote: >>>> On Nov 15, 3:24 pm, Jim Burns <burns...(a)osu.edu> wrote: >>>>> tg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I'm fascinated by JJ's ability to elicit responses >>>>>> with his language which closely approaches quantum >>>>>> randomness. However, there is a reasonable underlying >>>>>> language/philosophical question. >>>>> >>>>> I agree that these questions about quantum randomness >>>>> and others like them are reasonable. But the program of >>>>> consulting our intuition about their answers has expired, >>>>> has ceased to be: it is an ex-program. >>>>> >>>>> The assumptions of Bell's Theorem are that the >>>>> outcome of a quantum measurement is (i) determined >>>>> by properties of the particle and apparatus >>>>> (whether or not we can measure the properties >>>>> themselves), and (ii) /not/ affected by anything >>>>> that happens at some arbitrarily large distance >>>>> (which are often abbreviated as "local reality" >>>>> and may, for many purposes, be referred to as >>>>> "our intuition"). >>>>> >>>>> The theorem puts a limit on how strongly correlated >>>>> certain pairs of widely separated measurements >>>>> can be. Quantum mechanics claims that some of these >>>>> measurements will break those limits. It turns out >>>>> experimentally that quantum mechanics is right and >>>>> "local reality" (AKA "our intuition") is wrong. >>>>> >>>>>> We believe that there is no cause that can effect >>>>>> the lifetime of the decay of a particle. So it seems >>>>>> to me that we could attribute a label of >>>>>> 'hidden variable' to that information itself. IOW, >>>>>> while we do not claim a cause, we could argue that >>>>>> the lifetime could as easily be *determined* at the >>>>>> instant of creation of the particle as at the instant >>>>>> of decay. So there would be a piece of information >>>>>> about the particle which is inaccessible rather than >>>>>> non-existent. >>>>> >>>>> I'm afraid I don't find your description of this >>>>> whatever-it-is (that does not cause the particle's >>>>> decay but does determine it) to be very coherent. >>>> >>>> I wrote rather quickly but I thought it was >>>> understandable; let me try again: >>>> >>>> 1) I do not claim that something causes the >>>> particle's decay. >>>> >>>> 2) That nothing causes the particle's decay does >>>> not mean that the lifetime is not determined at the >>>> creation of the particle. By determined I only mean >>>> that it is inevitable, that there is nothing that >>>> can change it. >>> >>> Here is my understanding of /randomness/: the outcome of >>> an experiment (like rolling a die) is /random/ if, in all >>> the possible worlds that are /identical/, there is more >>> than one outcome (more than one face lands up). By >>> /identical/ I mean that /everything we know/ about >>> all the causal paths leading to our experimental >>> outcome is the same in each possible world. >>> >>> My understanding of /quantum randomness/ is that we >>> consider all the possible worlds where /everything/ >>> is identical, instead of /everything we know/, but >>> there is still more than one outcome of the experiment. >>> >>> I see two interpretations that you might intend (and >>> a third option -- that I just don't get it). >>> >>> (1) If we draw a box around the space-time just before >>> the decay of the atom, we can look at all the possible >>> worlds where the contents of the box is identical. >>> Because the decay of the atom has quantum randomness, >>> there are still different times of decay for the atom >>> in different possible worlds. HOWEVER, if we, in our >>> imaginations, mark the time of the decay on the box >>> (our hidden variable -- hidden because it plays no >>> part in the physics, being imaginary), then we can >>> further subdivide the possible worlds so that boxes >>> marked with the same time are grouped together. >>> Presto! The outcome is no longer random, because >>> these groups of possible worlds all have single outcomes >>> (the atom decays at the same time in each possible >>> world -- /within each subgroup/, that is). >>> >>> Under this view, I suppose there is no quantum >>> randomness, but there is no randomness either, >>> nor any probability except 0 and 100%. There are no >>> uncertain outcomes because every outcome will be what >>> it will be, tautologically. I don't know, but this >>> view may be logically consistent, but it seems to >>> me completely useless. It certainly isn't physics. >>> >>> (2) We have