From: John Jones on
haiku jones wrote:
> On Nov 17, 9:10 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> Marshall wrote:
>>> On Nov 15, 11:45 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>>>> Quantum mechanics employs everyday terms to support its mathematical
>>>> structure. My complaint, a valid one, is that these terms are no longer
>>>> employed with their standard meanings, thus making Quantum theory
>>>> meaningfully vacuous.
>>> That's obviously bullshit.
>> It's obviously NOT.
>
> It obviously is. If I use the noun "set", it can mean
> one thing to a mathematician, another thing to
> a tennis pro, a third to a theatrical designer,
> and a fourth to a dog breeder.

Those are different signs. We are talking about using the smae sign to
mean something else. which is an impossibility. you can't use the "same"
sign in a non-standard way!
From: John Jones on
haiku jones wrote:
> On Nov 17, 9:10 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> Marshall wrote:
>>> On Nov 15, 11:45 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>>>> Quantum mechanics employs everyday terms to support its mathematical
>>>> structure. My complaint, a valid one, is that these terms are no longer
>>>> employed with their standard meanings, thus making Quantum theory
>>>> meaningfully vacuous.
>>> That's obviously bullshit.
>> It's obviously NOT. It's self-evident. Look at it! am I talking to Mr.
>> stupido? If you describe something in non-meaningful terms then it is
>> meaningfully vacuous. Comprende?
>>
>>> If attempting to use a word in more than
>>> one way were to be any impediment to meaning, then nothing
>>> would mean anything. Every word is used more than one way;
>> No. So far wrong it's a long time getting back.
>> A word is a sign. The sign does not have a meaning. The meaning we
>> 'give' the sign is nothing that the sign displays to us.
>
> Of course...and that in no way contradicts his assertion that
> words can be given more than one meaning (and in English
> at least, most are). A chemist and I can give "mole" one
> meaning and a vertebrate biologist and I can give it another
> meaning. And practitioners of each field would know what
> I was talking about, know it to a degree of specificity
> not usually found in casual conversation.
>
>
> Haiku Jones
>
>

