From: tg on
On Nov 16, 12:49 pm, James Burns <burns...(a)osu.edu> wrote:
> tg wrote:
> > On Nov 16, 12:24 pm, James Burns <burns...(a)osu.edu> wrote:
>
> >>tg wrote:
>
> >> > Yeah, option 3, and I also think you have been over-consuming
> >> > caffeinated beverages or something. I always wonder about people who
> >> > can't read through a couple of short paragraphs before rambling on
> >> > with a reply that is nowhere near the point.
>
> >>All-righty, then. I'll give you the Reader's Digest version
> >>below.
>
> >>And here is the executive summary of the Reader's Digest version:
> >>You're wrong.
>
> > Makes my point. You can't make a clear statement of what I'm wrong
> > *about*, so you either throw up a lot of chaff and do a lot of hand-
> > waving, or do the indignation dodge.
>
> > If someone can describe an experiment to test my proposed conjecture,
> > I'm listening.
>
>  >>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem#Importance_of_the_theorem
>  >
>
>
>
> > -tg
>
> >>Jim Burns
>
> >>I wrote:
>
> >>>tg wrote:
>
> >>>>I'm fascinated by JJ's ability to elicit responses
> >>>>with his language which closely approaches quantum
> >>>>randomness. However, there is a reasonable underlying
> >>>>language/philosophical question.
>
> >>>I agree that these questions about quantum randomness
> >>>and others like them are reasonable. But the program of
> >>>consulting our intuition about their answers has expired,
> >>>has ceased to be: it is an ex-program.
> >>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem#Importance_of_the_theorem

zzzzzz..........
From: James Burns on
tg wrote:
> On Nov 17, 3:00 pm, James Burns <burns...(a)osu.edu> wrote:
>
> ****
>
>>This is not the sort of situation which we can use to
>>test local reality vs. quantum mechanics using Bell's
>>theorem.
>
> Very good.
>
>>Those situations involve entangled pairs of
>>particles being measured at macroscopically separated
>>locations. However, I have already explained once why
>>the collapse of local reality in those other situations
>>is still bad news for local reality in this situation.
>
> No, I don't think so. 'Bad news' is not a sufficient
> characterization in science or philosophy.

What, people don't speak informally in philosophy,
expecting others to fill in the formalities for themselves?
How odd. They certainly do in the sciences.

The bad news is that you cannot assume the constraints
of local reality will hold for a decaying atom, because
they have been shown not to hold for entangled pairs of
particles.

My original justification for extending the implications
of Bell's theorem from entangled pairs of particles to
individual decaying atoms was that this is just how science
works. We generalize to the greatest extent we can when
we theorize, and then use the contradictions from
experiment to drive the next cycle of theorizing.
The maximal generalizing is important because we /want/
contradictions -- or "new" contradictions, at least.
An argument could be made that, if we are not getting
contradictions of theory from our experiments, then we
are not learning anything we didn't already know.

I suppose maximal generalization is "merely" a
methodological concern, but that methodology is more firmly
embedded in the sciences than any theory you could name.

However, it occurs to me that I'm holding this thing the
wrong way around. The tests of various Bell inequalities
do not /validate/ any particular theory. What they do
is /invalidate/ the entire class of hidden-variable theories.

You think that you may have a hidden-variable
theory that side-steps the usual Bell-centric issues.

It's /your/ theory, so /you/ get to explain what the
difference is between decaying atoms and entangled
pairs of particles. Your theory seems to be "Let's
hide the outcome of the quantum measurement (the time
of decay of the atom) somewhere inside the atom
and let that determine the time of decay." How does
this generalize to spin measurements of entangled particles?
The obvious way is to say all quantum measurement
outcomes are somewhere in the quantum system, but
then the predictions for entangled pairs will be
bounded by Bell's theorem and definitely inconsistent
with experiment. Do you refuse to generalize? Then
you must explain why your theory applies in one place
and not another. This is /required/ for what you might
consider methodological reasons: if researchers cannot
answer questions like that from your description of
your new theory, then they will have to seek you out
and ask "Does it apply here?" every time they find
themselves in a novel situation. This is unworkable.

[...]
> But I thought that's what you just did---you
> translated my problem into the language of QM,
> which I appreciate. We are not looking for
> equations here but clear language and reasoning,
> so we can consider the philosophical implications,
> if any. You have framed this situation as follows:
>
> *The lifetime of the particle is dependent on its
> quantum state.*
>
> If that's correct, then we have a variable that
> determines the lifetime of the particle, correct?

