Radioactive decay and the myth of randomness
in [Logic]
|
Prev: Can we predict the outcome of a tossed coin?
Next: group of formal differences vs. Grothendieck group
From: haiku jones on 18 Nov 2009 09:04 On Nov 17, 9:11 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: > haiku jones wrote: > > On Nov 15, 2:13 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: > >> Jim Burns wrote: > >>> tg wrote: > >>>> I'm fascinated by JJ's ability to elicit responses > >>>> with his language which closely approaches quantum > >>>> randomness. However, there is a reasonable underlying > >>>> language/philosophical question. > >>> I agree that these questions about quantum randomness > >>> and others like them are reasonable. But the program of > >>> consulting our intuition about their answers has expired, > >>> has ceased to be: it is an ex-program. > >>> The assumptions of Bell's Theorem are that the > >>> outcome of a quantum measurement is (i) determined > >>> by properties of the particle and apparatus > >>> (whether or not we can measure the properties > >>> themselves), and (ii) /not/ affected by anything > >>> that happens at some arbitrarily large distance > >>> (which are often abbreviated as "local reality" > >>> and may, for many purposes, be referred to as > >>> "our intuition"). > >>> The theorem puts a limit on how strongly correlated > >>> certain pairs of widely separated measurements > >>> can be. Quantum mechanics claims that some of these > >>> measurements will break those limits. It turns out > >>> experimentally that quantum mechanics is right and > >>> "local reality" (AKA "our intuition") is wrong. > >>>> We believe that there is no cause that can effect > >>>> the lifetime of the decay of a particle. So it seems > >>>> to me that we could attribute a label of > >>>> 'hidden variable' to that information itself. IOW, > >>>> while we do not claim a cause, we could argue that > >>>> the lifetime could as easily be *determined* at the > >>>> instant of creation of the particle as at the instant > >>>> of decay. So there would be a piece of information > >>>> about the particle which is inaccessible rather than > >>>> non-existent. > >>> I'm afraid I don't find your description of this > >>> whatever-it-is (that does not cause the particle's > >>> decay but does determine it) to be very coherent. > >>> If the time of the decay of the particle is a function > >>> of this 'hidden variable', then the conditions > >>> of Bell's Theorem are met and there is a limit on > >>> correlations between widely separated measurements > >>> which is at least sometimes broken by our measurements. > >>> I take this to mean that there is, in fact, no such > >>> hidden variable, whether or not we can access it. > >>> Someone might object that we don't know that the > >>> results of the intuition-destroying experiments > >>> apply to decaying atoms as well as pairs of > >>> gamma rays. Personally, I find experimental > >>> results that dodge our constraints but only > >>> when we can't see them doing so to be considerably > >>> less intuitive than the loss of local reality. > >>> Perhaps a better answer would be to point out > >>> that the way physics proceeds, the way science > >>> proceeds is to generalize alleged laws to the > >>> utmost extent ("Energy is conserved everywhere > >>> in the universe.") and then wait for contradictions > >>> to pour in from the experimentalists. ("But, wait! > >>> I've got some radium that behaves very oddly.") > >>> Is there some contradiction, some troubling > >>> experimental result that makes it necessary to > >>> suppose there is this 'hidden variable'? > >>> Jim Burns > >>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem#Importance_of_the_theorem > >> The idea of a hidden variable is a grammatical consequence of any > >> quantum theory, as I argued. > > > Alas, the universe disagrees. > > > Fine. Oh great. I'll tell my mum. Better yet, write it up for _Annalen der Physik_. Convince the readers of that rag, and there's a Nobel Prize in it for you. Guaranteed. Haiku Jones
From: haiku jones on 18 Nov 2009 09:18 On Nov 17, 9:10 pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: > Marshall wrote: > > On Nov 15, 11:45 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: > >> Quantum mechanics employs everyday terms to support its mathematical > >> structure. My complaint, a valid one, is that these terms are no longer > >> employed with their standard meanings, thus making Quantum theory > >> meaningfully vacuous. > > > That's obviously bullshit. > > It's obviously NOT. It's self-evident. Look at it! am I talking to Mr. > stupido? If you describe something in non-meaningful terms then it is > meaningfully vacuous. Comprende? > > > If attempting to use a word in more than > > one way were to be any impediment to meaning, then nothing > > would mean anything. Every word is used more than one way; > > No. So far wrong it's a long time getting back. > A word is a sign. The sign does not have a meaning. The meaning we > 'give' the sign is nothing that the sign displays to us. Of course...and that in no way contradicts his assertion that words can be given more than one meaning (and in English at least, most are). A chemist and I can give "mole" one meaning and a vertebrate biologist and I can give it another meaning. And practitioners of each field would know what I was talking about, know it to a degree of specificity not usually found in casual conversation. Haiku Jones > > > some words are used dozens if not hundreds of different ways. > > Hell, *every* field of human endeavor uses everyday terms > > in idiomatic ways. > > > The closest true thing to what you wrote above is that if one > > enters a new field, one has to learn the field-specific meanings > > for its terms, and that can confuse the ignorant and the > > indolent. (Since you're both, this is a particularly heavy > > burden in your case.) > > > Bleah, I'm replying seriously to a troll; I need to go > > wash my hands. > > > Marshall > > And how many on the other side feel sick?