But it's another thing to say that a meaning has been given a
non-standard interpretation.
From: John Jones on
James Burns wrote:
> John Jones wrote:
>> Jim Burns wrote:
>>> tg wrote:
>>>> On Nov 15, 3:24 pm, Jim Burns <burns...(a)osu.edu> wrote:
>>>>> tg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm fascinated by JJ's ability to elicit responses
>>>>>> with his language which closely approaches quantum
>>>>>> randomness. However, there is a reasonable underlying
>>>>>> language/philosophical question.
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree that these questions about quantum randomness
>>>>> and others like them are reasonable. But the program of
>>>>> consulting our intuition about their answers has expired,
>>>>> has ceased to be: it is an ex-program.
>>>>>
>>>>> The assumptions of Bell's Theorem are that the
>>>>> outcome of a quantum measurement is (i) determined
>>>>> by properties of the particle and apparatus
>>>>> (whether or not we can measure the properties
>>>>> themselves), and (ii) /not/ affected by anything
>>>>> that happens at some arbitrarily large distance
>>>>> (which are often abbreviated as "local reality"
>>>>> and may, for many purposes, be referred to as
>>>>> "our intuition").
>>>>>
>>>>> The theorem puts a limit on how strongly correlated
>>>>> certain pairs of widely separated measurements
>>>>> can be. Quantum mechanics claims that some of these
>>>>> measurements will break those limits. It turns out
>>>>> experimentally that quantum mechanics is right and
>>>>> "local reality" (AKA "our intuition") is wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>>> We believe that there is no cause that can effect
>>>>>> the lifetime of the decay of a particle. So it seems
>>>>>> to me that we could attribute a label of
>>>>>> 'hidden variable' to that information itself. IOW,
>>>>>> while we do not claim a cause, we could argue that
>>>>>> the lifetime could as easily be *determined* at the
>>>>>> instant of creation of the particle as at the instant
>>>>>> of decay. So there would be a piece of information
>>>>>> about the particle which is inaccessible rather than
>>>>>> non-existent.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm afraid I don't find your description of this
>>>>> whatever-it-is (that does not cause the particle's
>>>>> decay but does determine it) to be very coherent.
>>>>
>>>> I wrote rather quickly but I thought it was
>>>> understandable; let me try again:
>>>>
>>>> 1) I do not claim that something causes the
>>>> particle's decay.
>>>>
>>>> 2) That nothing causes the particle's decay does
>>>> not mean that the lifetime is not determined at the
>>>> creation of the particle. By determined I only mean
>>>> that it is inevitable, that there is nothing that
>>>> can change it.
>>>
>>> Here is my understanding of /randomness/: the outcome of
>>> an experiment (like rolling a die) is /random/ if, in all
>>> the possible worlds that are /identical/, there is more
>>> than one outcome (more than one face lands up). By
>>> /identical/ I mean that /everything we know/ about
>>> all the causal paths leading to our experimental
>>> outcome is the same in each possible world.
>>>
>>> My understanding of /quantum randomness/ is that we
>>> consider all the possible worlds where /everything/
>>> is identical, instead of /everything we know/, but
>>> there is still more than one outcome of the experiment.
>>>
>>> I see two interpretations that you might intend (and
>>> a third option -- that I just don't get it).
>>>
>>> (1) If we draw a box around the space-time just before
>>> the decay of the atom, we can look at all the possible
>>> worlds where the contents of the box is identical.
>>> Because the decay of the atom has quantum randomness,
>>> there are still different times of decay for the atom
>>> in different possible worlds. HOWEVER, if we, in our
>>> imaginations, mark the time of the decay on the box
>>> (our hidden variable -- hidden because it plays no
>>> part in the physics, being imaginary), then we can
>>> further subdivide the possible worlds so that boxes
>>> marked with the same time are grouped together.
>>> Presto! The outcome is no longer random, because
>>> these groups of possible worlds all have single outcomes
>>> (the atom decays at the same time in each possible
>>> world -- /within each subgroup/, that is).
>>>
>>> Under this view, I suppose there is no quantum
>>> randomness, but there is no randomness either,
>>> nor any probability except 0 and 100%. There are no
>>> uncertain outcomes because every outcome will be what
>>> it will be, tautologically. I don't know, but this
>>> view may be logically consistent, but it seems to
>>> me completely useless. It certainly isn't physics.
>>>
>>> (2) We have almost the same situation as before:
>>> a box around the space-time just before the decay
>>> of the atom, a collection of all the possible worlds
>>> where the contents are identical. Except that, under
>>> this view, in stead of marking the time of decay
>>> on the outside of the box, it's placed inside the
>>> box, inside a lockbox, let us say, so that we know
>>> it can't be used in the processes leading to the outcome.
>>>
>>> I think this might qualify as a physical theory,
>>> but this is also the sort of situation that
>>> Bell's theorem applies to. It doesn't matter that
>>> the decay time written inside the lockbox does
>>> not participate. The theorem does not ask whether
>>> a particular parameter /participates/, just as the
>>> theorem does not ask whether /we know the value of/ a
>>> particular parameter.
>>>
>>>> 3) If you believe that this would violate QM,
>>>> then you should be able to describe a hypothetical
>>>> experiment whose outcome would be different
>>>> if my proposed conjecture is incorrect.
>>>
>>> I think the experimental verification of quantum mechanics
>>> over local reality are what you are asking for. If you
>>> are considering scenario 2 above, then you are trying
>>> to fix local reality by partitioning the possible worlds
>>> finely enough that the outcome appears non-random.
>>>
>>> I don't think local reality is fixable.
>>>
>>>> It seems to me that the best argument against
>>>> what I am suggesting is that it is not parsimonious,
>>>> but I'm not even sure that such a position holds up.
>>>> As I said in the first place, this is a question
>>>> of language and philosophy, not physics. I find
>>>> the use of decay as the knee-jerk example to explain
>>>> randomness to be facile.
>>>
>>> If what you describe is only a question of
>>> language and philosophy, then maybe my first
>>> interpretation is the correct one. If that is so,
>>> then the point you are making is that it is
>>> possible to change the meaning of
>>> "quantum randomness" so that what you have
>>> turned it into does not exist.
>>> I don't find that a very interesting point.
>
>> YOu never read the original post did you.
>
> Would that be a problem for you?
> I just assumed from your peculiar style that
> you wanted to drive potential readers away.
>
> However, it just so happens that I did read your
> original post, and my post just upthread serves as
> my answer to you, possibly better than it did as an
> answer to tg.
>
> Do you have any problems with my proposed definitions
> of randomness and quantum randomness? No?
>
> Then, your "argument" is just the assertion
> that if we knew everything about a quantum system,
> then we would be able to predict with certainty
> the outcome of quantum measurements.
>
> Yours is a coherent, sensible claim, that could
> have turned out to be true. In fact, Einstein,
> Podolsky,and Rosen expected it to turn out
> to be true. However, it did not: your assertion
> is false. That is why we have all this talk about
> Bell's theorem and tests of quantum mechanics
> against local reality. This is how we know your
> assertion is false.
>
> By the way, I think I heard that John Bell himself
> expected his theorem to prove EPR /right/. If the
> unexpressed part of your argument is "You all
> have to be wrong; that just doesn't make sense",
> then you will have a lot of agreement on the second
> part. Quantum mechanics does not make sense.
> Nonetheless, quantum mechanics is right, and
> the assumptions of local reality and you are wrong.
>
> Jim Burns

I've lost the whole plot here. I can't find who said what or anything.