almost the same situation as before: >>> a box around the space-time just before the decay >>> of the atom, a collection of all the possible worlds >>> where the contents are identical. Except that, under >>> this view, in stead of marking the time of decay >>> on the outside of the box, it's placed inside the >>> box, inside a lockbox, let us say, so that we know >>> it can't be used in the processes leading to the outcome. >>> >>> I think this might qualify as a physical theory, >>> but this is also the sort of situation that >>> Bell's theorem applies to. It doesn't matter that >>> the decay time written inside the lockbox does >>> not participate. The theorem does not ask whether >>> a particular parameter /participates/, just as the >>> theorem does not ask whether /we know the value of/ a >>> particular parameter. >>> >>>> 3) If you believe that this would violate QM, >>>> then you should be able to describe a hypothetical >>>> experiment whose outcome would be different >>>> if my proposed conjecture is incorrect. >>> >>> I think the experimental verification of quantum mechanics >>> over local reality are what you are asking for. If you >>> are considering scenario 2 above, then you are trying >>> to fix local reality by partitioning the possible worlds >>> finely enough that the outcome appears non-random. >>> >>> I don't think local reality is fixable. >>> >>>> It seems to me that the best argument against >>>> what I am suggesting is that it is not parsimonious, >>>> but I'm not even sure that such a position holds up. >>>> As I said in the first place, this is a question >>>> of language and philosophy, not physics. I find >>>> the use of decay as the knee-jerk example to explain >>>> randomness to be facile. >>> >>> If what you describe is only a question of >>> language and philosophy, then maybe my first >>> interpretation is the correct one. If that is so, >>> then the point you are making is that it is >>> possible to change the meaning of >>> "quantum randomness" so that what you have >>> turned it into does not exist. >>> I don't find that a very interesting point. > >> YOu never read the original post did you. > > Would that be a problem for you? > I just assumed from your peculiar style that > you wanted to drive potential readers away. > > However, it just so happens that I did read your > original post, and my post just upthread serves as > my answer to you, possibly better than it did as an > answer to tg. > > Do you have any problems with my proposed definitions > of randomness and quantum randomness? No? > > Then, your "argument" is just the assertion > that if we knew everything about a quantum system, > then we would be able to predict with certainty > the outcome of quantum measurements. > > Yours is a coherent, sensible claim, that could > have turned out to be true. In fact, Einstein, > Podolsky,and Rosen expected it to turn out > to be true. However, it did not: your assertion > is false. That is why we have all this talk about > Bell's theorem and tests of quantum mechanics > against local reality. This is how we know your > assertion is false. > > By the way, I think I heard that John Bell himself > expected his theorem to prove EPR /right/. If the > unexpressed part of your argument is "You all > have to be wrong; that just doesn't make sense", > then you will have a lot of agreement on the second > part. Quantum mechanics does not make sense. > Nonetheless, quantum mechanics is right, and > the assumptions of local reality and you are wrong. > > Jim Burns I've lost the whole plot here. I can't find who said what or anything. > > > :What I am going to tell you about is what > :we teach our physics students in the third > :or fourth year of graduate school... It is > :my task to convince you not to turn away > :because you don't understand it. You see > :my physics students don't understand it. > :... That is because I don't understand it. > :Nobody does. > -- Richard P. Feynman, Nobel Lecture, 1966 >