From: Christopher A. Lee on 18 Nov 2009 09:22 On Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:02:48 -0800 (PST), haiku jones <575jones(a)gmail.com> wrote: >On Nov 17, 9:10�pm, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: >> Marshall wrote: >> > On Nov 15, 11:45 am, John Jones <jonescard...(a)btinternet.com> wrote: >> >> Quantum mechanics employs everyday terms to support its mathematical >> >> structure. My complaint, a valid one, is that these terms are no longer >> >> employed with their standard meanings, thus making Quantum theory >> >> meaningfully vacuous. >> >> > That's obviously bullshit. >> >> It's obviously NOT. > >It obviously is. If I use the noun "set", it can mean >one thing to a mathematician, another thing to >a tennis pro, a third to a theatrical designer, >and a fourth to a dog breeder. None of >these is "meaningfully vacuous", you just have >to derive the current meaning from the current >context -- something speakers of English do >all day long, generally effortlessly, unless they >happen to wander into an area in which they >are technically ignorant. Like Christians telling atheists what our POV "really" is. Which isn't just ignorant, it's arrogant and sociopathic. >Haiku Jones
From: James Burns on 18 Nov 2009 10:18 John Jones wrote: > Jim Burns wrote: >> tg wrote: >>> On Nov 15, 3:24 pm, Jim Burns <burns...(a)osu.edu> wrote: >>>> tg wrote: >>>> >>>>> I'm fascinated by JJ's ability to elicit responses >>>>> with his language which closely approaches quantum >>>>> randomness. However, there is a reasonable underlying >>>>> language/philosophical question. >>>> >>>> I agree that these questions about quantum randomness >>>> and others like them are reasonable. But the program of >>>> consulting our intuition about their answers has expired, >>>> has ceased to be: it is an ex-program. >>>> >>>> The assumptions of Bell's Theorem are that the >>>> outcome of a quantum measurement is (i) determined >>>> by properties of the particle and apparatus >>>> (whether or not we can measure the properties >>>> themselves), and (ii) /not/ affected by anything >>>> that happens at some arbitrarily large distance >>>> (which are often abbreviated as "local reality" >>>> and may, for many purposes, be referred to as >>>> "our intuition"). >>>> >>>> The theorem puts a limit on how strongly correlated >>>> certain pairs of widely separated measurements >>>> can be. Quantum mechanics claims that some of these >>>> measurements will break those limits. It turns out >>>> experimentally that quantum mechanics is right and >>>> "local reality" (AKA "our intuition") is wrong. >>>> >>>>> We believe that there is no cause that can effect >>>>> the lifetime of the decay of a particle. So it seems >>>>> to me that we could attribute a label of >>>>> 'hidden variable' to that information itself. IOW, >>>>> while we do not claim a cause, we could argue that >>>>> the lifetime could as easily be *determined* at the >>>>> instant of creation of the particle as at the instant >>>>> of decay. So there would be a piece of information >>>>> about the particle which is inaccessible rather than >>>>> non-existent. >>>> >>>> I'm afraid I don't find your description of this >>>> whatever-it-is (that does not cause the particle's >>>> decay but does determine it) to be very coherent. >>> >>> I wrote rather quickly but I thought it was >>> understandable; let me try again: >>> >>> 1) I do not claim that something causes the >>> particle's decay. >>> >>> 2) That nothing causes the particle's decay does >>> not mean that the lifetime is not determined at the >>> creation of the particle. By determined I only mean >>> that it is inevitable, that there is nothing that >>> can change it. >> >> Here is my understanding of /randomness/: the outcome of >> an experiment (like rolling a die) is /random/ if, in all >> the possible worlds that are /identical/, there is more >> than one outcome (more than one face lands up). By >> /identical/ I mean that /everything we know/ about >> all the causal paths leading to our experimental >> outcome is the same in each possible world. >> >> My understanding of /quantum randomness/ is that we >> consider all the possible worlds where /everything/ >> is identical, instead of /everything we know/, but >> there is still more than one outcome of the experiment. >> >> I see two interpretations that you might intend (and >> a third option -- that I just don't get it). >> >> (1) If we draw a box around the space-time just before >> the decay of the atom, we can look at all the possible >> worlds where the contents of the box is identical. >> Because the decay of the atom has quantum randomness, >> there are still different times of decay for the atom >> in different possible worlds. HOWEVER, if we, in our >> imaginations, mark the time of the decay on the box >> (our hidden variable -- hidden because it plays no >> part in the