I would agree with the starred statement, but I want to
be sure you mean the same thing by "lifetime" as I do.

The lifetime I am talking about is NOT how long any
particular atom lives, from creation to decay.
It is a parameter for a probability distribution
that permits us to calculate the probability of a
certain number of these atoms decaying with a
certain period of time, or the probability of
one particular atom decaying within a certain period
of time, or many other things. But it will not give
a guarantee of the time the atom will decay.

I confess, I do not see the connection to your
original idea.

Jim Burns

From: John Jones on
Marshall wrote:
> On Nov 15, 11:40 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> Virgil wrote:
>>
>>> One normally asserts something in words.
>> But without position and momentum there is nothing substantial to assert.
>
> I question this: you yourself take a position, and you
> post so much as to have a certain momentum, and yet
> you still have nothing substantial to assert.
>
>
> Marshall

Does that merit a woof? I don't think so.
From: John Jones on
Herman Rubin wrote:
> In article <hdns88$77r$1(a)news.eternal-september.org>,
> John Jones <jonescardiff(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> Herman Rubin wrote:
>>> In article <hdkfq3$kp3$2(a)news.eternal-september.org>,
>>> John Jones <jonescardiff(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>>>> *Anarcissie* wrote:
>>>>> On Nov 13, 11:16 am, John Stafford <n...(a)droffats.net> wrote:
>>>>>> In article <hdjs2g$tb...(a)news.eternal-september.org>,
>>>>>> John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> ................
>
>>>>> It was my understanding that the hidden-variable thing had
>>>>> been pretty well disposed of a long time ago.
>>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hidden_variable_theory
>
>>> The hidden variable theory is not compatible with the properties
>>> of the wave function usually used in quantum mechanics.
>
>>>>> Of course, I suppose it could be like the gods. We don't
>>>>> see any, but there might be one under the bed when we're
>>>>> not looking. Same with hidden variables, I imagine.
>
>>>> A hidden variable is the only possibility in QM. If there is nothing
>>>> there then there is no outcome. If there is something there then it is
>>>> hidden.
>
>>> Observed outcomes behave like probability.
>
>> Then you assert that appearance itself has degrees of appearance. I
>> already said that this was not an adequate response.
>
>>> If hidden variables
>>> would explain the situation, there would be a joint distribution
>>> of position and momentum. It is easy to give examples where
>>> this joint distribution does not exist, since probabilities have
>>> to be non-negative.
>
>> If position and momentum are not players on the field, then how does one
>> assert something?
>
> Many have tried to come up with a good answer. I gave a
> simple counterexample to the possibility of a joint distribution
> more than 50 years ago; all one has to do is to consider the
> wave function of one of them as constant on a finite interval.
>
> This lack of a joint distribution is a problem in understanding,
> but not a problem in computation.
>
> A similar problem is that of the multi-slit experiment. If one
> knows which slit, the distribution is totally unlike the very
> useful observed distribution.

"Joint distribution" needs to say more than what the technical or
immediately semantically available implies.

What I am saying is that this term needs sounding out. You must provide
it with a foundation, just as I provided a foundation for my own
observations.
From: John Jones on
Marshall wrote:
> On Nov 15, 11:45 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote:
>> Quantum mechanics employs everyday terms to support its mathematical
>> structure. My complaint, a valid one, is that these terms are no longer
>> employed with their standard meanings, thus making Quantum theory
>> meaningfully vacuous.
>
> That's obviously bullshit.

It's obviously NOT. It's self-evident. Look at it! am I talking to Mr.
stupido? If you describe something in non-meaningful terms then it is
meaningfully vacuous. Comprende?


> If attempting to use a word in more than
> one way were to be any impediment to meaning, then nothing
> would mean anything. Every word is used more than one way;

No. So far wrong it's a long time getting back.
A word is a sign. The sign does not have a meaning. The meaning we
'give' the sign is nothing that the sign displays to us.


> some words are used dozens if not hundreds of different ways.
> Hell, *every* field of human endeavor uses everyday terms
> in idiomatic ways.
>
> The closest true thing to what you wrote above is that if one
> enters a new field, one has to learn the field-specific meanings
> for its terms, and that can confuse the ignorant and the
> indolent. (Since you're both, this is a particularly heavy
> burden in your case.)
>
> Bleah, I'm replying seriously to a troll; I need to go
> wash my hands.
>
>
> Marshall

And how many on the other side feel sick?