From: spudnik on 21 Nov 2009 22:26 the problem with Podolsky, Rosen and Einstein, as refuted by the Aspect experiment & so forth, is that they require the "gedanken" part of it to be a photon; Young conclusively proved, a hundred years after Newton-the-quackologist squeezed-out a corpuscular "theory" of light, that *all* of lights essential properties are those of waves, with the sole exception of the photo-electical effect, when Moon hits your eye *like* pizza. and, all of the important work, by Huyghens, Fresnel, Fizzeau etc. etc. has only improved this comprehension, perhaps best *formulated* by Schroedinger (and, anyway, let us recall, that Newton merely algebraized Kepler's orbital constraints -- if he didn't steal it from Hooke, which he did). Newton's "theory" was probably about as important as Descartes ridicuulous explanation for the law of refraction (see l'Ouvre, below .-) > > By the way, I think I heard that John Bell himself > > expected his theorem to prove EPR /right/. If the > > :Nobody does. thus: dood said, Numbertheory; if you don't want to know that, you don't want to know any thing in science, vis-a-vu *mathematica* -- not the God-am programme of the Wolframites / KNU Kinda Science; see l'Ouvre, below! > You have a point of view Marxist, mine is Platonist. What is the thus: Lord Berty was quite an evil pacifist (see larouchepub.com), but he also made me realize that "silly" must be derived from syllogism; apparently, he was completely fried by Godel's thing, although Whitehead would not have been. > Gorgias lived 2400 years ago. Maybe Russel borrowed from him :) thus: I have always meant to study difference equations, alas. anyway, I never googol anything that I am dyscussing online, particualry when using the googol front-end for Usenet at some public terminal. I recently saw who owned altavista.com, but I forgot, though I've used it, when needed. > A new verb, "google," a synonym for search, has thus: the original poster had mentioned 754 and 854, which latter I'd seen mentioned, somewhere on the IEEE website, but I wasn't a member. anyway, 754 is an article in Computer (magazine), from 1980; its implimentation is quite variable, I think. anyone got a reference to link? > The current IEEE 754 standard is IEEE 754-2008. Last year, not a --l'Ouvre: www.wlym.com Stop the second cap & trade rip-off; install a tariff on imported oil -- dumb-*** "republicans R Them!"
From: John Jones on 21 Nov 2009 22:39
spudnik wrote: > the problem with Podolsky, Rosen and Einstein, > as refuted by the Aspect experiment & so forth, is that > they require the "gedanken" part of it to be a photon; > Young conclusively proved, a hundred years > after Newton-the-quackologist squeezed-out a corpuscular "theory" > of light, that *all* of lights essential properties are those > of waves, with the sole exception of the photo-electical effect, > when Moon hits your eye *like* pizza. and, all > of the important work, by Huyghens, Fresnel, Fizzeau etc. etc. has > only improved this comprehension, perhaps best *formulated* > by Schroedinger (and, anyway, let us recall, that > Newton merely algebraized Kepler's orbital constraints -- if > he didn't steal it from Hooke, which he did). > > Newton's "theory" was probably about as important > as Descartes ridicuulous explanation > for the law of refraction (see l'Ouvre, below .-) > >>> By the way, I think I heard that John Bell himself >>> expected his theorem to prove EPR /right/. If the > >>> :Nobody does. > > thus: > dood said, Numbertheory; > if you don't want to know that, you don't want to know any thing > in science, vis-a-vu *mathematica* -- > not the God-am programme of the Wolframites / KNU Kinda Science; > see l'Ouvre, below! > >> You have a point of view Marxist, mine is Platonist. What is the > > thus: > Lord Berty was quite an evil pacifist (see larouchepub.com), but > he also made me realize that "silly" must be derived from syllogism; > apparently, he was completely fried by Godel's thing, although > Whitehead would not have been. >> Gorgias lived 2400 years ago. Maybe Russel borrowed from him :) > > thus: > I have always meant to study difference equations, alas. anyway, > I never googol anything that I am dyscussing online, > particualry when using the googol front-end for Usenet > at some public terminal. I recently saw who owned altavista.com, but > I forgot, though I've used it, when needed. >> A new verb, "google," a synonym for search, has > > thus: > the original poster had mentioned 754 and 854, > which latter I'd seen mentioned, somewhere on the IEEE website, but > I wasn't a member. anyway, 754 is an article in Computer (magazine), > from 1980; its implimentation is quite variable, I think. > anyone got a reference to link? >> The current IEEE 754 standard is IEEE 754-2008. Last year, not a > > --l'Ouvre: www.wlym.com > Stop the second cap & trade rip-off; > install a tariff on imported oil -- dumb-*** "republicans R Them!" what |