physics, being imaginary), then we can >> further subdivide the possible worlds so that boxes >> marked with the same time are grouped together. >> Presto! The outcome is no longer random, because >> these groups of possible worlds all have single outcomes >> (the atom decays at the same time in each possible >> world -- /within each subgroup/, that is). >> >> Under this view, I suppose there is no quantum >> randomness, but there is no randomness either, >> nor any probability except 0 and 100%. There are no >> uncertain outcomes because every outcome will be what >> it will be, tautologically. I don't know, but this >> view may be logically consistent, but it seems to >> me completely useless. It certainly isn't physics. >> >> (2) We have almost the same situation as before: >> a box around the space-time just before the decay >> of the atom, a collection of all the possible worlds >> where the contents are identical. Except that, under >> this view, in stead of marking the time of decay >> on the outside of the box, it's placed inside the >> box, inside a lockbox, let us say, so that we know >> it can't be used in the processes leading to the outcome. >> >> I think this might qualify as a physical theory, >> but this is also the sort of situation that >> Bell's theorem applies to. It doesn't matter that >> the decay time written inside the lockbox does >> not participate. The theorem does not ask whether >> a particular parameter /participates/, just as the >> theorem does not ask whether /we know the value of/ a >> particular parameter. >> >>> 3) If you believe that this would violate QM, >>> then you should be able to describe a hypothetical >>> experiment whose outcome would be different >>> if my proposed conjecture is incorrect. >> >> I think the experimental verification of quantum mechanics >> over local reality are what you are asking for. If you >> are considering scenario 2 above, then you are trying >> to fix local reality by partitioning the possible worlds >> finely enough that the outcome appears non-random. >> >> I don't think local reality is fixable. >> >>> It seems to me that the best argument against >>> what I am suggesting is that it is not parsimonious, >>> but I'm not even sure that such a position holds up. >>> As I said in the first place, this is a question >>> of language and philosophy, not physics. I find >>> the use of decay as the knee-jerk example to explain >>> randomness to be facile. >> >> If what you describe is only a question of >> language and philosophy, then maybe my first >> interpretation is the correct one. If that is so, >> then the point you are making is that it is >> possible to change the meaning of >> "quantum randomness" so that what you have >> turned it into does not exist. >> I don't find that a very interesting point. > YOu never read the original post did you. Would that be a problem for you? I just assumed from your peculiar style that you wanted to drive potential readers away. However, it just so happens that I did read your original post, and my post just upthread serves as my answer to you, possibly better than it did as an answer to tg. Do you have any problems with my proposed definitions of randomness and quantum randomness? No? Then, your "argument" is just the assertion that if we knew everything about a quantum system, then we would be able to predict with certainty the outcome of quantum measurements. Yours is a coherent, sensible claim, that could have turned out to be true. In fact, Einstein, Podolsky,and Rosen expected it to turn out to be true. However, it did not: your assertion is false. That is why we have all this talk about Bell's theorem and tests of quantum mechanics against local reality. This is how we know your assertion is false. By the way, I think I heard that John Bell himself expected his theorem to prove EPR /right/. If the unexpressed part of your argument is "You all have to be wrong; that just doesn't make sense", then you will have a lot of agreement on the second part. Quantum mechanics does not make sense. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics is right, and the assumptions of local reality and you are wrong. Jim Burns :What I am going to tell you about is what :we teach our physics students in the third :or fourth year of graduate school... It is :my task to convince you not to turn away :because you don't understand it. You see :my physics students don't understand it. :... That is because I don't understand it. :Nobody does. -- Richard P. Feynman, Nobel Lecture, 1966
From: Jesse F. Hughes on 18 Nov 2009 10:35
David C. Ullrich <dullrich(a)sprynet.com> writes: [To John Jones] > Sometimes you seem stupid. Yeah, sometimes. -- Jesse F. Hughes "I love Mathematics[...] She doesn't care about my feelings, or my pride or how I so wish to get out and travel. Truth is truth, and anything else is just plain wrong." -- James Harris, /A Love Story/ |