>
>
> :What I am going to tell you about is what
> :we teach our physics students in the third
> :or fourth year of graduate school... It is
> :my task to convince you not to turn away
> :because you don't understand it. You see
> :my physics students don't understand it.
> :... That is because I don't understand it.
> :Nobody does.
> -- Richard P. Feynman, Nobel Lecture, 1966
>
From: spudnik on
the problem with Podolsky, Rosen and Einstein,
as refuted by the Aspect experiment & so forth, is that
they require the "gedanken" part of it to be a photon;
Young conclusively proved, a hundred years
after Newton-the-quackologist squeezed-out a corpuscular "theory"
of light, that *all* of lights essential properties are those
of waves, with the sole exception of the photo-electical effect,
when Moon hits your eye *like* pizza. and, all
of the important work, by Huyghens, Fresnel, Fizzeau etc. etc. has
only improved this comprehension, perhaps best *formulated*
by Schroedinger (and, anyway, let us recall, that
Newton merely algebraized Kepler's orbital constraints -- if
he didn't steal it from Hooke, which he did).

Newton's "theory" was probably about as important
as Descartes ridicuulous explanation
for the law of refraction (see l'Ouvre, below .-)

> > By the way, I think I heard that John Bell himself
> > expected his theorem to prove EPR /right/. If the

> > :Nobody does.

thus:
dood said, Numbertheory;
if you don't want to know that, you don't want to know any thing
in science, vis-a-vu *mathematica* --
not the God-am programme of the Wolframites / KNU Kinda Science;
see l'Ouvre, below!

> You have a point of view Marxist, mine is Platonist. What is the

thus:
Lord Berty was quite an evil pacifist (see larouchepub.com), but
he also made me realize that "silly" must be derived from syllogism;
apparently, he was completely fried by Godel's thing, although
Whitehead would not have been.
> Gorgias lived 2400 years ago. Maybe Russel borrowed from him :)

thus:
I have always meant to study difference equations, alas. anyway,
I never googol anything that I am dyscussing online,
particualry when using the googol front-end for Usenet
at some public terminal. I recently saw who owned altavista.com, but
I forgot, though I've used it, when needed.
> A new verb, "google," a synonym for search, has

thus:
the original poster had mentioned 754 and 854,
which latter I'd seen mentioned, somewhere on the IEEE website, but
I wasn't a member. anyway, 754 is an article in Computer (magazine),
from 1980; its implimentation is quite variable, I think.
anyone got a reference to link?
> The current IEEE 754 standard is IEEE 754-2008. Last year, not a

--l'Ouvre: www.wlym.com
Stop the second cap & trade rip-off;
install a tariff on imported oil -- dumb-*** "republicans R Them!"
From: John Jones on
spudnik wrote:
> the problem with Podolsky, Rosen and Einstein,
> as refuted by the Aspect experiment & so forth, is that
> they require the "gedanken" part of it to be a photon;
> Young conclusively proved, a hundred years
> after Newton-the-quackologist squeezed-out a corpuscular "theory"
> of light, that *all* of lights essential properties are those
> of waves, with the sole exception of the photo-electical effect,
> when Moon hits your eye *like* pizza. and, all
> of the important work, by Huyghens, Fresnel, Fizzeau etc. etc. has
> only improved this comprehension, perhaps best *formulated*
> by Schroedinger (and, anyway, let us recall, that
> Newton merely algebraized Kepler's orbital constraints -- if
> he didn't steal it from Hooke, which he did).
>
> Newton's "theory" was probably about as important
> as Descartes ridicuulous explanation
> for the law of refraction (see l'Ouvre, below .-)
>
>>> By the way, I think I heard that John Bell himself
>>> expected his theorem to prove EPR /right/. If the
>
>>> :Nobody does.
>
> thus:
> dood said, Numbertheory;
> if you don't want to know that, you don't want to know any thing
> in science, vis-a-vu *mathematica* --
> not the God-am programme of the Wolframites / KNU Kinda Science;
> see l'Ouvre, below!
>
>> You have a point of view Marxist, mine is Platonist. What is the
>
> thus:
> Lord Berty was quite an evil pacifist (see larouchepub.com), but
> he also made me realize that "silly" must be derived from syllogism;
> apparently, he was completely fried by Godel's thing, although
> Whitehead would not have been.
>> Gorgias lived 2400 years ago. Maybe Russel borrowed from him :)
>
> thus:
> I have always meant to study difference equations, alas. anyway,
> I never googol anything that I am dyscussing online,
> particualry when using the googol front-end for Usenet
> at some public terminal. I recently saw who owned altavista.com, but
> I forgot, though I've used it, when needed.
>> A new verb, "google," a synonym for search, has
>
> thus:
> the original poster had mentioned 754 and 854,
> which latter I'd seen mentioned, somewhere on the IEEE website, but
> I wasn't a member. anyway, 754 is an article in Computer (magazine),
> from 1980; its implimentation is quite variable, I think.
> anyone got a reference to link?
>> The current IEEE 754 standard is IEEE 754-2008. Last year, not a
>
> --l'Ouvre: www.wlym.com
> Stop the second cap & trade rip-off;
> install a tariff on imported oil -- dumb-*** "republicans R Them!"

what