Free will
in [Lisp]
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From: Don Geddis on 24 May 2010 23:49 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote on Mon, 24 May 2010: > I'm deeply suspicious of many worlds [in quantum mechanics] on Occam's > Razor grounds You're mistaken to believe that Many Worlds is in conflict with Occam's Razor. If you wish to learn more, you could try reading http://lesswrong.com/lw/q3/decoherence_is_simple/ Near the beginning it suggests a version of your claim: The Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics postulates that there are vast numbers of other worlds, existing alongside our own. Occam's Razor says we should not multiply entities unnecessarily. The entire rest of the post debunks that apparent conflict. The concluding paragraph is: The notion that decoherent worlds are additional entities penalized by Occam's Razor, is just plain mistaken. It is not sort-of-right. It is not an argument that is weak but still valid. It is not a defensible position that could be shored up with further arguments. It is entirely defective as probability theory. It is not fixable. It is bad math. 2 + 2 = 3. _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org Science has proof without any certainty. Creationists have certainty without any proof. -- Ashley Montague
From: Don Geddis on 24 May 2010 23:30 Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavallaro(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote on Mon, 24 May 2010: > You believe we can define science in such a way that it can be > conducted by AIs or zombies. Such a definition (apart from being > factually unsubstantiated) is a reductio ad absurdum because it is > forced to conclude that subjective experience either: > a: doesn't really exist at all (e.g., Dennett) That's not what Dennett believes at all. A more careful statement would be: subjective experience is "real"; AIs (will) have it too; and "zombies" are a logical contradiction (and thus not physically possible). > b: is non-physical (e.g., Chalmers, and a conclusion you consider > possible). Chalmers is an idiot. No, no, don't bother. I can already imagine your mocking reply. Why should you believe me, over a guy who has actually published professional articles? Nonetheless, it's true. _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org I'm not sure I believe everything in the Bible. But I think I would believe if I opened it and found, say, a fifty-dollar bill, if you get my drift. -- Deep Thoughts, by Jack Handey [1999]
From: Don Geddis on 25 May 2010 00:10 Nick Keighley <nick_keighley_nospam(a)hotmail.com> wrote on Mon, 24 May 2010: > the godelerisation of the human will! > Turings result applied to the soul. What great phrases! I love the analogies. Yes, of course, you're exactly right. That's precisely what I meant to communicate. _______________________________________________________________________________ Don Geddis http://don.geddis.org/ don(a)geddis.org A polar bear is a rectangular bear after a coordinate transform.
From: Vend on 25 May 2010 04:28 On 24 Mag, 07:08, Raffael Cavallaro <raffaelcavall...(a)pas.despam.s.il.vous.plait.mac.com> wrote: > On 2010-05-23 23:47:17 -0400, Don Geddis said: > > > I really don't think your strawman is as mainstream as you believe. > > Well, we haven't even started counting Islam, Hinduism, and other > religions that believe in a non-physical, immortal soul. I think you > wildly underestimate the proportion of humanity that believes they > themselves are, in essence, non-physical. They attribute their free > will to this non-physical soul/atman or whatever their tradition calls > it, not physics, deterministic or otherwise. Soul and free will are not equivalent. Calvinists, for instance, believe in soul but not in free will.
From: Nick Keighley on 25 May 2010 06:41
On 24 May, 23:50, RG <rNOSPA...(a)flownet.com> wrote: > In article <hteltn$ep...(a)news.eternal-september.org>, > Raffael Cavallaro > > While an AI scientist remains purely hypothetical > > Wait a couple of years. "By 1985, machines will be capable of doing any work that a man can do" Herbert Simon 1965 |